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THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STATES:
PREEMPTION AND THE SECOND
TWENTIETH CENTURY REVOLUTION IN
THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE
HENRY H. DR UMMONDS*
In this Article, Professor Drummonds examines the division of work-
place regulatory authority between the states and the federal govern-
ment. The Article first explores the decline of the New Deal system of
collective bargaining and reviews the debates ignited by this decline. It
then reviews the role of state law in regulating the workplace, and illus-
trates the complex relationship between federal and state law in the
workplace by examining reductions in coverage for AIDS in employer-
provided group medical plans. The Article sets forth a framework and
theory for deciding federal-state authority issues. It analyzes traditional
preemption doctrine and recent Supreme Court decisions outside of la-
bor and employment law, and then applies these lessons to preemption
doctrine in employment law, urging congressional revision of ERISA's
preemption provisions, and judicial abrogation of current Federal Arbi-
tration Act preemption doctrine The Article concludes by recom-
mending major revisions in the primary preemption doctrines that
evolved out of the New Deal-era statutes concerning unionized
employees.
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INTRODUCTION
r1HIS Article examines the division of workplace regulatory authority
X between the sister sovereigns' and the federal government.2 Under
1. Some of my colleagues have expressed irritation over the use of the phrase "sister
sovereigns" in this Article. I use the phrase as a synonym for "states" for three reasons.
First, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the status of the states as "sister
sovereigns" in its federalism decisions during the past two terms. See, eg., New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-18 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S. Ct. 2395,
2399 (1991). Second, the phrase focuses attention on the unique status of the states under
the United States Constitution. Third, the language used in political and legal discourse
not only reflects a political/legal culture, but helps shape it. Thus, "sister sovereigns"
neatly summarizes this Article's thesis-that the states traditionally have played, and
should continue to play, a primary role in governing the workplace.
2. The division of governmental powers between the center and the constituent parts
of a political union constitutes a fundamental problem of political philosophy. See gener-
ally The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 50, 51 (James Madison) (illustrat-
ing importance Founders placed on the division of authority between the federal and
state governments during the constitutional debate); Laurence H. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 5-1 to § 6-35, at 297-545 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing conflict between
federal legislative authority and state sovereignty and limitations on state and local
power). Recent events in the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, India, and Canada illus-
trate that the problem is not uniquely American. See, eg., Alma E. Hill, New Policy for
the Later Yugoslavia, Atlanta J. & Const., Dec. 28, 1991, at A18 (commenting on Yugo-
slavia's disintegration and the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia); Martin W.G. King,
1993]
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the modem Commerce Clause and Civil War Amendments, Congress
possesses broad powers to regulate most aspects of the employment rela-
tionship.3 In deciding whether to regulate that relationship, Congress
also must decide whether to make federal regulation exclusive or, in-
stead, to allow the states continued regulatory4 authority consistent with
minimum federal standards. This decision-whether federal law should
preempt state law-shapes the contours of labor and employment law.
Indeed, it often decisively determines the legal rights and duties of em-
ployees, employers, and unions. Not surprisingly, lawyers increasingly
debate preemption issues in the courts.'
Because labor and employment law6 developed piecemeal over de-
cades, its component parts often were the product of ad hoc policy-mak-
ing. As a result, commentators and judges typically fail to relate
particular disputes to the larger, complex system that now governs the
workplace. Instead, there are Title VII disputes, ERISA disputes, union
activity disputes, whistleblowing disputes, and so forth. Little attention
is paid to how the many parts of the American law of the workplace fit
together. This Article analyzes preemption doctrines in labor and em-
ployment law as part of this larger, now-emerged system.7
Will Troubled Canada Be The Next Union To Crumble?, Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 26, 1992,
at HI (describing Quebec's threat to secede from Canada); William H. McNeill, Peasants,
Politics, and Television: Behind the Global Turmoil Is A Clash Of Ancient Folkways and
Mass Communications, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1990, at Cl (commenting on the decentrali-
zation of governmental power through the politicization of the peasantry).
3. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 308-10 (discussing interpretation of modern Commerce
Clause), 481-82 (discussing use of Civil War Amendments as tool for superseding "state
action" with federal labor legislation).
4. In this Article, the terms "regulatory" and "regulation" refer to any governmen-
tal intervention in the labor markets. Such regulatory intervention includes administra-
tive regulation, legislative enactments, constitutional rights adjudications, and common
law legal developments.
5. See infra part IV.A.
6. In this Article, the term "labor law" refers to legal regulations concerning the
organizing of unions, collective bargaining, strikes, boycotts, collective bargaining agree-
ments, and judicial intervention in collective labor disputes. The term "employment law"
refers to all other labor market regulation, including non-discrimination statutes, wage
and hour rules, child labor regulations, common law wrongful discharge and other tort
doctrines affecting the workplace, statutes and administrative regulations addressing
workplace safety and worker injury/occupational disease, pension and benefit plan regu-
lation, plant closure laws, and legal rules affecting family and privacy.
7. Several recent works propose changes in labor and employment preemption doc-
trine on a narrower basis. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Pre-
emption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 355 (1990) (proposing
the reform of labor preemption in order to facilitate collective bargaining); Eileen Silver-
stein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (arguing for a floor of
federally protected rights that states should not diminish); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights
and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575 (1992) (arguing
that the individual rights model of employment relations does not provide an adequate
substitute for collective bargaining because individual claims often are deemed preempted
by collective bargaining agreements). While I agree with much of what these writers say
in the narrower context, the approach followed in this Article develops a framework for
[Vol. 62
1993] THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STATES
As developed in Part I,' beyond the sheer number of cases in the
courts, several developments have converged to make a review of pre-
emption in labor and employment law timely. Part L.A reviews the
revolution that has occurred in the law of the American workplace dur-
ing the past quarter-century. Many legal rules changed, and there now
are more rules governing workplace relationships than ever before. But
not only the rules changed, the method for making and enforcing legally
binding terms of employment for most employees also changed. The col-
lapse of the New Deal-era system of collective bargaining by unions in
private-sector employment9 and the simultaneous rise of a jurisprudence
of individual workplace rights fundamentally has limited private-order-
ing as the governing mechanism for setting the terms of private employ-
ment.10 While much private-ordering of workplace relationships
remains, socially-conferred, rather than bargained-for, rights now domi-
nate the landscape of employment law. This raises a fundamental ques-
tion: who should make the social and regulatory judgments that
determine whether a workplace right is to be socially conferred? More
fundamentally, in the continuing search for the optimum mix of free
market and regulatory policies, who should make the judgment to in-
trude, or not to intrude, upon the workings of the labor markets? As
all areas of labor and employment law preemption and, indeed, for preemption issues
outside of labor law.
8. See infra part I.
9. See infra part I.A. Significantly, the number of public sector union members in-
creased rapidly in this same 25 year period, while the number of private sector union
members declined. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46. Much of this public-sector
expansion occurred under governing state, rather than federal, labor relations statutes.
An exception is federal civil service employment, which now is governed by the Federal
Labor Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). Many commenta-
tors have noted the vastly different experiences of private and public sector unions. See,
e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 616 (1990)
(book review) ("The public sector has come to rival, if not surpass, the private union
sector in setting the terms and conditions of the current labor market.")
10. Many writers have noted the shift from collective bargaining to individual rights.
See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 9-15 (1990) (tracing the decline of
collective bargaining and offering explanations for it); Joseph R. Grodin, Past. Present
and Future in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 Lab. Law. 97 (1990) (comparing the shift
from collective bargaining to a tendency towards adopting a European model of wrongful
termination law in which the role of the state is to provide certain basic protections to
workers); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half
Century, 61 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 631, 635-45 (citing several reasons for the diminished role
of unions and collective bargaining) (1985); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Cen-
tury Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 7, 10-12 (1988) (describing the
move from collective bargaining toward prescribing minimum rights and terms of em-
ployment by law). As Professor Grodin aptly describes it:
I have observed at close range the gradual but ineluctable transition of our legal
system away from the characteristically American model in which the role of
the state is simply to establish a structure within which collective bargaining
may occur, toward the characteristically European model, in which the role of
the state is to provide certain basic protections to employees; in short, from
process to values.
Grodin, supra, at 97.
474 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
Part I.B demonstrates, no theoretical consensus exists about how these
judgments should be made.
Beyond this upheaval in the governing structures of employment law,
a policy debate now rages about what changes may be required to pre-
pare the law of the American workplace for the 21st century.II The in-
ternationalization of the labor markets 12 and concern about the slowly
sinking American standard of living13 have generated numerous propos-
als. One group of proposals seeks to resuscitate the New Deal-era labor
11. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition:
The Paper Industry Example, 102 Yale L.J. 1803, 1877-94 (1993) (recommending steps
that would improve labor bargaining power); Douglas L. Leslie, Retelling the Interna-
tional Paper Story, 102 Yale L.J. 1897, 1906 (1993) (discounting Getman and Marshall's
arguments as incompletely explaining the reasons for the decline of unions); Paul Weiler
& Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace, 102 Yale L.J. 1907, 1915-
24 (1993) (arguing that the focus of labor law should be upon improving worker represen-
tation in the operational and policy decisions of employers). President Clinton has
appointed a blue-ribbon Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations to
report by May 1994 on necessary changes in the law of the workplace.
12. See generally Robert Reich, The Work of Nations (1991). Reich notes that the
world market economy should not be divided between "foreign" and "American" compa-
nies. Rather, a distinction should be drawn between companies, regardless of whether
foreign or American owned, that manufacture or otherwise employ American workers in
the United States and those that do not. Id. at 136-53. Thus, Nike, an American corpo-
ration, manufactures its shoes in Southeast Asia, while Japanese automobile manufactur-
ers may employ American assembly workers or use American-manufactured parts.
Reich also distinguishes the interests of three categories of workers-symbolic analysts
(engineers, managers, lawyers, doctors, financial consultants, advertising executives,
scientists and the like), in-person service providers (restaurant, hotel, resort and retail
sales employees, janitors, mechanics, secretaries, police and security and the like), and
routine production workers. The symbolic analysts face worldwide competition, but en-
joy worldwide demand for their services. In contrast, in-person service providers provide
service where demand exists, chiefly where symbolic analysts live. Last, American rou-
tine production workers, who also face a worldwide labor market, are in the least
favorable position because their services often can be provided more cheaply in Latin
America, Asia, or elsewhere. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 171-240.
13. See, e.g., Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess 27-28 (1991) (documenting declin-
ing inflation-adjusted pay for most American workers during the past twenty years, dem-
onstrating that American executives' salaries dramatically increased during the same
period, and finding that American CEOs' earn far more, as a ratio of average worker pay,
than their managerial counterparts in Japan and Western Europe); Frank Levy & Rich-
ard J. Murnane, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent
Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 1333, 1371 (1992) (concluding that
there were fewer middle class jobs for men in the mid-1980s than a decade earlier, docu-
menting increased income disparity between men and women, and identifying "the de-
clining position of young, less educated men" as the "single most important change in
male income distribution"). At the same time, Americans work more hours than ever
before. See Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of
Leisure (1991); Working Hours Increased for Most Americans, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
208 (reporting on Economic Policy Study showing decrease in paid time off from 1969 to
1989). Although these increased hours masked the decline of real wages for more than a
decade, a recent Department of Commerce analysis showed that real incomes and aver-
age wage rates fell during 1991. See First Decline in Real Income Since 1982, 141 Lab.
Re]. Rep. (BNA) 54 (1992). See also Weiler & Mundlak, supra note 11, at 1909 n.6
(noting that hourly wages of the average employee has decreased since the 1970s).
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relations system by changing the statutes affecting unionization. 4 These
proposals spring not only from the traditional argument that unions bal-
ance managerial and owner economic leverage over individual employ-
ees, but also from a realization that collective bargaining preserves both
employee voice and private-ordering. Thus, the practical alternative to
collective bargaining with unions may not be unbridled labor markets,
but greater intrusion by judges and legislators. Another set of policy op-
tions revolves around the concept of employee voice in the governance of
the workplace. Mandatory worker-management councils, work teams,
quality circles, and the like are proposed for both unionized and non-
unionized workplaces as a means to increase rank and file employees'
stake and involvement in increasing productivity and competitiveness.' 5
But, if mechanisms for employee empowerment in the high skill work-
places of the future provide a strategic framework, 16 the question again
arises whether the choice of means and degree of market intervention
should be decided by federal or state officials. This question takes on
renewed urgency in light of the absence of any theoretical consensus on
how to proceed.
Part I117 reviews the role of state law in regulating the workplace.
Even in areas of pervasive federal regulation, state law plays a "leading
edge" role or otherwise functions as an important complement to federal
regulation. This pattern emerges from an examination of five crucial ar-
eas of workplace regulation: occupational injury and disease, status dis-
crimination, family issues, privacy issues, and wrongful discharge.
In Part III, 8 the recent controversy about reductions in coverage for
AIDS in employer-provided group medical plans is used to illustrate the
complex relationship between federal and state law in the workplace.
Excessive focus on federal law obscures the vital role of state law in the
complex system of employment law that has evolved, piece by piece, over
the past half-century. Even public policy disputes about federal statutes
must take into account widespread state regulation of the workplace.
Preemption in employment law also should fit within the larger analyt-
ical framework for deciding federal-state authority issues in other areas
14. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics
in the Workplace, 100 Yale L.J. 2767, 2794-2803 (1991) (book review) (supporting Paul
Weiler's proposals to amend labor laws that inhibit unionization); Weiler, supra note 10,
at 225-306 (mapping a strategy for labor law reform).
15. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 10, at 186-224 (discussing alternative types of em-
ployee involvement with management); but see Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2804-09
(expressing reservations about the efficacy of such alternatives).
16. See, eg., Gettman & Marshall, supra note 11, at 1812-14 (arguing that the best
strategy for United States companies is to pursue high-productivity per employee rather
than low wages); Louis Uchitelle, Union Leaders Fight for a Place in the President's
Workplace of the Future, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1993, at 32 (reporting that empowering
labor held key to workplace of future).
17. See infra part II, pp. 489-509.
18. See infra part III, pp. 509-13.
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such as economic, environmental, and consumer regulation. Part IV 19
sets forth a framework and theory for deciding such issues generally.
This Part distinguishes three dimensions of the preemption problem: (1)
the practical and political, (2) the policy-making and normative, and (3)
the institutional and interpretive. The Section also reviews the pragmatic
and political reasons for the flood of preemption controversies now bur-
dening courts. Second, this Section identifies various considerations that
policy-makers may examine in deciding whether exclusive federal regula-
tion is appropriate. Part IV also examines the institutional role of the
courts in the preemption controversy. Both the constitutional scheme of
dual sovereignty and considerations of political accountability require
that the sister sovereigns' regulation of the workplace remain undis-
turbed unless and until Congress clearly indicates a preemptive intent.
Thus, for institutional reasons, judges must resist the temptation to as-
sume a policy-making role.
Part V2 1 analyzes traditional preemption doctrine and recent Supreme
Court decisions outside of labor and employment law. This review sug-
gests an emerging right-left consensus on the Rehnquist Supreme Court,
consistent with the theory of Part IV, supporting a strong constitution-
ally-based presumption against preemption. Congressional intent to pre-
empt must be "clear and manifest" or "clear and unambiguous."
Finally, Part V applies this newly emerging right-left consensus to tradi-
tional preemption doctrine and demonstrates the traditional framework's
shortcomings.
Part VI 2 then applies these lessons to preemption doctrine in employ-
ment law. Preemption decisions under particular employment statutes
must make sense not only in terms of the particular statute and preemp-
tion doctrine in other areas of the law, but also in terms of the broader,
complex system that now governs the workplace.
First, federal employment statutes, including, for example, the wage,
hour and child labor laws, status discrimination statutes, and recent en-
actments concerning privacy and plant closing, typically address preemp-
tion issues expressly. Further, these enactments declare that federal
regulation is not exclusive. Under this baseline model, preemption oc-
curs only when state enactments conflict directly with federal rights or
duties.22
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197423 ("ERISA")
represents an alternative federal preemption regime.24 It broadly
preempts the sister sovereigns from regulatory authority even when state
regulation does not directly conflict with the federal enactment. That is,
19. See infra part IV, pp. 513-28.
20. See infra part V, pp. 528-34.
21. See infra part VI, pp. 534-60.
22. See infra part VI.A, pp. 534-43.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
24. See infra part VI.B, pp. 543-52.
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in the ERISA preemption model, Congress not only decides what regula-
tion to adopt federally, but also that beyond federal requirements free
market principles control. ERISA's broad preemptive reach is also con-
sistent with the principles outlined in Parts IV and V. Because the retire-
ment and social security of American employees constitutes a matter of
paramount federal policy concern, Congress expressly stated a broad pre-
emptive intent in ERISA. Thus, Supreme Court decisions broadly apply-
ing ERISA's preemption provision fit the interpretive principles outlined
earlier. In some instances, however, the reach of ERISA preemption ex-
ceeds its policy rationale. These anomalies are identified and, consistent
with the interpretive principles developed earlier, this Article urges
amendment by Congress rather than the judiciary.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197125 ("OSHA") repre-
sents an intermediate preemption regime.26 Here again, however, Con-
gress expressly states a preemptive intent. Federal administrative
standards divest the states of authority over safety issues covered by the
federal standards, but not over issues that fall outside the areas for which
federal standards exist. Even within areas covered by federal standards,
however, OSHA's cooperative federalism provision27 allows a kind of re-
verse preemption if the Secretary of Labor approves state workplace
safety plans that meet or exceed federal standards. Thus, once again,
decisions under OSHA fit the interpretive principles outlined earlier in
the Article.
But one preemption doctrine in employment law-preemption under
the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA")-finds little support in this
analysis.2" Both as a policy and interpretive matter, current FAA pre-
emption doctrine stands unsupported.
Part VII2 9 reviews and urges major revisions in the preemption doc-
trines that evolved out of the New Deal-era statutes concerning union-
ized workplaces. After a review of the pragmatic aspects of labor law
preemption, the Garmon doctrine, the Machinists doctrine, and section
301, or contract preemption, are reviewed and summarized.
3 0
Part V113 1 then criticizes the so-called Garmon preemption doctrine
and urges that its primary agency jurisdiction rationale be discarded both
as a matter of interpretive32 and policy analysis.33 In place of the Gar-
mon doctrine's broad preemptive reach and the numerous exceptions
that thirty-five years of case law have added, the Article urges adoption
of the narrow conflicts preemption model, which constitutes the baseline
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
26. See infra part VI.C, pp. 552-55.
27. See OSHA § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988).
28. See infra part VI.D., pp. 555-60.
29. See infra part VII, pp. 560-95.
30. See infra part VII.A, pp. 562-64.
31. See infra part VII.B, pp. 564-67.
32. See infra part VII.C.1., pp. 567-7 1.
33. See id.
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model in employment law generally. There is simply no support for
Garmon's complex jurisprudential edifice under the interpretational prin-
ciples set forth above. As a policy matter, concern that only the National
Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") possesses the institutional compe-
tence to decide federal labor relations law issues flies in the face of
myriad developments since Garmon. Unions and employers already face
a broad range of federal and state court regulation of various aspects of
the New Deal-era system of collective bargaining. Further, application
of state law, such as wrongful discharge doctrine, may aid, not impede,
federal rights. The experience in the public sector further supports the
view that state law is not invariably hostile to collective bargaining.
The Machinists doctrine34 finds more support in the application of the
policy and interpretive principles urged in this Article. Where Congress
establishes or permits self-help remedies to unions and employers as an
affirmative part of the federal labor relations scheme, state regulation
conflicts with the unimpeded exercise of the federally-granted right. One
anomaly in Machinists case law, however, is identified.
Finally, Part VII addresses section 301 preemption. This doctrine
finds no support in the interpretive principles outlined above,35 nor does
a policy analysis support congressional action to save the doctrine.36 As
presently articulated and applied, the doctrine denies unionized employ-
ees state law rights and remedies available to non-unionized employees.
At the same time, the doctrine fails to protect employers from the pros-
pect that judges and juries will be called upon in many cases to apply the
complex provisions of collective bargaining agreements without the aid
of the arbitral expertise for which employers and unions contracted. Or
worse, existing doctrine may compel ignoring the provisions of collective
bargaining agreements entirely, even though such contracts carry obvi-
ous evidentiary significance for many state law claims. Finally, the Arti-
cle suggests a non-preemptive solution to the problems raised by current
section 301 preemption doctrine-arbitration pendente lite of all collec-
tive contract issues relevant to a unionized employee's individual rights
claim.
I. THE SECOND TWENTIETH CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE LAW
OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
This Part examines the decline of the New Deal system of collective
bargaining and reviews the debates ignited by this decline.
34. See infra part VII.B.2, pp. 564-67.
35. See infra part VII.C.2., pp. 571-74.
36. See id.
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A. The Collapse of Collective Bargaining and the Rise of Individual
Rights in Private-Sector Employment: The Eclipse of Private
Ordering
The New Deal system of collective bargaining has failed as the central
mechanism for establishing the terms and conditions of private sector
employment.37 This New Deal system, embodied in the 1935 Wagner
Act38 and other enactments,39 represented the first twentieth century
37. As Professor Pope put it, the New Deal collective bargaining system began its
slow "slide toward oblivion" long ago. See James Gray Pope, The Past of Labor La-
and Its Future, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 481, 482 (1991) (book review). For twenty-five years,
the percentage of unionized employees in the private sector has been falling, while the
percentage of unionized employees in the public sector has been rising. Today, public
sector employees are more than three times as likely to be unionized as private-sector
employees. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
38. The Wagner Act is also popularly known as the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (the "NLRA"). Formally, the Wagner Act is
now part of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992) (the "LMRA"), which includes labor relations statutes enacted after the Wag-
ner Act. For a contemporaneous account of the development of the New Deal labor
legislation, see Joseph Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works (1940).
See also Calvert Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of
Collective Bargaining, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (1937) (discussing the development and
history of collective bargaining and the NLRA).
39. On the eve of the New Deal, in 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia
Anti-Injunction Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
15 (1988)) (the "Norris-LaGuardia Act"). Broadly speaking, the statute prohibits federal
courts from enjoining a wide range of union activities in labor disputes. See Burlington
N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 440 (1987)
(holding that Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits injunction against railroad union's nation-
wide secondary boycott); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, Inc., 457 U.S. 702, 721 (1982) (holding that Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits in-junction against longshoremen's boycott of all shippers carrying goods of then-Soviet
Union during Afghanistan invasion).
Passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act followed a long history of judicial hostility to
labor organizations and their activities. See generally Archibald Cox et al., Cases and
Materials on Labor Law 17-51 (1991) [hereinafter Cox, Labor Law] (discussing cases);
Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 165-66 (1930) (citing cases
where judges avoided previous law prohibiting injunctions and continued to issue injunc-
tions against striking unions). Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not provide af-
firmative rights to unions or employees, it signaled a shift in the federal government's
policy from hostility toward unions to one favoring unionization as a means of producing
greater equality of bargaining power between employees and corporations. See, eg., 29
U.S.C. § 102 (stating that Norris-LaGuardia Act is intended to protect freedom of labor
and to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment).
The 1935 Wagner Act extended the Norris-LaGuardia Act by expressly protecting the
right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in "concerted activities"
for "mutual aid and protection." See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157. Moreover, the Wag-
ner Act established the NLRB to supervise the process by which unions could obtain
legal status as the authorized collective bargaining representative of employees, see
NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159, as well as to prosecute and remedy "unfair labor practices"
by employers. See NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
Following perceived union abuse of these legislative enactments during and after
World War II, Congress adopted a policy of greater neutrality toward collective bargain-
ing in the 1947 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 8(a)(3), 61
Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1988)) ("Taft-
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revolution in the law of the workplace. It fundamentally changed the
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal doctrine that the employ-
ment relationship was largely a matter of contract between individual
employees and their employers.' Paradoxically, while the New Deal's
Hartley"). Taft-Hartley explicitly recognized an employee's right to refrain from con-
certed activities in order to protect an individual from union harassment and coercion.
Moreover, it made various acts, generally paralleling those unfair employer labor prac-
tices prohibited under the Wagner Act, illegal, including secondary boycotts and other
practices Congress deemed abusive. See Taft-Hartley, § 8(a), (b), 61 Stat. at 140-42.
In 1959, in response to continuing perceptions that unions were using federal laws
improperly, Congress enacted the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 1, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 401 (1988)) (the "LMRDA"). It primarily regulated the rights of employees
regarding internal union practices, but also amended the provisions of unfair union labor
practices. See LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 401. See generally Cox, Labor Law, supra, at 51-98
(examining the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act); Ju-
lius G. Getman & Bertrand B. Pogrebin, Labor Relations: The Basic Processes, Law and
Practice 1-4 (1988) (discussing history of the Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley Act, and Lan-
drum-Griffin Amendments).
40. This philosophy dominated American law from the mid-19th century to the New
Deal-era. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court equated liberty with the right to buy
and sell labor unimpaired by most social regulation. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (holding New York labor law regulating bakers' hours violated fundamen-
tal constitutional right to contract). For a contemporary analysis of Lochner and its
progeny, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). For a
revisionist argument that Lochner did not invalidate much social legislation, see David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests,
1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324, 381 (1985).
The liberty to exchange labor stood as the foundation of the common law "employ-
ment at will" doctrine. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 425
(E.D.N.Y. 1908) (holding that a contract without fixed dates of employment is presumed
to be terminable at will). See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employ-
ment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976) (examining history and origin of the
"employment at will" rule). Further, the common law defenses to employer liability for
workplace injury-contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant
rule-were based on the freedom of contract. These defenses, which were known as the
"unholy trinity," barred many workers from any remedies for workplace injury. See
generally Matthew W. Finkin et al., Legal Protection for the Individual Employee 523-30
(1989) (examining common law responses to employee injuries).
When workers combined to challenge corporate employment policies, judges, using
conspiracy and antitrust doctrines, created the labor injunction to protect freedom of
contract. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding
that printing press manufacturer has right to injunction under Sherman Act against de-
fendant unions ); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (holding that federal government could
punish defendants for organizing strike against Pullman sleeping cars because strike af-
fected interstate commerce). See generally William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of
the American Labor Movement 58-127 (1991); Frankfurter, supra note 39, at 17-18, 23,
82-133. Eventually, the widespread use of the labor injunction led Congress to enact the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
For an excellent summary of several recent books chronicling specific episodes of labor
strife during the late 19th century, see Joshua B. Freeman, Andrew and Me, 255 The
Nation, Nov. 16, 1992, at 572-80; see also Nell Painter, Standing at Armageddon 1877-
1919 (1987) (providing general historical summary of economic, political and cultural
strife during this turbulent period of American history); Robert B. Reich, On the Slag
Heap of History, N.Y Times, Nov. 8, 1992, § 7, at 15 (book review of William Serrin, The
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minimum labor standards legislation4" and collective bargaining stat-
utes4 2 repudiated the old regime's emphasis on the sanctity of individual
employment contracts, the principle of private-ordering remained at the
center of the New Deal legislative scheme. Contracts-albeit collective
contracts-still defined the terms and conditions of a worker's employ-
ment. The traditional American reluctance to legislate directly the terms
of employment thus was preserved.43 Even disputes about contract rules
were channeled through a system of private dispute resolution-the fed-
erally-preferred alternative dispute resolution procedure known as griev-
ance-arbitration."
The New Deal collective bargaining system peaked in the 1950s. At
that time, approximately forty percent of the private-sector, non-agricul-
tural workforce was unionized.4 5 A decline then began, however. By
Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town (1992), which describes the infamous
Homestead Strike of 1882).
41. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (the "FLSA") (estab-
lishing minimum wage rates, mandating premium rates for work over 40 hours per week,
and regulating child labor).
42. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
43. Traditionally, American workers have been viewed as culturally less inclined than
European workers to directly promote their interests through the political process. See,
e.g., Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1394, 1400 (1971) (discussing distinctive factors underlying development
of American labor law and how those factors have caused American laws and regulatory
processes to differ from those of other countries); Grodin, supra note 10, at 97 (discussing
the evolution of wrongful termination law). Professor Forbath, however, disputes this
classical interpretation and argues that American labor and employment law not only
reflected political culture, but helped shape it. See Forbath, supra note 40. Indeed, some
argue that the fear of such direct labor legislation prompted President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to seek an alternative means of diffusing social tensions while preserving a
system of private ordering. See Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions 105
(1985). For the view that upheaval in the streets usually precedes American legal reform,
see Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 383 (1990) (arguing that
the timing of labor legislation is shaped by the needs of the governing elites to define
labor's societal position and that industrial unrest plays a significant role in the process)
and Michael Goldfield, Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and the New Deal La-
bor Legislation, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1257 (1989) (arguing that worker insurgency and
radical organizations strongly influenced final form and passage of NLRA).
44. For a discussion of current issues in grievance arbitration under the labor rela-
tions statute, see Gary Minda, Arbitration in the Post-Cold-War Era-Justice Kennedy's
View of Postexpiration Arbitrability in Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 22
Stetson L. Rev. 83 (1992).
45. See Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1017 (1991). See also Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer,
Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 953 (1991) (discussing decline in union membership, proposing changes in
representation elections, and strengthening remedies for bad faith employer-union bar-
gaining). Some studies place the percentage of unionized workplaces at 35%. See Ken-
neth C. Crowe, Union Movement Takes to Street Tactics Turn Aggressive, But Some Say
Labor Has Seen its Day, Newsday, Sept. 3, 1989, at 78. The higher 40% figure excludes
the non-agricultural and public sector labor force.
Collective bargaining in major American manufacturing industries has acted as a
trendsetter for the entire economy. As unionized workers won higher pay, an eight-hour
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1992, only 11.5% of the private-sector, non-agricultural workforce was
unionized. 4 Startlingly, this percentage has fallen below the fifteen
percent that were unionized when the New Deal collective bargaining
statute was enacted in 1935."7 Many explanations have been offered for
this decline, including structural changes in the labor markets, 48 in-
creased foreign competition,4 9 the cultural preferences of employees, 50
the bureaucratization of unions, 5I rogue employer illegality and ineffec-
tive NLRB remedies, 52 and hostile judicial and administrative law deci-
sions, especially during the Reagan years.53 It seems likely that all these
day, pension and medical insurance benefits, and greater job security, similar employment
terms and conditions were extended to many of the 60% of American workers who were
not union members. These gains, however, generally were not legislated or judicially
imposed. Rather, they were obtained through employer-employee collective bargaining
or extended unilaterally by employers to attract labor and to create or reward employee
loyalty and productivity without unionization. With few exceptions, the principle of pri-
vate-ordering remained intact.
46. See Proportion of Union Members Hits 15.8 Percent, 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
180 (Feb. 15, 1993) (reporting the latest United States Bureau of Labor Statistics survey
on the decline in union membership). In comparison, public sector unionization contin-
ued its now decades-old rise, reaching 36.7%. See id. Today, though far more employees
work in the private-sector, 40% of all union members now work in the public sector. See
id. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between the private and public sectors in
analyzing trends in unionization. Unless otherwise noted, the figures given in this article
exclude agricultural employment.
47. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 45, at 1017.
48. See, e.g., Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul Weiler,
59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 682-84 (1992) (attributing decline in private-sector unionism and
collective bargaining to natural market forces, structural changes in the American econ-
omy, increased domestic and foreign competition, and increased employee opposition to
private-sector unionization).
49. See id. at 682, 688.
50. See id. at 687-88; Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 631-32.
51. See Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 630.
52. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 45, at 1016-21 (analyzing NLRB data and concluding
that 5% of employees who vote for unions in NLRB-sponsored elections each year are
fired illegally, that such illegal firings occur in every third NLRB election, and that these
figures undercount the total number of illegal firings); Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and Prospects for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
251 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Striking a New Balance] (attributing decline of collective
bargaining to increasing employers' use of illegal tactics to resist union representation of
employees); Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organi-
zation Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises to
Keep] (arguing that legal procedures by which employees make their choice about union
representation should be changed to system of instant elections). Compare LaLonde &
Meltzer, supra note 45, at 953-55 (disputing Weiler's data and conclusions but conceding
that illegal firings occur in one in every twenty NLRB-sponsored elections).
53. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 Md. L.
Rev. 841 (1985) (analyzing impact of increasing concentration of capital on labor and the
role of the law in ignoring or thwarting union efforts to equalize bargaining power); Wil-
liam B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act:
The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 937 (1986) (discuss-
ing the decline of the American unions and need for labor reform); Lee Modjeska, The
Reagan NLRB, Phase , 46 Ohio St. L.J. 95 (1985) (reviewing and analyzing significant
NLRB decisions and their impact upon national labor policy); Stone, supra note 7, at
578-84 (1992) (citing and discussing numerous articles); Richard Trumka, Why Labor
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factors have contributed to the decline of union membership.
Yet, American employees, as distinct from unions, now enjoy greater
legal protection than ever before. Just as the regime of collective bar-
gaining receded, employees slowly were accumulating a panoply of indi-
vidual rights. In a series of unconnected developments in Congress, state
legislatures, and the common law, employees won numerous socially-
conferred workplace rights. From freedom from sexual harassment' to
family leave,55 to workplace safety, 6 to early notice and/or severance
pay upon plant closure, 7 to workplace privacy, 8 to wrongful dis-
charge,59 both union and non-union workers possess rights far exceeding
those recognized only a generation ago. Unlike the New Deal collective
bargaining regime, however, these rights were derived from an individ-
ual's status as a worker, rather than from any notion of contract or ex-
change.' Moreover, these new rights often carried powerful remedies.6
Law Has Failed, 89 W. Va. L. Rev. 871 (1987) (arguing that recent NLRB decisions have
been anti-labor, that NLRB has been dominated by the far-right, and advocating the
abolition of the Wagner Act, Taft Hartley, and Landrum-Griffin acts).
54. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 4084 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1993) (No.
92-1168) (holding that sexual harassment claim based on hostile or abusive work environ-
ment actionable even though defendant's conduct does not "seriously affect [the em-
ployee's] psychological well-being" or lead the employee to "suffer injury"); Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding claim of "hostile environment"
sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII).
55. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
56. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1591 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
57. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379,
102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.§§ 2101-09 (1988)).
58. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat.
646 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (1988)).
59. See Model Uniform Employment Termination Act, infra note 211. For a discus-
sion of the background and policy concerns underlying the Uniform Act, see Theodore J.
St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates. Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67
Neb. L. Rev. 56 (1988).
For a general discussion of the wrongful discharge doctrine, see Cornelius T. Peck,
Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage" Understanding the Development of the Law of Wrong-
ful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719 (1991).
60. Throughout Anglo-American legal history, the framework for governing the rela-
tions of human beings jointly engaged in productive enterprises has fluctuated between a
status-based model and a contract-based model. See, eg., E. H. Phelps Brown, The Eco-
nomics of Labor 9-48 (1962) (discussing the status of workers before the contract of
service, the rise of unions, and state regulation); Robert Cottrol, Law Labor and Liberal
Ideology: Explorations on the History of A Two-Edged Sword, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1531, 1534
(1993) (reviewing three recently published studies of labor and employment law history
analyzing from 1350 to 1932, including Robert Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor.
The Employment Relation in English and American Law and Culture (1991)).
61. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (authoriz-
ing punitive and emotional distress damages for discrimination based on race, national
origin, religious and sex).
The emerging system of individual rights in employment law has resulted in a litigation
explosion. Often these disputes do not concern the facts underlying the legal claims or
the law, but rather the various defenses to a court's assertion of jurisdiction to deprive a
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B. The Theoretical Debate
Academics belatedly noticed the forty-year decline in private-sector
union membership and the increasing irrelevance of New Deal labor rela-
tions law to most American workers.62 But, gradually, the New Deal
system came under intense attack from across the ideological-
jurisprudential spectrum. This debate, however, does not concern the
causes of union decline, but rather its desirability.
Neoclassical law and economics scholars63 directly attacked the prem-
ises and policies of the New Deal legislation."4 They challenged the no-
tion, explicit in the 1935 Wagner Act and still part of the United States
Code,65 that most individuals, acting alone, lack sufficient equality of
bargaining power for market mechanisms to function properly.66 The
neoclassical scholars also rejected the New Deal solution-the encour-
agement and protection of collective bargaining by employees to balance
the collective power of capital. According to Judge Posner's now famous
court of the opportunity to decide the merits-issues like preemption, preclusion, defer-
ral, and waiver. I will examine the latter three issues in a forthcoming article.
62. As Michael Gottesman observes, "An entire generation of labor law academics
focused their scholarship upon perfecting the system of collective bargaining created by
the Wagner Act for ordering the legal relations between employers and employees."
Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2767-68.
63. It should be emphasized, however, that a law and economics analysis need not
lead necessarily to neoclassical free market conclusions. One may view the economic
analysis of law simply as another tool for making normative judgments about policy. See,
e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 991 (1986) (cm-
ploying law and economics analysis more receptive to the New Deal labor statutes but
proposing changes). For a lengthier discussion featuring historical and practical exam-
ples, see Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions (3d ed. 1989). For a recent article
using law and economics analysis from a non-neoclassical perspective, see Keith N. Hyl-
ton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 471, 474 (1993) (concluding that much
of labor law is efficient, that unions can be efficient in solving public goods problems, that
statutory law can be as efficient as common law, and that labor law doctrine generally
seems "designed to deter opportunistic wealth transfers").
64. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (concluding that "New
Deal legislation is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should be scrapped in favor
of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily upon tort and contract
law").
65. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
66. See Epstein, supra note 64, at 1406 ("To repeat the central point, an argument
against [the New Deal-era labor legislation] is not an argument against unions as such. It
is an argument against the special privileges and immunities that these statutes confer
upon them."). Epstein's famous article was not the first attempt at applying economic
analysis to the New Deal labor relations regime. See Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections
on Syndicalism, 52 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1944) (applying economic analysis in argument
against union monopoly powers in labor market); see also Campbell, supra note 63, at
998-1004 (summarizing literature); see also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Con-
tract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 962-79 (1984) (applying legal and economic analy-
ses in defending usefulness of contract at will). In turn, Epstein's powerfully argued, but
controversial, theories came under attack. See Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler,
The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 Yale L.J.
1415 (1983); see generally Weiler, supra note 10, at 57-78.
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analysis, "[t]he NLRA is a kind of reverse Sherman Act, designed to
encourage [the] cartelization of labor markets.... 6  In the neoclassical
view, while unionization permits union members to earn higher wages in
the labor markets, their increased wages are often at the expense of other
workers or consumers.68 According to this view, employers will relocate
to seek lower labor costs, increase capital expenditures to reduce the de-
mand for labor, raise consumer prices, or simply close operations in the
United States due to competition in other countries.
Although the neoclassical argument that union wages69 reduce the de-
mand for labor and increase consumer prices carries force, other com-
mentators point out that an economic analysis of labor law is not so
simple.7" These commentators reject the implicit assumption underlying
much of the neoclassical argument-that labor markets are properly ana-
lyzed through a spot market model-and argue that a relational contract
model more aptly describes many employees' circumstances.7 Accord-
ing to this view, because employees invest human capital in their employ-
ment, often lack relevant information, and often face high transaction
costs in changing employers, the labor market within a firm, rather than
an external spot market, is the relevant labor market to analyze.7 More-
over, according to this view, even if one views a union as a cartel mono-
polizing the supply of labor, employers often also enjoy monopsonistic
powers over their employees; unionization thus often results in a bilateral
monopoly.73 As a result, labor markets do not satisfy the conditions nec-
essary for a perfect labor market.74 Additionally, these critics also argue
67. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 325 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
Posner, Economic Analysis]; see also Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law,
51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 988, 990 (1984) (arguing that American labor regulation is a device for
facilitating the cartelization of labor supply by unions). For a view that labor and em-
ployment law would profit by drawing a finer distinction between owner and manage-
ment interests, see Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in the Work Relations
Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1012,
1037-38 (1984).
68. See Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 322-23.
69. The law and economics school appears to define "wages" to include working con-
ditions, such as safer conditions, job security, seniority rights, and the like. See id. at 305.
70. See, e.g. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 246-47
(1984) (arguing that unions can be efficient mechanisms for governing the workplace and
positively affect productivity); see also Hylton, supra note 63.
71. See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2783-87.
72. See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2781-90; Weiler, supra note 10, at 56-77; see
generally Douglas L. Leslie, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 14-46 (1992) (providing
a lucid and even-handed summary of competing economic arguments).
73. See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2782-83. Monopsony is a condition of a market
in which only one buyer exists for a particular commodity. See Black's Law Dictionary
1007 (6th ed. 1990).
74. See Leslie, supra note 72, at 25-26 (noting that in addition to their investment of
human capital, workers lack complete information and may be unwilling to relocate their
residence, may be thwarted by "no-raid" understandings among employers, and may suf-
fer unique costs, such as loss of pensions and fringe benefits, by changing jobs).
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that unions efficiently solve public goods problems." Thus, even if neo-
classical efficiency assumptions dominate, some type of market interven-
tion is justified. Finally, the critics of the neoclassical scholars assert that
redistribution of wealth, in addition to efficiency, is an appropriate goal
for labor and employment law.76 The New Deal collective bargaining
statutes also fell under attack from the "left." Critical legal scholars at-
tacked the New Deal assumptions that the labor laws instituted a worka-
ble, neutral legal regime for governing the workplace as a mini-
democracy. In a thought-provoking 1978 article, Professor Karl Klare
argued that, though the New Deal labor statutes were "radical" in their
conception, they were "defanged" by early judicial interpretations that
favored preserving the status quo and marginalized the involvement of
rank and file employees. 7 Later, Klare's theory of judicial sabotage was
rebutted.78 His larger point, however, that judicially-made labor law not
only reflects policy choices, but defines-and confines-them, stood
unanswered.
Three years later, Professor Katherine van Wezel Stone79 argued that
75. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 70, at 8-9; Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2789-
90; see also Hylton, supra note 63, at 477-85.
76. 76. See, e.g., Marion Crane, Rationalizing Inequality: An AntiFeminist Defense of
the "Free Market", 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556 (1993) (book review of Richard A. Ep-
stein, Forbidden Grounds (1992)); Maria L. Ontiveros, The Myths of Market Forces,
Mothers and Private Employment: The Parental Leave Veto, I Cornell J.L. Pub. & Pol'y
25 (1992) (examining arguments against parental leave). As Professor Gottesman argues,
increases in income may have greater marginal utility to the less affluent than the more
affluent; broader income and wealth distribution also may stimulate aggregate demand.
See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2790-93.
77. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 265 (1978).
78. In response, Professor Finkin convincingly argued that Professor Klare greatly
exaggerated the Wagner Act's "radical" potential and that judicial interpretation of the
Act remained true to its policies and legislative history. See Matthew W. Finkin, Revi-
sionism in Labor Law, 43 Md. L. Rev. 23, 25 (1984). This, in turn, led Klare to respond
to Finkin, see Karl E. Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collec-
tive Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 Md. L. Rev. 731 (1985), Finkin to
respond to Klare, see Matthew W. Finkin, Does Karl Klare Protest Too Much?, 44 Md. L.
Rev. 1100 (1985), and, finally, for Klare to close the exchange with one final salvo, see
Karl E. Klare, Lost Opportunity: Concluding Thoughts on the Finkin Critique, 44 Md. L.
Rev. 1111 (1985).
Briefly, the Klare-Finkin debate concerned four Supreme Court decisions: (1) NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (creating the doctrine of permanent
replacement of strikers); (2) NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (holding that
employer properly fired an entire workforce for threatening a work-stoppage in order to
change labor agreement terms); (3) NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240
(1939) (condemning sit-down strikes); and (4) Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941) (requiring that even the NRLA's limited reinstatement and back pay remedy
for anti-union discrimination be subject to offsets for other earnings and employee's duty
to mitigate).
79. See Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Post- War Paradigm In American Labor Law,
90 Yale L.J. 1509 (1981). Professor Stone argues that the "industrial pluralist model of
collective bargaining represents an ideology shared by legal theorists, judges, industrial
sociologists, and labor economists." Id. at 1515.
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"the theory of [the New Deal labor relations system] rests upon an asser-
tion of equal power or potentially equal power between management and
labor"-a fatally flawed assumption.80 According to Professor Stone,
the New Deal labor laws placed too much emphasis on private arbitra-
tion as a means of securing remedies for aggrieved workers, subordinated
individual employee rights to union interests, and limited labor to proce-
dural rights, like the right to bargain and to arbitrate disputes.8 ' Thus,
"[u]nder the guise of government regulation and protection, [the liberal
industrial pluralist] interpretation delegated the crucial aspects of
collective bargaining to a private forum, shielded from public penetra-
tion. Such half-way measures are characteristic of many liberal social
programs of the last generation."8" Finally, other voices from the left
questioned the New Deal system's effectiveness. While accepting that
collective efforts are consistent in principle with feminist theories, Profes-
sor Marion Crain, a leading feminist scholar of labor law, noted that the
Wagner Act system was hierarchal and adversarial-an example of the
male preoccupation with the patriarchal notion of "power over" rather
than feminist notion of "power to."8 3 Finally, several prominent labor
leaders called for the repeal of the New Deal labor laws. They argued
that unions would be better off with unregulated labor-management rela-
tions than with the many restrictions that judicial and administrative in-
terpretations of the labor laws have imposed on unions.84
Legislation of the terms and conditions of employment, however, also
80. Id. at 1577, 1579-80.
81. Id at 1516.
82. Id. at 1517. See also James B. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law 1-34 (1983) (criticizing premises of New Deal labor relations system, includ-
ing the right to strike, unprotected status of sitdown and slowdown strikes, the restricted
scope of bargaining, and the status categories of employee, supervisor, manager, and em-
ployer). For a historian's review of the works of leading critical scholars in employment
and labor law, see Wythe Holt, The New American Labor Law History, 30 Lab. Hist. 275
(1989).
83. See Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33
B.C. L. Rev. 481, 487-88, 510-11 (1992) [hereinafter Crain, Images of Power] (defending
Wagner Act's philosophy favoring employee collective actions); see also Marion Crain,
Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L
Rev. 1155 (1991) [hereinafter Crain, Feminizing Unions] (arguing that labor unions can
be effective tools in challenging the "gendered structure of wage labor" and in empower-
ing women).
84. See, e.g., Trumka, supra note 53, at 877 (1987) (arguing that labor law has failed
to secure the rights of workers); Lane Kirkland, Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding
NLRB, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 13, 13 (1989) (arguing that labor relations statutes
often "forbid[ ] [unionists] from showing solidarity and direct union support"); UE Presi-
dent Calls on Labor to Take More Aggressive Stance, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 417
(April 13, 1992) (reporting international union president's call for "comprehensive labor
law reform" or, absent reform, repeal of the New Deal-era labor statutes) ("I would
rather have no [labor] laws at all than have the laws today that do nothing but stifle us.").
For a more neutral depiction of the Act's remedy problems, see Cox, Labor Law, supra
note 39, at 261-71 (describing severe delays, inadequate enforcement of reinstatement
rights, and limited equitable back pay relief requiring deduction of mitigation income for
illegal discrimination under the Act).
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presents problems. For one thing, legislated solutions to perceived
problems may not work. The 1988 Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act,85 for example, mandates 60 days advance notice to em-
ployees regarding plant closures or major layoffs. Because of numerous
limitations and exceptions in the law, however, it has had little impact. 6
Further, OSHA,87 while federalizing the requirement of a reasonably safe
workplace, required a federal administrative agency to promulgate safety
standards for virtually every workplace in America, in every region, in
every industry, and for every occupation. Many standards either have
been poorly conceived or are hopelessly outdated. 88
In addition, theoretical problems arise.89 While legislation addressing
the terms of employment allows employees to substitute their collective
political and voting power for their often inadequate bargaining power,
the issues presented may often be "too complex and too varied to be dealt
with by government."90 Governmental regulatory schemes, particularly
federal ones, often suffer from lack of effective enforcement. 9' Further,
legislation may often result from interest group lobbying, rather than
capturing the voice and aspirations of rank and file employees.92 Even
judicially-conferred, as opposed to legislatively-conferred, rights, such as
the upheaval in wrongful discharge law over the past decade, 93 face criti-
cism from both the left and the right.9a
Missing from much of the academic and policy debate, however, is an
acknowledgment or analysis of the influential role that state, as opposed
to federal, law has played in the revolution in the workplace. Part II
examines this role.
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1988).
86. See Sylvia Nasar, Layoff Law Impact is Almost Nil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1993, at
D I (reporting that the number of workers who receive required notice is no higher than
before the law passed).
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
88. See generally Finkin, supra note 40, at 317-417; Mark Rothstein et al., Employ-
ment Law 601-28 (2d ed. 1991).
89. See generally Weiler, supra note 10, at 152-61.
90. Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2794.
91. Id. at 2795-96. For example, serious questions have been raised about the effec-
tiveness of the enforcement of both OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988), and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
92. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 10, at 159-61, 181-83.
93. See generally Peck, supra note 59, at 719.
94. See generally Crain, Images of Power, supra note 83, at 485 (supporting increased
empowerment of employees through "participation in the process of workplace govern-
ance" rather than through safeguarding individual entitlements); Epstein, Contract at
Will, supra note 66 (providing a neoclassical defense of traditional doctrine that employ-
ment relationship can be terminated by either party at any time). For an excellent sum-
mary of the major schools of legal scholarship, including the traditional, law and
economics, critical, feminist, race theory and the narrative, see Matthew W. Finkin, Re-
flections on Labor Law Scholarship and Its Discontents: The Reveries of Monsieur Verog,
46 Miami L. Rev. 1101 (1992).
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II. STATE LAW AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE
The federal government extensively regulates the American work-
place. The Fair Labor Standards Act,95 the Equal Pay Act,9 6 Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 97 the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act,9" the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,99 the Americans With
Disabilities Act,"°° the Occupational Safety and Health Act,'0 ' the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act,'02 the Polygraph Protection
Act,103 the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,"° the
Drug-Free Workplace Act, 05 and the Family and Medical Leave
ActlO'6 -to name only a few of the dozens of federal enactments-illus-
trate the breadth of federal regulation.107 Additional federal regulation,
such as an electronic monitoring statute, also may be on the way.' 08
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
96. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988)).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
98. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
99. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991)).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (1988).
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1988).
105. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4304 (1988) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 701-07 (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
106. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (1993)).
107. Numerous other federal enactments affect particular classes of employees. See,
e.g., Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at
38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1988)) (providing right to re-employment for those inducted into
military service); Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at
40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1988)) (establishing prevailing wages for construction work-
ers on federal projects); Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)) (authorizing damages actions for
workplace injuries to railroad employees); Walsh-Healey Act, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036
(1936) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1988)) (authorizing prevailing wages
for employees working under federal purchase contracts); Merchant Marine (Jones) Act,
ch. 250, § 20, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988)
(damages action for injuries to sailors); Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-575, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988) (providing damages action for workplace injury); Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)) (setting federal health and safety stan-
dards); Civil Service Due Process Amendments, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-21 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (establishing procedures for disciplinary actions against federal employees); Fed-
eral Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (1988) (establishing proce-
dures for federal employees to participate in labor organizations).
108. The House Education and Labor Committee approved the Privacy for Consumers
and Workers Act on July 31, 1992. See Workplace Eavesdropping Limits Approved By
House Committee, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 886 (Aug. 10, 1992). A similar mea-
sure is before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. See New Version of
Worker Monitoring Restrictions Introduced, 7 Individual Employee Rts. (BNA) 19 (Oct.
6, 1992) (reporting introduction of S.3238 and summarizing its provisions). For a review
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
But, as extensive as federal regulation of the workplace has become, 10 9
the law of the American workplace includes another important ele-
ment-state law. Historically, the states regulated the employment rela-
tionship." 0 Moreover, state law played a leading role in more recent
developments-from sexual harassment"' and family leave issues," 2 to
disabilities discrimination' and drug testing," 4 to the intellectual
of workplace monitoring issues, see Workplace Privacy, 10 Employment Rel. Wkly.
(BNA) 535-36 (May 18, 1992).
109. As Justice Brennan recently told a conference of labor arbitrators: "Today [arbi-
trators] operate in a somewhat changed environment, one that is more constrained by
federal laws and federal courts. This... may be unsettling [but is] an unavoidable result
of greater protection for individual rights." 1991 NAA Proceedings, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 445 (Aug. 3, 1992).
110. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (holding that
state law establishing wages for female hotel employees is valid exercise of state regula-
tion); see also Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (Tenn. 1884) (holding
that state exceeded common law in regulating employer-employee relationship); Jordan
v. State, 103 S.W. 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907) (holding that state exceeded police
powers in regulating employer-employee relationship).
111. Compare Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (Or. 1984)
(en banc) (providing tort remedy for wrongful discharge where plaintiff was sexually
harassed) and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974) (providing
contract remedy for breach of oral contract where employee was maliciously fired after
refusing sexual advances) with Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986)
(providing relief under Title VII for "hostile environment" sexual harassment where
plaintiff was publicly fondled and forcibly raped by bank vice president).
112. Before the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107
Stat. 6, was adopted this year, thirty-five states had some type of official policy concern-
ing family and medical leave. See 35 States Have Enacted Varying Forms of Family
Leave, But Only 11, D.C. Closely Resemble New Federal Mandate, Daily Lab. Rep. 106
(June 4, 1993). Of the states having laws affecting both private and public sectors, about
one-half have laws guaranteeing that workers on leaves of absence for family or medical
reasons will have jobs when they return from their leaves. Id.; see, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code
§§ 12945.2(a), 12945(a)-(e), 12960-76 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 5-248a, 31-51cc to 31-51gg (West Supp. 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:1IB-1 to B-16
(West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 659.010-. 121, 659.360-.370, 659.560-.570 (But-
terworth 1991 and Supp. 1992). Another group of states have job-guarantees for state
employees only. See 35 States, supra, at 106; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 110.221 (West
1992); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 45-24-1 to 45-24-9 (Supp. 1993); II1. Ann. Stat. ch. 20 para.
415/8c(5) (Smith-Hurd 1993); W. Va. Code §§ 21-5D-1 to 21-5D-9 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
See also Maureen E. Lally-Green, The Implications of Inadequate Maternity Leave Poli-
cies Under Title VII, 16 Vt. L. Rev. 223, 230-231 (1991) (examining state statutes guaran-
teeing family leave). Working Women also reported that many states now go beyond the
PDA in laws of general applicability, while other states grant additional maternity leave
benefits to public employees only. See Diane Harris, You're Pregnant? You're Out, Work-
ing Women, Aug. 1992, at 48, 50.
113. See, e.g., Barns v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 266 Cal. Rptr. 503, 513
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that refusal to reinstate industrially injured worker to light
duty was discriminatory); King v. Bangor Fed. Credit Union, 568 A.2d 507, 509 (Me.
1989) (holding that settlement under Workers' Compensation Act did not waive em-
ployee's discrimination claim based on pulmonary condition); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that obesity is a disa-
bility and that employer cannot discriminate on that basis); Kent State Univ. v. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n, 581 N.E.2d 1135, 1137, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
employee's suspension due to respiratory condition constituted illegal discrimination
based on a handicap); Quinn v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 711 P.2d 139, 150 (Or. Ct.
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property rights of employees and employersI '--state law led the individ-
ual rights revolution. Nor does the future appear to offer early reprise
from the determination of state legislatures to regulate this central rela-
tionship of life. 
116
Further, state common law judges have created wrongful discharge' 7
and other tort remedies to avoid the harshness of the employment-at-will
App. 1985) (holding that employer illegally discriminated against job applicant on the
basis of color blindness where employer did not establish that test was bona fide occupa-
tional requirement).
Long before passage of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1993), state disability discrimination laws regulated private-sector
employees, sometimes providing a damages remedy. See, eg., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 775,
para. 5/1-101 to 5/8A-104 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (enacted in 1980 to prohibit discrimina-
tion); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993) (enacted in 1986 to prohibit discrimina-
tion); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 659.405-.425 (Butterworth 1989 & Supp. 1992) (declaring in
1973 that state policy prohibited discrimination).
114. By 1989, nine states had enacted laws regulating drug testing. See Rothstein,
supra note 88, at 192-93 n.8. In other states, common law judges have imposed limita-
tions on drug testing. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 626 (3d
Cir. 1992) (imposing balancing test to determine whether employer's drug and alcohol
program violated employee's privacy rights); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285-86
(Cal. CL App. 1990) (imposing a balancing test of employee's privacy expectations
against employer's interest in drug-free workplace). Wisconsin's legislature recently en-
acted a law prohibiting discrimination against workers who use lawful products off the
job during non-working hours. See Wisconsin Protection for 'Lawful Products' Advances,
7 Individual Employee Rts. (BNA) 9 (Apr. 7, 1992) (describing S.292).
115. For example, non-competition agreements and trade secrets regulations, which
are important in high-tech firms and many sales jobs, are governed largely by state law.
See, e.g., 1979 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, reprinted in 2 Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets
Law, app. Al (1993) (adopted in 28 states). See generally, Rothstein, supra note 88, at
809-38. Recently, the fear that high-level business executives might leave one corpora-
tion to join a competitor has affected contract provisions governing company plans and
strategies, as well as deferred bonus programs. See, e.g., James Bennet, Who Owns Ideas;
and Papers, Is Issue in Company Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1993, at AI (discussing
trade secret and intellectual property issues involved in GM executive's recent defection
to Volkswagen).
116. Other examples of state regulation include: establishing conditions for video dis-
play terminal uses see, eg., ILC Data Device Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 182 A.D.2d 293,
295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), appeal denied, 613 N.E.2d 965 (N.Y. 1993); prohibiting
smoking in the workplace, see Workplace Smoking Restrictions Spreading Report Says, 7
Individual Employment Rts. (BNA) 12 (June 30, 1992), protecting private use of legal
products, most commonly tobacco, outside the workplace, see Wisconsin Bars Bias For
Off-Duty Use of Lawful Products, 7 Individual Employment Rts. (BNA) 9 (May 19,
1992), and prohibiting genetic testing in connection with employment, see Nets, Wisconsin
Law Restricts Genetic Testing in the Workplace, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 314
(Mar. 23, 1992).
Additionally, state regulation often directly supplements federal regulation. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code Ann. § 668.15 (West Supp. 1993) (restricting discovery of the sexual conduct
history of sexual harassment and abuse plaintiffs). But see Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142
F.R.D. 311, 317 (S.D. Iowa. 1992) (refusing to apply Iowa statute restricting discovery of
history of sexual conduct where alleged harasser brings wrongful discharge claim).
117. See, e.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959) (holding that employee's discharge for refusing to commit perjury violates
public policy); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876. 878 (111. 1981)
(holding that employee's discharge for reporting theft to law enforcement officials violates
public policy). But see Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 90-91
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rule.' 18 These causes of action often provide employees with jury trials
and damages for perceived unjust or wrongful treatment." 9 Today,
multi-million dollar jury verdicts are common. 120 Indeed, the costs of
employment litigation and its effect on the competitiveness of American
business are hotly debated.
12 1
(N.Y. 1983) (refusing to recognize cause of action for abusive discharge of an at-will
employee).
118. See, e.g. Caesar v. Chemical Bank, 460 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)
(holding that employees' privacy rights violated where employer displayed photos with-
out consent in trade show), aff'd, 106 A.D.2d 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Bodewig v. K-
Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 661-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding retail clerk's cause of
action for emotional distress proper where store manager recklessly, but not deliberately,
asked employee humiliating questions and required strip search in response to customer
accusation); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976) (permitting defamation claim where employer stated that employee's test re-
sult revealed trace amounts of methadone without revealing that amounts were clinically
insignificant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
119. See supra note 118 and cases cited therein. Even where other remedies are pro-
vided courts increasingly recognize damages and jury trial remedies. See, e.g., Holien v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or. 1984) (allowing common law remedy
despite existence of statutory remedy); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 898-
99 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that statutory remedies are not exclusive remedies available to
employee discharged or discriminated against for serving on jury).
120. See, e.g., Texas Firm Hit With $124 Million Wrongful-Discharge Verdict, 7 Indi-
vidual Employment Rts. (BNA) 10 (June 2, 1992) (discussing verdict in Janacek v. Tri-
ton Energy Corp. (D. Tex. May 22, 1991) (No. 90-07220-M) (reporting $124 million jury
verdict, including $80 million in punitive damages, for employee claiming retaliatory dis-
charge for refusal to falsify corporate annual report); Jury Awards $3.2 Million in Sex
Bias Discharge Suit, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 804 (July 20, 1992) (discussing
Stanfill v. Science Applicators Int. Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 1992) (No. 607274)
(reporting that jury awarded $3.2 in state law sex discrimination suit to administrative
vice-president allegedly fired after new male supervisor required her to train successor);
Clark v. Claremont Univ. Center and Graduate Sch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (affirming $1.4 million verdict for black professor subjected to racist remarks by
faculty and denied tenure); Former Xerox Employee Awarded $1.4 Million in Defamation
Suit, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 692 (June 22, 1992) (discussing Baker v. Xerox
Corp., (D. Minn. June 8, 1992) (No. 90-20087) (reporting $1.4 verdict award). One study
of California wrongful discharge jury verdicts showed a sharp escalation in jury awards
from an average of $450,000-$650,000 before 1988 to an average of $1.4 million between
1989 and 1991. See Study Says Post-Foley Jury Verdicts Have Tripled, 7 Individual Em-
ployment Rts. (BNA) 7 (Apr. 21, 1992). The median verdict increased from $135,000-
$175,000 before 1988 to $410,000 between 1989 and 1991. See id. The newly established
availability of jury trials and damages in federal Title VII and ADA cases threatens to
accelerate the trend of increasing verdicts in employment litigation. See Randall
Samborn, Bias Law Booms, Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1992, at 1.
121. A recent Rand Corporation study found that a litigation explosion in the 1980s
over employer liability for wrongful termination has led to significant drops in employ-
ment. See Rand Study Links Liability, Job Loss, 7 Individual Employment Rts. (BNA)
15 (Aug. 11, 1992) (noting that a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge had no
significant impact on employment in manufacturing, but led to a 3% decline in non-
manufacturing industries.) In addition to the direct and indirect costs of litigation, em-
ployment law regulation affects the allocation of costs in many other areas, such as cata-
strophic illnesses like AIDS and cancer. Concern about American competitiveness, in
turn, sometimes generates proposals for even more regulation. See, e.g., Joint Approach
to Raising Skills of Workforce Sought, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 116 (May 25, 1992)
(reporting union official's Senate testimony advocating enactment of legislation contain-
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This Part now examines the role of state law in more detail in several
critical areas of workplace regulation: (a) workplace injury and occupa-
tional disease, (b) status discrimination, (c) accommodation of family
and other issues of concern to persons working both inside and outside
the home, (d) privacy in the workplace, and (e) wrongful discharge.
A. The State Role in the Compensation and Prevention of Workplace
Injury and Occupational Disease
Workplace injuries and occupational disease involve tremendous costs
for employees and employers alike. For that reason, the equitable alloca-
tion of these costs, and their reduction by preventative safety measures,
remain issues near the top of the employment law agenda.' 22 Yet, even
under OSHA,123 the high-water mark of detailed federal regulation, the
states retain a crucial role.
First, and most obvious, compensation for workplace injury or disease
remains for most American workers primarily a state law issue.1 24 Since
the Progressive Era, state no-fault workers' compensation statutes have
covered workplace injury; many of these statutes now cover occupational
diseases as well.12 Moreover, notwithstanding the exclusive remedy bar
against employer negligence liability to employees, which is a feature of
ing incentives for employers to invest in worker training and his endorsement of the High
Skills Competitive Workforce Act of 1991, S.1970).
122. See, e.g., Jon Jefferson, Dying for Work, A.B.A. J. Jan. 1993, at 46 (discussing
problems with federal worker safety laws); Roger Thompson, Workers' Comp Costs: Out
of Control, 79 Nation's Bus. July 1992, at 22 (reviewing innovative, but controversial,
efforts in Oregon and Michigan to stem increases workplace injury costs); Putting the
Brakes on Workers' Comp, 79 Nation's Bus., Nov. 1991, at 57 (warning that workers'
comp system faces collapse unless medical costs curtailed).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
124. Federal workplace injury statutes cover certain categories of employees. See, e.g.,
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1988 & Supp. IV 1991)
(workers' compensation statute for federal civil service employees); Black Lung Benefits
Amendments Act of 1981, 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992) (authorizing miners
to bring claims for occupational disease and injury); Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988) (workers' compensation statute for long-
shoremen, harbor workers, and shipbuilders); Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988) (authorizing railroad employees to bring negligence claims and
actions for damages against employers); Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, 46 U.S.C. App.
§ 688 (1988) (workmens' compensation statute for those in merchant marine); See also
Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program: The View
From the Top, 87 W.Va. L. Rev. 575 (1985) (discussing evidentiary issues arising from
black lung claims and describing the process of administrative review of claim).
The Supreme Court often considers cases concerning these federal job injury statutes.
See, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 117 (1988) (invalidating United
States Department of Labor black lung regulation restricting presumption of compen-
sability to miners with ten years experience); Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S.
108, 117-19 (1963) (requiring reasonable foreseeability of harm as an essential element of
FELA negligence); Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958) (holding
employer liable for seaman's death under Jones Act without showing of negligence).
125. See generally Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, 37 Cornell L. Q. 206, 231-34 (1952) (discussing development of workmens' compen-
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virtually all state workers' compensation statutes, employee damages ac-
tions against employers are often allowed where workplace hazards re-
sult from intentional 126 or reckless 2 7 conduct or where the dual capacity
doctrine allows an employee to sue an employer for a defective product
that has injured the employee.'22 Additionally, workers suffering injury
or occupational disease increasingly bring state law third party products
liability claims against the manufacturers and suppliers of workplace
equipment. 129  Finally, employer liability under state law for toxic
sation in the United States to demonstrate its unique intermediate character and to dispel
the strict-liability-trust fallacy).
These no-fault laws frequently are debated in state legislatures and courts. See, e.g.,
Santa Rosa Jr. College v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 708 P.2d 673, 680 (Cal.
1985) (holding "going and coming" rule prevents claim based on driving instructor's
death in auto accident on his way home from work even though bringing home student
papers for grading); Eckis v. Sea World Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding employee injured while riding whale for promotional activities is compensable);
Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 494 A.2d 313, 323 (N.J. 1985) (holding that cost of
construction of attached apartment for quadriplegic employee in parent's home properly
included in workers' compensation award); Rose v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 218, 219
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding injury suffered during softball game not compensable where
game played off work premises and after work hours); Mulcahey v. New England News-
paper, Inc., 488 A.2d 681, 684 (R.I. 1985) (holding that stroke suffered by sport colum-
nist after covering NFL football game compensable).
126. See, e.g., Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 973 F.2d 555, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1992)
(awarding back pay to victim of sexual harassment based on finding that no reasonable
employee would have continued working for employer under the circumstances), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 981 (1993); Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding employer liable to employee for battery where substantial certainty that
clean-up employees exposed to PCBs without warning or protective gear would be in-
jured); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948, 955
(Cal. 1980) (allowing cause of action based on aggravation of asbestos-related disease on
fraud theory); Millison v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 516-17 (N.J.
1985) (holding that fraudulently concealing knowledge of pre-existing asbestos-related
diseases sufficient for civil fraud claim); Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. 576 N.E.2d 722,
729-30 (Ohio 1991) (holding an Ohio statute regulating claims against employers for in-
tentional torts unconstitutional because it would violate workers' compensation provision
of state constitution).
127. See, e.g. Blankenship v. Cinncinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572, 576
(Ohio) (holding employee injured by exposure to chemicals entitled to enforce common
law remedies against employer for intentional tort), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982);
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978) (holding employer
liable under common law tort theory where employer commits intentional tort or engage
in reckless conduct). See generally Rothstein, supra note 88, at 754-60 (discussing
Mandolidis case and emphasizing that workers' compensation applies only to cases of
negligence, not to cases of reckless conduct).
128. See, e.g., Pagani v. BT II, Ltd. Partnership, 592 A.2d 397, 400 (Conn. App. Ct.
1991) (permitting waitress to bring a common law tort action against for salmonella
poisoning even though received workers' compensation payments); Guy v. Arthur H.
Thomas, Co., 378 N.E.2d 488, 491-92 (Ohio 1978) (sustaining cause of action against
hospital-employer based on its capacity as treating physician); Tatrai v. Presbyterian
Univ. Hosp., 439 A.2d 1162, 1165-66 (Pa. 1982) (permitting medical employee injured
while undergoing x-ray examination at work to bring negligence action).
129. See generally Finkin, supra note 40, at 693 n.l ("With growing frequency, injured
workers are able to obtain separate damages recovery against third parties based upon a
theory of product liability.") (citing Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d
1993] THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STATES
exposures in the workplace remains unsettled, including whether an em-
ployer may be liable for birth defects in children conceived by employees
who have been exposed to toxic substances in the workplace. 30
Shifting focus from compensation for worker injury to its prevention,
one finds that, though OSHA standards preempt some state safety regu-
lation,13 1 much regulatory authority is left to the states. Indeed, OSHA
preempts state safety regulations only to the extent that those regulations
address safety issues covered by federal OSHA standards.' 32  Conse-
quently, the states remain free to regulate the many issues not addressed
by specific OSHA safety standards. Even more significantly, about half
of the states regulate workplace safety under state plans approved by the
Secretary of Labor. 133 Although such plans require federal approval,
they amount to a reverse preemption of OSHA regulations.' 3' Further,
because of a perceived laxity in federal enforcement of OSHA standards,
state criminal prosecutions of serious wrongdoing have increased.' 35
1182 (5th Cir. 1978) and Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305 (N.J.
1984)); Mark Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law, §§ 510-12 (3d ed. 1990)
(discussing the availability of actions against third parties, such as insurance companies,
unions, and govermnent agencies where cause of action against employer is unavailable);
Rothstein, supra note 88, at 760-61 (discussing third party actions against other employ-
ers, insurance companies, and manufacturers of defective products where cause of action
cannot be brought against employer).
130. Cf. International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 (1991)
(holding that employer's policy of prohibiting fertile women from positions involving
exposure to lead violates Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Pregnant Assemblers of Com-
puter Chips More Likely to Have Miscarriages, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1357(DATE) (reporting University of California-Davis study of 220,000 workers in the semi-
conductor industry); Eleanor Wallace, Comment, Fetal Protection Policies in Retrospect:
Does U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls Answer the Difflcult Questions About Toxic Workplace
Hazards, 22 Envtl. L. 355 (1992) (discussing safety concerns not addressed by Supreme
Court's opinion).
131. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assoc., 112 S. Ct. 2374, (1992)(holding OSHA preempts state laws regulating safety issues covered by federal safety
standards even though state laws have "dual impact or purpose" of protecting employees
and members of the public).
132. OSHA § 18(a), (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).
133. In addition, OSHA § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4), preserves "the common law
or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any [state] law
with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment." In addition, OSHA § 18(b), 29 U.S.C. § 667(b), authorizes a state to de-
velop a state plan for workplace safety, subject to the Secretary of Labor's approval.
Twenty-two states and the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico have devised plans to enforce
state standards and have received federal approval. See 29 C.F.R. § 1952 (1992). Con-
necticut and New York have received federal approval of their plans to enforce state
health and safety standards for state and local government employees. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1956 (1992).
134. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386 n.2.
135. See, eg., People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (111.), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989) (holding that OSHA does not preempt state criminal prosecu-
tions); People v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989) (holding that OSHA does not
preempt state criminal law prosecution for involuntary manslaughter in connection with
carbon monoxide poisoning of employee). See also Rothstein, supra note 88, at 664.
("There is an unmistakable irony surrounding the issue of OSHA pre-emption. The fed-
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Finally, the worker right-to-know movement originated in the states ,36_
only later did OSHA propose standards for disclosing to workers the
hazards associated with certain toxic substances in the workplace.
B. State Regulation of Status Discrimination
State anti-discrimination laws not only preceded Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196413' and other federal status discrimination statutes,138
but continue today as an important component in the overall regulatory
system for discrimination in the workplace. This Section examines reme-
dies for status discrimination, the breadth of anti-discrimination provi-
sions, and burdens of proof. It turns first to the central question of
remedies.
1. The Search for Remedies
State law remedies for status discrimination often exceed those avail-
able under federal law. Consider, for example, sexual harassment. The
United States Supreme Court did not recognize sexual harassment as a
Title VII violation until 1986139 and then only equitable relief, not dam-
ages, was available. Yet, state courts already provided remedies for such
conduct under state common law tort causes of action for assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
privacy, and wrongful discharge.1" These tort causes of action offered
eral law was enacted in large part because state efforts to protect employee safety and
health were viewed as largely inadequate. State criminal prosecutors are now being
brought in large part because of a perceived laxity in federal OSHA enforcement ef-
forts."); Note, Getting Away With Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions For Industrial Accidents, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 534 (1987) (arguing that OSHA
should not use preemption defenses to block state criminal prosecutions for workplace
injuries and deaths).
136. Between 1980 and 1985, about half the states enacted right-to-know laws. See
Rothstein, supra note 88, at 664. Enactment of a federal "right to know" law, however,
may preempt many of these state laws. See United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d
728, 736 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding that OSHA Hazardous Communication Standard, to
extent valid, preempts state hazardous communication rules in manufacturing sector).
See generally State Labor Law Developments, 7 Lab. Law. 431, 446-59 (1991) (discussing
right-to-know laws).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-7 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
138. See generally Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961) (discussing the role of state
antidiscrimination commissions)
139. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
140. See, e.g., Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding Title VII
violation where waitress terminated because she refused to wear sexually suggestive uni-
form as well as refused employer's requests for sexual favors); Phillips v. Smalley Mainte-
nance Servs., Inc., 435 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (holding that employee's right to privacy
violated where manager questioned plaintiff about sexual habits after plaintiff spurned
sexual requests); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (holding that
plaintiff's dismissal after declining foreman's request for date breached implied covenant
of good faith); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984) (holding that
employee fired for refusing sexual advance wrongfully discharged).
19931 THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STATES
victims of sexual harassment substantial advantages over Title VII ac-
tions' 4 1-the availability of jury trials, tort damages for emotional dis-
tress and mental anguish, and punitive damages.1 42 Even after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991143 amended Title VII to establish federal jury trials
and damages remedies, claims under state law will continue to go for-
ward because of questions about the retroactive application of the 1991
amendments 1" and the strict limits placed on Title VII damages. 145
Further, state law may recognize an employer's liability for a
141. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, amended Title VII
to provide jury trials and emotional distress and punitive damages. Yet, many commen-
tators still criticize Title VII as inadequate to redress sexual harassment in the workplace.
See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex At Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1991). Indeed, many argue
that Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), throws into question whether an employer
is liable to an employee for a supervisor's sexual harassment. As evidence, they point to
the Supreme Court's statement that "Title VII ... surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held re-
sponsible." Id at 72.
142. According to Sarah E. Wald, "Since victims of employment discrimination often
suffer injury that is inadequately compensated through awards of back pay, and since
reinstatement in a job situation in which job discrimination has occurred is often not a
realistic remedy, awards of punitive damages to cover mental distress are often necessary
to make a sex discrimination victim whole." Sarah E. Wald, Alternative to Title VII:
State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies For Employment Discrimination, 5 Harv.
Women's L.J. 35, 60 (1982). See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women (1979); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment- Related Sexual Harass-
ment, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 151, 168-71 (1979) (examining common law and statutory theo-
ries of action to compensate victims of sexual harassment); Alice Montgomery, Note,
Sexual Harassment In The Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 Golden
Gate L.J. 879 (1980) (discussing common law tort causes of action available in California
to victims of sexual harassment and describing California workmens' compensation law).
143. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071-99 (1991).
144. See infra text accompanying note 155.
145. See, eg., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (affirming
award of $250,000 in compensatory damages, including emotional distress damages, and
$1 million in punitive damages under tort theories of action where owner of film studio
habitually asked and "ordered" employees to have sex with him).
Title VII caps damages for intentional discrimination as follows:
[T]he amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed,
for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300.000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
In one recent conference on employment law developments, a management-attorney
suggested that plaintiff's may seek to avoid the Title VII caps by proceeding under state
law. See Maximum Punitive Damage Awards Apply to Each Individual in Class Action,
10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 629 (June 8, 1992).
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supervisor's sexual harassment of another employee in situations where
Title VII does not. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 46 the Supreme
Court cast into doubt whether an employer is liable for a supervisor's
acts, at least in hostile or abusive environment147 -as opposed to quidpro
quo 14s-sexual harassment cases. Conversely, state law often holds an
employer vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a
supervisor's misconduct. 49
State law theories also appeared in workplace racial discrimination
cases. 5 ' Although section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866's'
146. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
147. A hostile or abusive environment exists when an employee is subjected to unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment such that a reasonable person, or a reasonable person of the victim's gender,
would consider the working environment abusive. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991). But see, e.g., Rabidue v. Oscola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff failed to sustain burden of proof under Title VII
even though male employee customarily used vulgar and obscene language to refer to
women, directed obscenities at plaintiff, and workplace contained posters of nude and
scantily clad women), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See generally Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1449 (1984) (arguing against the use of disparate impact analysis in sexual harassment
claims in favor of "abusive working environment" test).
148. In quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, a supervisor conditions an employment
benefit on sexual favors. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Catherine
MacKinnon, supra note 142, at 32-47 (discussing quid pro quo sexual harassment).
149. See, e.g., Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., Oregon Civil Rights Laws Handbook
95 (1992) (stating that employer is liable for supervisor's acts "regardless of whether:...
(c) the employer knew or should have known of the occurrence of the specific acts com-
plained of"); Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So.2d 398 (Ala. 1992) (holding that
employer must take adequate steps to remedy employee's tortious conduct); New York
Task Force on Sex Harassment Recommends Strict Employer Liability, 10 Employee Rel.
Wkly. (BNA) 1352 (Dec. 14, 1992) (reporting that state law commission suggested
amending New York law to make employers strictly liable for discriminatory conduct of
supervisors and managers if the employer knew, or should have known, about the con-
duct and failed to act).
150. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979) (holding employer liable
for supervisor's wilful misconduct and affirming award of compensatory and punitive
damages for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970) (holding that supervisor's racial epithets sufficient
to state cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Fisher v. Carrousel
Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (holding employer liable for employee's
assault and battery where employee refused to serve black plaintiff and "snatched" buffet
plate from plaintiff's hands); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173
(Wash. 1977) (holding that plaintiff's allegations that employer permitted racial slurs and
comments attacking his Mexican-American heritage was sufficient to support cause of
action for tort of outrage).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). It provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
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provided unlimited liability for racial harassment" 2 before Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,' and does once again with enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,15 only retroactive application of the 1991 law
would prevent a two year gap in section 198 1's coverage of racial harass-
ment in the workplace.' 5
State racial discrimination laws also provide for jury trials and unlim-
ited compensatory damages for wrongful discharge and other acts of dis-
crimination.156 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized in a recent
opinion, allowing supplemental state law remedies for Title VII racial
discrimination violations may further both federal non-discrimination
policies and be consistent with, and merely supplemental to, Title VII
remedies.15 7
152. Before McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court held that § 1981 created an
implied cause of action for damages applicable to racially-motivated discharges. See
Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that "[ilf [plain-
tiff] on remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the
fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or
his religion, he will have made out a case... "); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against
white employees). See generally Comment, Developments In the Law: Section 1981,
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 29, 35-69 (1980) [hereinafter Section 1981] (providing compre-
hensive review of § 1981's legislative history).
153. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In McLean Credit Union, Justice Kennedy, in a 5-4 deci-
sion, held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination only in the making and enforcement
of contracts, not racial harassment occurring after the formation of an employment con-
tract. Ia at 176-78 (emphasis added). This holding was contrary to the prior under-
standings of most courts. See id at 189, 210 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
154. Congress overruled McLean Credit Union in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L
No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (providing that § 1981's prohibition on racial discrim-
ination applies to the "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship").
155. Whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act should be applied retroactively is unsettled.
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, most United States Courts of Appeal have de-
clined to apply the act retroactively. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1993) (No. 92-1190);
Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1374-78 (8th Cir. 1992); Johnson v.
Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.), petition for cert filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S.
Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-737); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 1992 App. Lexis 20895 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1992) (No. 92-977); Mozee v. American Commercial
Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 934-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 207 (1992);
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86
(1992). The Ninth Circuit, however, has reached the opposite conclusion. See Reynolds
v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 994 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court recently heard argument on the issue. See Landgraf : USI Film
Products, 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993)
(argued Oct. 13, 1993).
156. In one recent California case, for example, a black professor won a 51.4 million
verdict for a racially-affected tenure denial. See Clark v. Claremont Univ., 8 Cal. Rptr.
151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
157. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992). But see Makovi v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. 1989) (declining to recognize wrongful dis-
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2. Broader Discrimination Prohibitions
State law sometimes covers a broader range of discrimination than fed-
eral law. Private-sector disabilities discrimination, for example, except
for federal contractors and grant recipients,'5 8 remained outside federal
law until the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901'9 (the "ADA")
took effect in July 1992. Many state laws, however, not only prohibited
private-sector disabilities discrimination before ADA's passage,' 6 but
also provided damages remedies.' 61 Indeed, state law provided models
for federal legislation as well as practical experience about how a national
prohibition on disabilities discrimination might affect private-sector em-
ployers. It also is likely that business opposition to federal legislation
was dulled because state laws already covered many businesses.
Sexual orientation discrimination provides another example. 62 Sexual
orientation generally is not protected under the United States Constitu-
tion.' 63 Nor is Title VII generally thought to apply.'" Statutory regula-
tion of this form of employment discrimination exists in some states, 65
charge tort where other civil remedies available). Title VII contains an express non-
preemption provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
158. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 770-77 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
(the "Rehabilitation Act"). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies, see 29
U.S.C. § 501, federal contractors, see 29 U.S.C. § 503, and federal grant recipients, see 29
U.S.C. § 504, from discriminating on the basis of an employee's disability.
159. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
160. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b) (West 1982 & Supp.) (providing compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees for denial of civil rights or discrimina-
tion); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 393.13(5) (West 1993) (stating that "[a]ny person who violates or
abuses any rights or privileges of persons who are developmentally disabled ... shall be
liable for damages as determined by law"); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659.425 (Butterworth
1989 & Supp. 1992) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons in employment
or public accommodations); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659.121(2) (Butterworth 1989 & Supp.
1992) (providing compensatory damages for violating Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659.425).
162. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation and the Law].
163. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy).
164. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination should not be judicially
extended to include sexual preference); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that Congress intended only to guarantee equal job opportunities
for males and females). For an argument that Title VII applies to discrimination based
on sexual orientation, see Samuel Estreicher & Michael C. Harper, The Law Governing
the Employment Relationship 159-60 (2d ed. 1992).
165. Wisconsin is the first state with a broad ban on sexual orientation discrimination.
See Wisc. Stat. Ann. §§ 11.31-.393 (West 1986 & Supp 1993). California bars violence
against homosexuals and lesbians in the workplace. See Cal. Civ. Code. § 51.7 (West
Supp. 1984). New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan have enacted statutes or issued
executive orders prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in state employ-
ment. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574
n. 10 (9th Cir.) (listing statutes and executive orders), reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.
1990). Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont also recently have enacted statutes. See
Rothstein et al., Employment Law 35 (Supp. 1993); see generally Lesbians and Gay Men
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and there are many local government ordinances. 66 While the effective-
ness and pervasiveness of state regulation against sexual orientation dis-
crimination in the workplace may be questioned, 161 the probability of the
people, or their representatives, acting to prohibit such discrimination at
the state and local level1 68 often may exceed the probability of enacting
such legislation at the federal level. State law also provides a potential
tort remedy to gay or lesbian persons where privacy or political activity
statutes are violated. 169 Moreover, local governments, acting under state
law authority, increasingly are providing medical insurance benefits to
domestic partners of employees. 7 Finally, many states prohibit marital
status discrimination; federal law does not."17
3. Burden of Proof Rules
Twice in the past four years, the Supreme Court has announced new
burden of proof rules that were widely regarded as significantly changing
the law and making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win lawsuits.' 72
and The Law 270 (1993). In 1991, the Governor of California, Pete Wilson, vetoed a gay
rights bill that would have applied to California employers. See Veto of California Gay-
Rights Bill Will Stand, 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 183 (Oct 7, 1991).
166. See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 162, at 1667-70 & nn. 51-56.
167. Judge Canby was not impressed with state and local regulation of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. He stated in dissent: "One state broadly bars employment discrimi-
nation against homosexuals, two other states more narrowly bar discrimination against
homosexuals, and a few cities bar some types of discrimination. That showing is clearly
insufficient to deprive homosexuals of the status of a suspect classification." High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (cita-
tions omitted) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
168. Gay and lesbian individuals comprise approximately ten percent of the United
States population-about 25 million people-and employment discrimination constitutes
the largest category of discrimination. See Gay, Lesbian Employees Seeking Recognition
of Value in the Workplace, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 731, 731 (July 6, 1992). A
"major employment issueol for gays and lesbians... [is] the passage of non-discrimina-
tion policies in employment in all 50 states." Id at 732. Many companies, among them
Xerox, US West, Lotus Development Corporation, Levi Strauss & Co., and Woodward &
Lothrop, prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 731-32.
169. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (denying cause of action against journalist for revealing plaintiff's sexual
orientation where plaintiff was public figure and openly homosexual). A homosexual
falsely accused of being HIV-positive would have a claim for defamation. See generally
W. Page Keeton et. al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 771-97 (5th ed.
1984).
170. See, e.g., San Mateo County Extends Benefits To Domestic Partners. Adult Depen-
dents, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 613 (June 1, 1992).
171. By 1990, 22 states prohibited discrimination based on marital status. See Mack
A. Player et al., Employment Discrimination Law 325 (1988). There a two basic models.
Some states, such as New York, New Jersey, and Michigan, only prohibit discrimination
based on whether the employee is married, single, or divorced. Other states prohibit an
employer from making an employment decision based on the identity or activities of one's
spouse. See Illinois Law Prohibits Discrimination on Basis of Marital Status, 10 Employee
Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1356 (Dec. 14, 1992) (discussing laws in Illinois, Hawaii, Montana,
Minnesota, and Washington in the latter group).
172. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993) (holding that,
in intentional discrimination cases, plaintiff bears burden of persuading trier of fact that
1993]
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While Congress promptly overturned the Court's new rule in uninten-
tional discrimination, or "disparate impact" cases, 173 the Supreme
Court's latest decision in intentional discrimination cases again has un-
settled the burden of proof rules for intentional or "disparate treatment"
cases. 174 Again, electing a state law remedy may avoid such uncertainty.
C. State Regulation Accommodating Persons Working Inside and
Outside the Home
If our economy in the next decades is to tap fully the human resources
potential of our citizens, women must continue to make progress against
the glass ceiling1 75 in the manager's office and the stereotyping that in-
fects blue collar occupations like the construction trades.' 76 But if wo-
men are taking their places with men in the world of work outside of
home, then recognition of their traditional child-bearing and nurturing
responsibilities must follow. Although men, too, can step forward to
bear more of these responsibilities, women seem likely to play a special
role. The important debate between "sameness" and "difference" femi-
nists aside, 177 what rules of the workplace do these realities counsel?
State law again has led the way.
When the Supreme Court declared in 1976 that discrimination against
pregnant women did not constitute sex discrimination,' 78 many state
courts and legislatures refused to follow.' 79 Instead, they applied state
gender discrimination laws to discrimination based on pregnancy."' °
discriminatory animus motivated employer's action, even though plaintiff has demon-
strated that employer's defense that legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons led to act is
false and pretextual); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (re-
placing "business necessity" defense in disparate impact discrimination cases with "sub-
stantial business justification" defense and shifting burden of proof from defendant to
plaintiff), overruled by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat.
1071, 1074-75.
173. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074-75, overrules Wards Cove
and reinstates "business necessity" as an affirmative defense on which the employer bears
the burden of proof. For discussions of the act's complex legislative history, see § 105(b),
105 Stat. at 1075 and Rothstein, supra note 88.
174. A few weeks after the decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993), efforts already were underway in Congress to overturn the decision. See
Legislation to Overturn, Debate Follow Hicks Decision, Fair Empl. Prac. Rep. (BNA)
(July 19, 1993).
175. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 201-10, 105 Stat. 1081,
1081-87 (establishing federal "Glass Ceiling Commission" to study and prepare recom-
mendations concerning barriers to the advancement of women in management and deci-
sion-making positions).
176. See, e.g., Hard Times for Women in Construction, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1992, at
B1.
177. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797 (1989)
(offering an alternative vision of gender). Resolving "the deep split among American
feminists between 'sameness' and 'difference'" adherents is "the major challenge for
modern feminism." Id. at 798 & n.2.
178. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
179. See Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
180. See Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 386 A.2d 396, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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Although the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act' amended Title
VII to permit pregnancy discrimination claims in 1978,82 state law pro-
tected against restrictive judicial and administrative interpretations of
federal coverage.18 3
But efforts to accommodate the new realities in the workplace soon
went far beyond the now almost quaint-sounding equal treatment princi-
ple of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 84 Even though the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires that women receive pregnancy
leave equal to that allowed for other disabilities, 8 5 states responded with
new parental and family leave laws granting women-and men-unpaid
leave to care for children, parents, or sick family members. 8 6 On the
federal level, legislative efforts to enact family leave legislation twice re-
sulted in presidential vetoes before President Clinton signed the Family
and Medical Leave Act"8 7 into law this year.
Div. 1978) (finding discrimination based on gender where employee absent from work for
childbirth denied sick leave benefits), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 400 A.2d 1182 (NJ.
1979) (affirming finding of sexual discrimination, but reversing award of S600 million in
damages for humiliation, pain, and mental suffering); Anderson v. Upper Bucks County
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 373 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (holding that
discrimination based on pregnancy constitutes sexual discrimination); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 20 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1789, 1791 (Wis. Cir. Ct.) (holding that Goodyear's plan limiting disa-
bility benefits to pregnancy and childbirth constituted unlawful discrimination under
state law), aff'd, 273 N.W.2d 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978); see also Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 359 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 1976) (holding
that private employers must provide health benefits for pregnant women).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
182. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
684 (1983) (holding PDA prohibits unequal treatment of male employees spouses regard-
ing pregnancy-related medical insurance benefits as compared to female employees). The
PDA also prohibits discrimination against women who choose to terminate their
pregnancies, but an employer's medical plan may exclude coverage of abortions. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1993); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1604 questions 34-36 (1993) ("Questions
and Answers On The Pregnancy Discrimination Act").
183. Pregnancy discrimination remains a major enforcement problem. See Complaints
of Pregnancy Discrimination Persist Thirteen Years After Passage of Pregnancy Bias Act,
137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 331 (July 15, 1991).
184. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and The Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1984).
185. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987). Guerra
rejected a preemption challenge to a California statute requiring four-month, unpaid
pregnancy disability leave. See id at 292. The majority opinion, written by Justice Mar-
shall, interpreted the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may
not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
Thus, a state could mandate more than equal treatment of pregnancy compared to other
disabilities as long as the mother remained "disabled." See id. at 290.
186. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 659.010-.121, 659.360-.370, 659.560-.570 (But-
terworth 1989 & Supp. 1991).
187. See Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Star. 6. Presi-
dent Bush favored voluntary leave programs supplemented by tax credits. See Parental
Leave: Senate Overrides Bush Veto of Family Leave Legislation, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
1675 (Sept. 28, 1992). According to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, who led the fight against the
legislation in the Senate, family leave and other government-mandated employee benefits
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D. Privacy in the Workplace
Privacy stands poised as the workplace issue of the 1990s. Consider
the wide range of privacy issues presented: drug and polygraph testing,
electronic monitoring, improper disclosure of HIV test results, humiliat-
ing public questioning of employees, and employers' regulation of em-
ployees' lives outside work. 8' Again, the sister sovereigns have led the
way in addressing these emerging areas of concern.
1. Technological Testing
Drug testing of public employees is partially regulated under the Four-
teenth and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution.' 89
For union members, drug testing constitutes a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining. 190 Non-union, private-sector employees, however, are
not protected under the Constitution from invasive private employer
drug testing. Consequently, some states statutorily regulate employee
drug testing, 19' while others provide state constitutional protections' 92 or
would "strangle" flexibility for both employees and employers. Id. Oregon state officials
report, however, that the state's family leave law has encountered little resistance from
employers. See id. at 1676 (reporting study of Oregon family leave bill that found that
91% of Oregon employers indicated that the state law had caused little problem).
188. See generally David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue
of the '90s, 23 J. Marshall L. Rev. 591 (1990) (providing background information con-
cerning privacy issues in employee-employer relationship); Michael F. Rosenblum, Secur-
ity vs. Privacy: An Emerging Employment Dilemma, 17 Employee Rel. L. J. 81 (1991)
(same); Peter T. Kilborn, Workers Using Computers Find A Supervisor Inside, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1990, at Al (same); Carol Kleiman, Most U.S. Workers in Survey Fear
Employers Getting Too Nosy, Oregonian, Aug. 5, 1992, at D1 (same); Kevin Maney, Elec-
tronic Mail Policies Ignite Debate, USA Today, July 8, 1991, at 3B (discussing monitoring
of electronic mail); Evelyn Richards, Privacy at the Office: Is There A Right To Snoop?,
Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1990, at HI (same); Michael Stroud, Rise of Electronic Mail Raises
Sticky Privacy Issues, Investor's Daily, June 22, 1990, at 13 (same).
189. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-18 (1989). See also
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (public employee has reasonable expectation of
privacy in office, desk, and file cabinets, but search may be justified by "reasonable" and
"individualized suspicion."); National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d
968, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding unconstitutional mandatory drug testing of workers
not employed in "safety-or security-sensitive jobs").
190. See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 188 (1989) (ruling that employer
has duty to bargain with unions over drug testing of employees); Minneapolis Star Trib-
une, 295 N.L.R.B. 543 (1989) (ruling that applicants are not considered employees for
bargaining purposes and that employer has no duty to bargain over drug testing of
applicants).
191. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51x (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting random
drug testing of employees, except for and employees in safety-sensitive positions or those
who voluntarily enter an employee assistance program); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen.
§ 17-214.1 (1992) (permitting employers to drug test employees, but requiring employers
to provide employees who test positively a written copies of their test results, the em-
ployer's drug abuse policy, and the employer's intent to discipline the employee); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 21, §§ 513 (1992) (prohibiting random drug testing except where employer has
probable cause to believe that employee is using drugs and employer provides a rehabili-
tation program). By 1989, nine states-Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
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recognize common law claims.193 In some cases, even for public employ-
ees, state law protections exceed those mandated by the federal
Constitution.
1 9 4
Technological testing issues arise in other areas as well. For example,
although the federal Polygraph Protection Act of 1988195 now restricts
employee polygraph testing, the states were first in imposing restrictions
on such examinations.196 Further, genetic testing regulations also follow
the pattern of mixed federal-state decision-making. 197
Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Vermont-had enacted laws regulating drug testing. See
Rothstein, supra note 88, at 192-93. In contrast, Utah encourages drug testing, provided
managers also submit to such testing. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-3 (1988).
192. Compare Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding no protection exists under state constitution) with Semore v. Pool, 266
Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct App. 1990) (allowing state constitutional claim).
193. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992)
(employer breached covenant of good faith and fair dealing where employee received
drug test without prior notice and no other employee tested); Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App.) (employer breached covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by terminating employee for refusing to submit to drug test), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
194. See, e.g., Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523 (Mass. 1991)
(holding Massachusetts constitution imposes more stringent restrictions on drug testing
of Boston police officers than National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989)).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988). "As many as two million polygraphs were performed
each year in the private-sector prior to passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act. Roughly 85 percent of these polygraphs are now prohibited." Rothstein, supra note
88, at 143.
196. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 703.010-.990 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (regulating all
person who use lie detectors, polygraphs, and deceptographs); Ballaron v. Equitable Ship-
yards, Inc. 521 So.2d 481 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that state polygraph law did not
grant private right of action); Bucko v. First Minn. Say. Bank, 471 N.W.2d 95 (Minn.
1991) (awarding punitive damages to employees who were compelled to take polygraph
test). Before enactment of the Polygraph Protection Act, 18 states regulated or prohib-
ited the use of employee polygraph testing. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 143.
197. Genetic and HIV testing of employees for risks of future medical problems raise
unique issues of public policy and privacy. See Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office
of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that HIV testing of public
employees violates 4th Amendment); but see Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby,
779 F. Supp. 402, 418 (N.D. Ohio, 1991) (holding that HIV testing of firefighters and
medics constitutional). See also Rothstein, supra note 88, at 196-211; see generally Mark
A. Rothstein, Medical Screening and the Employee Health Cost Crisis (1989). The ADA
prohibits testing for the HIV-virus in many circumstances.
In the 1970s, states began to restrict genetic testing in connection with specific condi-
tions, such as sickle cell anemia. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 207. As the Human
Genome Project and other genetic research projects continue to reveal the secrets of ge-
netic coding, however, demands for protection against intrusive employer screening have
increased. See Philip J. Hilts, Panel Reports Genetic Screening Has Cost Some Their
Health Plans, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1993, at A20 (reporting on findings of National Acad-
emy of Science survey that some American workers have lost jobs or health insurance on
the basis of information obtained through genetic testing and on recommendations that
federal regulation necessary). Some states, like Oregon and Wisconsin, have enacted
broad restrictions against genetic screening. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659.227 (Supp.
1992); 1991 Wis. Laws 117; see also Wisconsin Prohibits Genetic, Polygraph Testing, 7
Individual Employee Rts. (BNA) 2, 3 (June 2, 1992) (reporting amendments to Wiscon-
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2. Monitoring
Technology also presents other challenges to the privacy of employees.
As Professor Westin has observed, "supervisory monitoring goes back as
far as the pyramids... what you have today is a new capacity to use that
supervisory monitoring made possible by computers."' 198 Technological
monitoring of employees occurs in at least five contexts: (1) computer
monitoring of key stroke and video display terminal operators, 199 (2) tel-
ephone call accounting, 2" (3) telephone call monitoring, 20 (4) review of
employee electronic mail ("E-mail"), 20 2 and (5) trip monitoring of truck
drivers.20 3 While Congress is considering legislation in these areas,2 4 the
states already have been active.20 5 -
3. Other Examples of State Law Privacy Regulation
State tort law also regulates other aspects of privacy, including the
right to pursue private relationships outside of work20 6 and the right to
sin genetic testing law). HIV virus testing, though arguably restricted by ADA, faces
state regulation as well. As of 1991, at least nine states enacted laws prohibiting HIV
testing or other forms of discrimination based on AIDS or HIV infection. See Rothstein,
supra note 88, at 203.
198. Columbia Professor Contends Monitoring Does Not Breach Employee Privacy
Rights, 44 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A7 (Mar. 8, 1989) (arguing that federal and state
legislation is unnecessary because employers largely monitor employee conversations con-
cerning business affairs, not private conversations). But see Terry M. Dworkin, Protect-
ing Private Employees From Enhanced Monitoring: Legislative Approaches, 28 Am. Bus.
L.J. 59 (1990) (arguing that regulation of electronic monitoring is necessary).
199. See generally Rosenblum, supra note 188; John Lund, Computerized Work Per-
formance Monitoring and Production Standards: A Review of Labor Law Issues, 42 Lab.
L.J. 195 (1991).
200. Telephone call accounting records the length, time, and destination of employee
telephone calls without the employee's knowledge. See Rosenblum, supra note 188, at 87.
201. Telephone call monitoring enables the employer or supervisor to listen to and
record the substance of conversations. See id.
202. See generally Note, Addressing The New Hazards of the High Technology Work-
place, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1898, 1909-10 (1991).
203. See, e.g., Dennis v. Tomahawk Servs., Inc., 767 P.2d 346, 349 (Mont. 1989); In re
Santamore, 597 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
204. See S. 516, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) ("Privacy for Consumers and Workers
Act"); H.R. 1218, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same); see also Paul Katzeff, Surveillance
Legislation Pending: Both Sides Decry 'Big Brother, Nat'l. L.J. 1 (Apr. 15, 1991).
205. West Virginia was the first state to enact protective legislation. California, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island also have introduced legislation. See Katzeff,
supra note 204, at 1.
206. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
discharge of female manager due to romantic relationship with manager of rival firm
illegal), disapproved by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). But see
Patton v. J.C. Penny, 719 P.2d 854 (Or. 1986) (holding that discharge of male employee
for maintaining an off-work social relationship with female employee is not illegal); Ward
v. Frito-Lay, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. App. 1980) (holding that employee not wrongfully
discharged where his relationship with another employee was causing dissension at em-
ployer's factory).
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be free from public questioning and intrusive searches.2"7
E. Wrongful Discharge
In his seminal article almost twenty years ago,20" Clyde Summers rec-
ognized that most private-sector employees enjoy neither the job security
protection of civil service employees nor the just cause protections com-
mon in union contracts. As Professor Summers' article foreshadowed,
the erosion of the common law employment-at-will doctrine by public
policy wrongful discharge and other tort doctrines represents one of the
great upheavals of legal doctrine in our time.' Though volumes have
been written about this phenomenon,21 0 the point here is that, once
again, state employment law holds center stage. Recently, however,
some commentators have called for the enactment of federal legislation
to govern this area.2
F. Miscellaneous Areas of State Regulation
In addition to workplace safety, discrimination, family, privacy, and
termination, many other aspects of the employment relationship are
state-regulated.
In the child labor area, state law remedies for oppressive child labor 21 2
co-exist with federal regulation of child labor under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.213 Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act's restrictions
on the working hours and activities of school age children are endemic,
however.214 State law remedies may allow parents to bring actions
207. See, e.g., Brodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
employer liable to employer under tort law for intentional infliction of emotional distress
for public questioning and search of a store clerk in front of customer); K-Mart Corp.
Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding employer's
search of employee's locker "wrongful"); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d 16
(Md. 1977) (holding employer liable for detaining employee suspected of theft).
208. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For
A Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481 (1976). See also Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will
v. Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum.
L. Rev. 1404 (1967).
209. See supra notes 10 & 208 and articles cited therein.
210. See generally Peck, supra note 59.
211. In 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rec-
ommended enactment of the "Model Uniform Employment-Termination Act." See Indi-
vidual Employment Rts. Man. (BNA) § 540:21 (1991). Conversely, former NLRB
Chairman Edward B. Miller has called for enactment of a federal "just-cause" statute.
See 4 Individual Employment Rts. (BNA) 19 (Oct. 24, 1989). See generally Note, Em-
ployer Opportunism and The Need For A Just Cause Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 510
(1989) (arguing that courts should require just cause for employee termination); Peck,
supra note 59.
212. See FLSA, §§ 3 & 12; 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). FLSA § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 218 states
that "no provision of this chapter relating to the employment of child labor shall justify
non-compliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a
higher standard than the standard established under this chapter."
214. See Child Labor Violations, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 220 (June 15, 1992) (re-
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against their child's employer 215 or authorize state administrative offi-
cials to enforce state and federal law directly.216
Negligent hiring, training, and supervision suits constitute another
area of state common law regulation.21 7 Churches that employ child sex
abusers as ministers,218 or cities that hire sex abusers as playground
.maintenance employees,21 9 or bars that hire employees with histories of
assaulting people 220 may face tort liability for negligent hiring, training,
or supervision. Federal law does not reach such cases.
In some areas of employment, such as high-technology jobs, non-com-
petition agreements and restrictions on an employee's use of employer
trade secrets generally are enforceable subject to state law limits. 221
Again, much regulation in this important area of employment law largely
arises from the sister sovereign states,222 rather than from the federal
government. 223
porting that 41% of all employers investigated for child labor violations in 1990 were
found violating the law and that two years into recently heightened federal child-labor
enforcement program a 28% violation rate exists). See also Labor Department Wage and
Htour Enforcement Lacking, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 215 (June 15, 1992) (describing
Labor Department inspector general's list of ten "trouble spots" in FLSA enforcement).
215. See, e.g., Strain v. Christians, 483 N.W.2d 783 (S.D. 1992) (permitting wrongful
death action brought by parents of 14 year-old farm employee against employer).
216. Enforcing The Law: Legislation to Try to Protect Child Labor in the State, Hous-
ton Chronicle, Mar. 5, 1993, at 26 (discussing proposed child labor legislation in Texas);
Judy Mann, The Grisly Child Labor Picture, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1991, at D3 (discussing
documentary concerning child labor law violations).
217. See Nigg v. Patterson, 276 Cal. Rptr. 587, 596 (Cal. 1990) (holding that employer
has duty to select competent employees), vacated, 823 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1992); Connes v.
Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1320-21 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (holding em-
ployer liable for negligent hiring based on tort law because employer created risk "by
exposing members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual"); Corbally v.
Sikras Realty Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that em-
ployer's failure to perform background check may constitute actionable negligence).
218. See Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
219. See Haddock v. City of New York, 532 N.Y.S. 2d 379 (N.Y.) (holding employer
liable for parks employee's rape of child because city failed to investigate history of sexual
offenses), leave to appeal granted, 545 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1990).
220. See, e.g., Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 827 P.2d 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding bar owner liable for negligently hiring doorman).
221. See, e.g., Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1989) (holding accountant's cove-
nant not to provide services to clients of former employer valid and enforceable), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 911 (1990); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590(N.Y. 1976) (holding that restrictive covenant not enforceable where employee's knowl-
edge did not qualify for protection as trade secret and his skills were not unique); Kadis v.
Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 1944) (holding covenant void for public policy reasons where it
prevents a delivery man from working in only occupation in which he is trained).
222. See, e.g., Si Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985) (federal
court applied state law to find that trade secret protection for some aspects of design
system); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream. 278 N.E.2d 636 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that former
employee was not liable for any wrongful conduct for soliciting former employer's cus-
tomers whose names could be readily found from a source other than the former em-
ployer's customer list).
223. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1992) (limit-
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In sum, the question is not whether this pervasive state regulation of
the employment relationship is wise or desirable. Rather, it is that state
legislatures and judges often, indeed most often, decide the appropriate
mix between the free market and government intervention. Thus, far
from being a marginal or interstitial aspect of our system of workplace
governance, state law a often plays a vital and "leading edge" role.
III. AN ILLUSTRATION: AIDS COVERAGE IN WORKPLACE
MEDICAL PLANS
Despite the centrality of state law in our regulatory system of work-
place governance, national debates over employment law issues some-
times ignore the complex relationships between federal and state law.
The much debated issue of the coverage of AIDS in workplace medical
plans provides an example.2 24
In McGann v. H & H Music Co. ,22 an employee with AIDS informed
his employer that he had contracted the disease. At that time, the em-
ployer's medical plan provided up to $1 million in coverage for most
medical conditions, including AIDS. After learning of the employee's
condition, however, the employer implemented a $5,000 cap on the
plan's coverage for AIDS, effectively denying the employee further cov-
erage. In turn, the employee filed an ERISA claim in federal court alleg-
ing interference with his right under ERISA to receive the benefits of his
employer's ERISA covered medical plan.226 The district court granted
ing non-competition agreement to non-disclosure because original agreement "unneces-
sary for [employer's] protection"). See generally Rothstein, supra note 88, at 809-38;
State Labor Law Developments, 7 Lab. Law. 431, 485 (1991).
224. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Patients Cite Bias in AIDS Coverage by Health Plans,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1993, at Al; Health Insurance Caps Primary Concern of Employees
Writh AIDS, Attorney Says, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1123 (Oct. 19, 1992). Such
coverage is important to homosexuals, intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs, and the
partners of other persons at risk being infected with HIV. The Centers for Disease Con-
trol estimates that two out of three large companies have at least one HIV-positive em-
ployee, as do one in ten small companies. See Business and Labor Groups Join CDC in
Laundering AIDS Program, 141 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 419, 429 (1992). It is estimated
that approximately a million people in the United States, or one out of 250, are HIV-
positive. See iL The average expenditure for a person who develops AIDS is approxi-
mately $100,000-and rising. See Health Insurance Caps Primary Concern of Employees
With AIDS Attorney Says, supra, at 1123.
The legal issues implicate a range of interests. Many argue that the precedent estab-
lished in the case of AIDS may affect the availability of medical coverage for other condi-
tions, such as breast cancer, premature births, birth defects, genetic disorders, cystic
fibrosis, and leukemia. See Congress Urged to Amend Pension Law to Prevent Health
Coverage Reductions, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1337 (Dec. 7, 1992). This concern
prompted such groups as the American Association of Retired Persons to file an amicus
curaie brief supporting the petition for certiorari in McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
225. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
226. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. 1140 prohibits discrimination or other adverse action
"for exercising [an ERISA] right" or "for the purpose of interfering with" ERISA rights.
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) provides a private cause of
action for equitable relief. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144
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the employer's motion for summary judgment.227 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit also ruled against the employee, finding that the employer's moti-
vation in selectively cutting medical coverage of AIDS was to reduce
costs, not to interfere with this particular employee's rights under the
employer's medical plan. 228 The Supreme Court's denial of review 229 re-
ceived much attention in the press.230
To be sure, the federal law issue-whether ERISA's retaliation/inter-
ference provisions allow an employer to shape a medical plan to avoid or
minimize exposure for illnesses already contracted by employees-
presents an important issue.231 But suppose the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari and reversed the Fifth Circuit in H & H Music. Sup-
pose that the Court instead had ruled that a change in a benefit affecting
an employee, or an employee's covered dependents, who already had suf-
fered the previously-covered condition constituted interference with, or
retaliation for, the exercise of ERISA rights. Such a ruling, or even con-
gressional amendment of ERISA's non-interference provision,232 doubt-
lessly would benefit those employees and families already suffering from
diseases like AIDS.
But what about presently healthy persons who face AIDS or other
catastrophic diseases in the future? Even if the Supreme Court had re-
versed H & H Music, nothing in ERISA would have prevented employ-
ers from selectively limiting coverage or benefits for catastrophic illnesses
prospectively-that is, as to employees and dependents not already in-
(1990) (holding that ERISA provides exclusive remedy for interference/retaliation claim
and that state law claims preempted).
227. See H & H Music, 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
228. See H & H Music, 946 F.2d at 403; cf Fleming v. Ayers & Assocs., 948 F.2d 993,
997 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that employer's discharge of worker where employer antici-
pated increased medical insurance costs because employee's infant required extensive
medical care violated ERISA § 501).
229. See H & H Music, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
230. See, e.g., Dena Bunis & Tim M. Phelps, A "No"for AIDS, Newsday, Nov. 10,
1992, at 17; Jay W. Waks, Disabilities Act May Affect Medical Costs, Nat'l L.J., June 15,
1992, at 18. The employee, John McGann, died before the Fifth Circuit decided his case
and his estate continued the case. See id.
231. One would think that a medical insurance plan-whether provided through an
insurance carrier or via a self-insured employer plan-should cover all risks that eventu-
ate while the risk is covered by the plan. In other words, when a carrier or employer
agrees to provide certain coverage, the medical plan should not be able to avoid liability
retroactively. Analogously, if I suffer personal injury in an auto accident, my first party
insurance should cover all costs of the injury even though some of them may not be
incurred until after the policy has lapsed or been amended. It is the time of claim, not the
time costs are actually incurred, which should measure whether the risk was within the
bargained-for coverage.
Although the H & H Music court assumed that only actionsfor the purpose of interfer-
ing with ERISA rights fell within ERISA's retaliation/interference clause, the statutory
language-"discrimination for exercising any [ERISA] right"-arguably would appear
to cover any adverse action based on an employee's assertion of a claim.
232. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress to amend ERISA to prevent ret-
roactive reduction of benefits. See H.R. 6147, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
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fected with disease.2 3 3 In general, ERISA simply does not regulate the
level of pension or medical benefits provided.234 Cost-driven reductions
in the scope of an employer-provided health plan, even those targeted at
particular medical conditions, thus generally are allowed under the fed-
eral regulatory scheme embodied in ERISA.2 35
The sister sovereigns, however, have long regulated insurance benefits,
including those in employer-provided medical plans. In fact, "state laws
regulating the substantive terms of insurance contracts were common-
place well before the mid-1970s, when Congress considered ERISA."" 6
States increasingly adopted "mandated benefit" laws in the 1980s.2"
Typically, such laws mandate certain types of coverage, such as prenatal
care, well-baby care, drug and alcohol treatment, mental health services,
optometric and chiropractic services, and reconstructive surgery for mas-
tectomy patients.238
Not only do the states extensively regulate the coverages in workplace
and other medical plans, but such state insurance regulation receives ex-
press deference under federal law.239 ERISA, in fact, contains an express
non-preemption, or saving, clause exempting state insurance regulation
233. Catastrophic illness remains a major threat to the health and economic security of
many workers and their families. One study has suggested that one in four American
families will face a catastrophic illness and that most have inadequate medical insurance
for such illnesses. See Waks, supra note 230.
234. "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits ... 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 85 (1983); see Musto v. American General
Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988) ("ERISA's concern is to administer the elements
of a plan... rather than mandate the [creation of a program]."), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1020 (1989). Some commentators have urged amending ERISA to regulate the coverage
provided by medical and other fringe benefit plans. See, e.g., David Gregory, The Scope
of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
427, 470 (1987) (arguing that national legislation mandating minimum mental health
benefits for "all employees in all states" would be "optimal").
235. "With regard to an employer's right to change medical plans, Congress evidenced
its recognition of the need for flexibility.... [M]edical insurance must take account of
inflation, changes in medical practice and technology, and increases in the costs of treat-
ment independent of inflation." Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d
Cir. 1988).
Since 1992, however, the ADA may prevent selective reductions in medical plan cover-
ages of particular conditions like AIDS. An employer must not only act without any
purpose to discriminate, but also must prove affirmatively that the particular reduction is
justified "'by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably anticipated experience,
and that conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or experience are treated the same
way."' EEOC Issues Guidance on ADA Application to Health Insurance, 20 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. 1275 (June 14, 1993) (emphasis added). Under this regulation, an employer would
violate the ADA if it reduced coverage for AIDS, but not heart disease, if both conditions
had similar cost data.
236. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742.
237. See id at 728 n.3 & at 729-30 nn.9-10.
238. See id at 729-30; Rothstein, supra note 88, at 445-57.
239. See, eg., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S.
724 (1985); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1015 (1988)).
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from ERISA preemption. 24 Pursuant to this provision, problems like
the one illustrated by H & H Music-coverage of AIDS in employer-
provided medical plans-may be addressed through state legislation. In-
deed, several states have enacted legislation effectively mandating cover-
age of AIDS or otherwise prohibiting discrimination against persons
with AIDS. 241 Under the scheme of the federal ERISA provisions noted
above, state regulation constitutes an integral part of the overall Ameri-
can system of employment law. So whatever the merits of a particular
"mandated benefit" as a matter of policy, 24 2 in the American system of
workplace regulation, the forum for debating and resolving the public
policy issue traditionally has been the states.
But, alas, for persons looking to the political process in the states to
regulate employer-provided medical plans, there is a catch. Although
ERISA preserved the traditional state law role with respect to insurance
regulation, self-insured employers escape such state regulation by virtue
of the so-called "deemer clause." '243 As construed by the Supreme Court,
the deemer clause "exempt(s) self-funded ERISA plans from state laws
that regulat[e] 'insurance' within the meaning of the saving clause.' ' 244
In other words, state-level regulations may address a social issue like
AIDS coverage if the employer provides health care through a tradi-
tional plan provided by a carrier like Blue Cross, but not if the employer
maintains a self-insured plan.245
The example of AIDS coverage in employer-sponsored medical plans
carries important lessons. First, under the system of American
240. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (ERISA preemption clause
does not apply to "any law of any State which regulates insurance").
241. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 203. Professor Rothstein and his colleagues also
report that "every state law now provides that AIDS and AIDS-related conditions are
disabilities." See id. at 336 n.1.
242. Of course, someone has to pay for legislatively mandated benefits.
243. See ERISA § 514(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (1988). It states that
"[n]either an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust established under such a plan, shall
be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... for purposes of any law of
any state purporting to regulate insurance .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
244. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990). The disparity between ERISA's
treatment of medical plans provided through insurance companies and self-insured plans
is an anomaly created by Congress; the court has "no choice but to 'begin with the lan-
guage employed by Congress ... "' Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 740 (1985).
245. The distinction between self-insured and insured medical plans is not as clear as it
may appear. Are employer-pays plans, with back-up stop-loss coverage from a carrier,
self-insured or insured plans? The characterization may determine whether state man-
dated-benefit laws apply to the plan. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers &
Employees Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that stop-loss plan is a self-insured plan); see also General Motors Corp. v. California
State Bd. of Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that plan with mini-
mum premium feature is insured plan), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 941 (1988). Not all agree
that an employer-paid plan with stop-loss protection is a self-insured plan, however. See,
e.g., Eccles & Gordan, 1 ERISA Litigation Reporter 3-4 (1991). Further, traditional
insurance companies continue to administer many self-funded plans.
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employment law that evolved during the past half-century, the states his-
torically have regulated the content of workplace medical plans. This is
also true of many other aspects of the employment law system. Thus,
looking at the overall system, the AIDS controversy primarily raised
state policy issues. Second, ERISA preemption law limits this author-
ity-in this instance, along the anomalous line between self-insured and
insured medical plans. 2" Third, elucidating these limits raises political,
normative and institutional issues-issues of federalism. To those issues
this Article now turns.
IV. THE THEORY OF PREEMPTION IN THE LARGER CONTEXT
The division of authority between the state and the federal govern-
ments in employment and labor law falls within the broader problem of
dividing regulatory authority more generally-for example, in environ-
mental, consumer, and business regulation. Particular preemption deci-
sions in labor and employment law must make sense not only from the
perspective of the overall, complex system of integrated state and federal
regulation that has evolved to govern the workplace, but also from the
perspective of this broader tradition of federalism as well.
For two centuries, striking the right balance between centralized and
decentralized authority has presented a continuing problem for our gov-
ernmental system. 247 The Constitution reflects a compromise-both the
states and the federal government possess sovereign powers.248 Indeed,
246. Self-insured plans are common in larger business enterprises and most Fortune
500 companies self-insure their medical plans. Small businesses traditionally used insur-
ance carriers. But, because of the anomaly in ERISA preemption law, many smaller em-
ployers have an incentive to switch to self-insured plans (perhaps to stop-loss coverage) to
escape state mandated benefit laws. See Health Insurance Caps Primary Concern of Em-
ployees with AIDS, Attorney Says, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1123 (Oct. 19, 1992)
("Most large employers are self-insured.") Professor Rothstein notes that "many advan-
tages" result from self-insuring, not the least of which is avoiding state mandated cover-
ages. See id. According to testimony at a congressional hearing in December, 1992, two-
thirds of health plans are now self-insured. See Congress Urged to Amend Pension Law to
Prevent Health Coverage Reductions, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1337 (Dec. 7,
1992).
247. See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 15, 28, 59 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 39, 51
(James Madison); Harrop A. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemp-
tion, 21 DePaul L. Rev. 630 (1972); Paul A. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 561 (1954); Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist
and Federalism, 91 Yale L.J. 1317, 1320-22 (1982); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Feder-
alism: The Missing Link, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 69 (1988).
248. As Justice Scalia once put it:
We have to bear in mind that [federalism] is a form of government midway
between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy, the disunity, the conflict
of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the inflexibility, the monot-
ony of one centralized government. Federalism is meant to be a compromise
between the two.
Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 19, 19 (1982).
Many distinct questions arise under the banner of federalism. One concerns the consti-
tutional powers of the Congress. See, e.g. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408
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the historian Samuel Eliot Morrison went so far as to describe the con-
cept of a "sovereign union of sovereign states" as "the most original con-
tribution of the United States to the history and technique of human
liberty."249 This Part examines the broader federalism/preemption de-
bate from three perspectives: (1) the political, or pragmatic, (2) the nor-
mative, or policy-making, and (3) the interpretive, or institutional. It
suggests that current preemption doctrine inadequately separates these
three distinct aspects of the federalism debate.250
A. Federalism as a Political or Pragmatic Question
From the New Deal-era to the 1970s, liberals often trumpeted the vir-
tues of uniform federal standards, while conservatives often invoked the
values of local autonomy and control. 251 But, as then-Professor Scalia
pointed out in 1982, federalism "is a stick that can be used to beat either
dog. ' 25 2 For Scalia, conservatives "simply [had] been out-gunned at the
federal level for half a century" and the "trick" was not to shun the
federal government but "to use [regulation] wisely. '25a Gradually, many
interest groups and conservatives embraced federal regulation as a shel-
ter from state regulatory initiatives. 4 It often was argued that "in an
increasingly global economy, the specter of diverse and stringent regula-
tion will weaken United States competitiveness. ,255
(1992) (holding that 10th Amendment limits Congressional authority); Helvering v. Da-
vis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (recognizing that Congress may spend money to promote
the general welfare); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Robert M.
Cover, Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 Yale L.J. 1342 (1983). A second
concerns the sovereign immunity of states and their officers under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S. Ct. 2395 (1991); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974); see generally Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale
L.J. 1425 (1987). A third concerns whether Congress, assuming it is acting constitution-
ally, intends federal regulation to be exclusive or merely complimentary to state regula-
tion-i.e., whether federal law preempts state law.
249. Samuel Eliot Morrison, 1 The Oxford History of the American People 408 (1972).
250. See Ben W. Heineman, The Law Schools' Failing Grade on Federalism, 92 Yale
L.J. 1349 (1983) (distinguishing between policy conflicts, political conflicts, and func-
tional analysis).
251. As Professor Foote observed in 1984 in her leading article on administrative pre-
emption, "[t]he past two decades have witnessed shifting political allegiances on regula-
tory issues. In the 1970's consumers, workers, and environmentalists sought federal
protection, while businesses sang the praises of state autonomy. Today, businesses seek
federal laws and regulations that will preempt state laws." Susan Bartlett Foote, Admin-
istrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 1466
(1984).
252. Scalia, supra note 248, at 19.
253. Scalia, supra note 248, at 20-22.
254. See State Regulators Rush In Where Washington No Longer Treads: Will the New
Federalism Create A 50-Headed Hydra?, Bus. Wk., Sept. 19, 1983, at 124, 131
("[B]usiness is now calling for federal regulation in a manner reminiscent of the Progres-
sive Era .. "). See generally Foote, supra note 251, at 1430; S. Candice Hoke, Preemp-
tion Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 687, 690-99 (1991);
Wolfson, supra note 247, at 87-89.
255. W. John Moore, Stopping the States, Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1990, at 1758, 1762.
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In due course, the sword of federal regulation evolved into the shield
of federal preemption. From federal regulation of cigarettes," 6 pesti-
cides,257 water quality, 258 seat belts, 25 9 airfares,260 and nuclear safety,2 61
to name but a few, grew preemption defenses to ban or limit regulations
at the local and state level.262 In the meantime, political progressives
began to see state and local politics as bastions for innovative regulatory
initiatives,26 3 and academics warned against the "capture" of Washing-
ton-based regulatory bureaucracies by the interest groups they
regulated. 2 4
The political ambivalence of federalism also was reflected in workplace
disputes. Proponents of the New Deal collective bargaining system, such
as Archibald Cox, once favored broad preemption of state laws touching
labor relations because they feared interference with federal labor pol-
icy. 26 ' But the rise of a jurisprudence of individual workplace rights,
256. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (1969 Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act, but not original 1965 Act, preempts failure to warn and certain
fraudulent misrepresentation claims in product liability suit based on cigarette marketing
practices).
257. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991) (holding that
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act does not preempt local regulation of
aerial pesticide-spraying).
258. See California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) (hold-
ing that Federal Power Act preempts state-set minimum stream flow rates); International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (holding that Clean Water Act preempts
common law nuisance action based on law of non-source state).
259. See Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.) (holding that federal law
preempts claims based on state common law theories of liability for design defects arising
from defendant's failure to equip van with air bags or automatic safety belts), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 853 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 8816 (11th Cir. 1989)
(same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395
(1st Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp.,
875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1988) (same), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); cf Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that
federal agency's rescission of regulation requiring passive restraints or airbags in
automobiles arbitrary and capricious).
260. See Morales v. TWA, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 (1992) (holding that 1978 Airline De-
regulation Act preempts state regulation of deceptive airline fare advertising); Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (holding that Federal Aviation Act does
not preempt state fraud claim).
261. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); see generally Note,
Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency In Federal Energy Statutes, 103 Harv. L Rev. 1306
(1990).
262. See Hoke, supra note 254, at 687.
263. See, e.g., David Morris, You Can Fight City Hall, Utne Reader, Nov./Dec. 1991,
at 89 (1991) ("[L]ocal politics, unlike national politics, can truly be empowering for eve-
ryday citizens.").
264. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 251, at 1431 ("[B]usinesses have begun to lobby for
uniform federal regulations that would preempt more protective state laws."). See gener-
ally Hoke, supra note 254 (arguing that it is more difficult to capture fifty-state legisla-
tures and bureaucracies than to master one in Washington).
265. See, e.g., Archibald Cox & Marshall J. Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations,
64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 245 (1950) [hereinafter Cox & Seidman] ("We have argued for a
large area of exclusive federal authority in order to permit the development of a unified
1993]
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based to a great extent on state law, soon caused employers-and their
legal counsel-to invoke the preemptive shield of federal employment
enactments. Predictably, employee-plaintiff attorneys often became the
guardians of state regulatory prerogatives in the workplace.266 As with
much environmental and consumer regulation, preemption disputes
often dominate employment law litigation.267 In practical terms, these
disputes concerned not only what conduct was regulated, 268 but also
what remedies were available for violations of federal and state law.
269
labor relations program, not only by the NLRB in administering the present statute but
also by the Congress in improving the law."). Cox received recognition in both scholarly
and judicial circles as a leading labor law authority. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 7, at
389. ("[A] new school of scholars.., championed a more activist judicial role enlarging
federal power at the expense of the states. Prominent among these was Archibald Cox,
who, in a series of brilliant articles that profoundly influenced the Court's labor preemp-
tion jurisprudence, advocated [a] presumption in favor of NLRA preemption. His argu-
ment was a clarion call for judicial knitting of federal labor policy that preempted
without authorization from Congress, indeed in open defiance of what Cox assumed was
the mind-set of the legislators who had enacted the statute."). The Supreme Court not
only adopted many of Cox's ideas, but approvingly cited his scholarship in numerous
decisions. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
753 n.30 (1985); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 n.6 (1985); Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 n. 5 (1964). Cox's other preemption works include: Archi-
bald Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 Va. L.
Rev. 1057 (1958) [hereinafter Cox, Labor Decisions]; Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemp-
tion Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1972) [hereinafter Cox, Preemption Revisited];
Archibald Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Ohio State
L.J. 277 (1980) [hereinafter Cox, Developments]; Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297 (1954) [hereinafter Cox, Federalism]; Archibald
Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319 (1951) (hereinafter
Cox, Concerted Activities]. See also Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 956-1039.
266. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (holding that
ERISA bars state wrongful discharge action where employee claimed termination to pre-
vent vesting of pension benefits); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 202 (holding that LMRH
§ 301 preempts state claim for breach of insurance contract covenant of good faith and
fair dealing). Of course, such claims are not always successful. See, e.g., English v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (holding that state law mental distress claim against
employer was not preempted by federal nuclear safety regulations); Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1988) (holding that retaliatory termination claim
based in Illinois tort law not preempted by Labor Management Relations Act).
267. The Supreme Court, for example, has addressed § 301 preemption questions five
times since in 1985, while hundreds of federal appeals court and state appellate court
decisions have considered this perplexing doctrine in the last ten years. Yet, § 301 pre-
emption is merely one preemption doctrine in employment law; there are many others.
For example, Justice Stevens has stated that lower federal courts are flooded with some
2,800 ERISA preemption cases. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
113 S. Ct. 580, 586 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. For example, in Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220, the Supreme Court held that
LMRA § 301 preempted a worker's state law claim alleging bad faith processing of medi-
cal insurance and disability claims.
269. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), the Supreme Court
held that ERISA preempted an employee's state law wrongful discharge claim where he
alleged his discharge was an attempt to prevent vesting of his pension benefits. Accord-
ing to the Court, ERISA § 514 (interference provision) made the defendant's alleged con-
duct actionable under ERISA, but only for equitable relief. See id. at 145.
[Vol. 62
THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STA TES
Until the Civil Rights Act of 1991,270 jury trials, compensatory damages
(including emotional distress), and punitive damages were more likely to
be available to employees asserting state law rights than to those bringing
suit under federal statutes.271 The switch of sides by management and
employee lawyers on federalism issues is thus predictable.
B. Federalism as a Normative or Policy Question
As important as politics may be to an understanding of the forces driv-
ing the explosion of preemption claims during the 1980s and 1990s, the
doctrine raises questions far more profound than a mere tactical shift
between market and regulatory enthusiasts reflecting control, or the lack
of control, over the federal government. A debate continues across ideo-
logical lines between proponents of regulatory centralism and uniformity
and those who favor Brandeisian decentralization.272 Thus, as Professor
Fried puts it, beyond the pragmatic aspect of federalism lies "a concern
for the deeper, more intrinsic values"-the belief that "one's particular
hobby horse [might] be ridden harder and more successfully by the fed-
eral government" does not justify "immediately switch[ing] from advo-
cating federalism to advocating centralism., 273
Although Congress possesses broad authority under the modern Com-
merce Clause, Spending Clause, and Civil War Amendments to preempt
state decision-making, what principled considerations, besides politics,
might guide Congress in deciding whether to make federal regulation
270. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
271. Even with the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, state law causes of action
often continue to offer additional remedies. Federal discrimination claims for damages
are still capped, while many state discrimination statutes do not limit damages. For a
discussion, see supra part II.B. 1. Moreover, state common law causes of action, such as
defamation, violation of privacy, and outrageous conduct, often permit the recovery of
damages. For a discussion, see supra part II.B. 1. No analogous body of federal common
law exists. Finally, even for claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the circuit courts
differ about whether the statute, including its damages provisions, should be applied ret-
roactively. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
272. Louis Brandeis' argument for decentralized regulatory structures appears in his
famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932):
The economic and social sciences are largely uncharted seas.... [Humans are]
weak and [their] judgment is at best fallible... There must be power in the
States ... to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and
institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.... It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.
Commentators, such as Walter Lippman, popularized the term "laboratories for experi-
ment." See, ag., Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism, 93-95 (1937) (quoting
New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1936). President Clinton embraced this notion dur-
ing the 1992 presidential campaign. See Jon Hamilton, Laboratories of Reform: States
Experiment With Health Care Plans, A.B.A. J., July, 1993, at 81, 82.
273. Charles Fried, Federalism: Why Should We Care?, 6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 1
(1982).
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exclusive? The next sections examine arguments against and for
preemption.
1. Arguments Against Preemption
Arguments for state-level decision-making may be divided into four
categories: (a) experimentation, (b) context or "shaping," (c) power-dif-
fusion, and (d) civic autonomy and participation.
a. Experimentation
Louis Brandeis' classic argument for state-level decision-making still
rings true.274 Although largely rejected by the New Dealers,275 and even
today sometimes considered an "old chestnut," '276 the "laboratories for
experiment" argument carries renewed force for two reasons. First,
many now appreciate more clearly that wisdom in policy often eludes
even the best and the brightest.277 Consequently, federal decision-mak-
ers, less confident that federal law strikes the optimal mix of free market
and regulatory intervention, may be more reluctant to impose a federal
orthodoxy on the states. Second, "disaggregat[ion of] governmental
power... may [provide] an impetus toward innovation, toward experi-
mentation. ' 278 Experiments conducted locally, if unsuccessful, will have
effects that are largely local. If successful, they can be adopted by other
states or the central political authority itself. Thus, though the
274. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 272, at 93. Arnold comments that:
We cite a column from one of the most learned economic pundits of the time,
Walter Lippmann. He had an emotional bias against the exercise of national
power to solve national problems. He converted that emotional leaning into
certainty by pretending that the separate states were like physical or chemical
laboratories, dealing with economic problems as a scientist deals with physical
experiments. The notion that our checker squares of states were economic units
or that they had the power to conduct experiments or that the experiments they
conducted could be utilized by other states is of course pure daydreaming.
Id.
276. See Fried, supra note 273, at 2.
277. I borrow from David Halberstam's classic work, The Best and The Brightest
(1972).
Commenting on the New Dealers' mind set, Cass Sunstein writes that "[a] critical
feature of the learning of the New Deal period . . .is that the original constitutional
structure of dual sovereignty was a large mistake, allied with anachronistic goals of lim-
ited government and inconsistent with the need for continuing national intervention into
marketplaces." Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539,
1578 (1988).
278. Fried, supra note 273, at 2. Fried, however, adds a caveat:
that local governments not be allowed to enjoy monopoly power .... The
industry that is overburdened by environmental regulations, featherbedding la-
bor practices or by an excessively generous social welfare program, must be able
to pick up, without penalty, and move across the border. If that is not possible,
... then the virtue of innovation disappears and what remain[s] are fifty petty
and stultifying tyrannies, rather than fifty laboratories of experimentation.
Id. at 2-3.
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"laboratories" rationale may not be a controlling criterion, it remains an
important consideration.
Consider workplace safety." 9 Notwithstanding OSHA standard-set-
ting, the states pioneered the use of the criminal law in cases involving
serious wrongdoing.2 80 And even a spokesperson for the national AFL-
CIO, long a proponent of uniform national workplace health and safety
standards, recently conceded that concurrent state regulatory authority
provides "some advantages" over exclusive federal regulation.2"'
Or, take another example, health-care. The national government is
currently debating a national health-care plan.2 2 Oregon already has
developed an employer-mandate plan that also prioritizes medical serv-
ices.283 Indeed, some aspects of the Clinton Administration's plan ap-
pear to have been modelled after health-care programs developed in
Oregon and other states.
b. Context or "Shaping"
OSHA's legislative history reflects Congress' dissatisfaction with the
effectiveness of state regulation of workplace safety.284 Twenty years
later, federal regulation of workplace safety has received similar
279. OSHA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1988).
280. See, e.g., People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (11.) (holding
that OSHA did not preempt state from prosecuting employer where employees unreason-
ably exposed to poisonous substances), cert denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); People v. Hege-
dus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989) (holding that employer guilty of involuntary
manslaughter for employee's death from carbon monoxide asphyxiation); Note, A Propo-
sal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Limita-
tions of Punishment and Culpability, 91 Yale L.J. 1446, 1448-57 (1982) (arguing that
OSHA's criminal sanction provisions are "moribund" for lack of federal criminal prose-
cutions and are ineffective as an enforcement mechanism); Note, Getting Away With Mur-
der: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 535 (1987) (arguing that state criminal prosecutions deter dangerous
employer practices and should not be preempted).
281. See AFL-CIO Sees Some Advantages In State Oversight of Workplace Safety, 10
Employee Rel. Wdy. (BNA) 1273 (Nov. 23, 1992). Although the AFL-CIO is a federa-
tion of labor unions representing employees, it has not consistently supported employees
in preemption disputes. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 203
(1985) (AFL-CIO filed amicus brief supporting federal preemption of bad faith insurance
claims against employers).
282. See Robin Toner, Political Shoals Ahead: Clinton's Health Plan Goes from Con-
cept to Clauses, Every One a Potential Target, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1993, at Al; Robert
Pear, Congress is Given Clinton Proposal for Health Care, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1993, at
Al.
283. The Clinton administration approved the Oregon Plan with certain modifications
to protect disabled persons. See Robert Pear, US. Backs Oregon Health Plan for Cover-
ing All Poor People, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1993, at A8. The employer-mandate feature,
however, continues to be controversial in Oregon. See Health Care Overhaul Is Approved
in Oregon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1993, at A18. Other states also have adopted innovative
plans. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., As U.S. Policy Makers Debate, States Move Ahead
on Health Care Overhaul, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1993, at A30 (reviewing developments in
Hawaii, Minnesota, Vermont, Tennessee, Florida, New York, Massachusetts, and
Maryland).
284. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 601.
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criticism.285 In fact, in 1985, a congressional agency attributed a de-
crease in national injury rates during a three-year period to slow-downs
in business activity, not OSHA safety regulations.2 s6 For decades,
OSHA struggled to promulgate revised regulations on toxic exposure.287
Many preliminary OSHA standards, however, were based on 1960s sci-
ence and, not until 1989, were obsolete exposure levels revised for many
standards.288 Some remain outdated. In large part, these problems oc-
curred because OSHA required the United States Department of Labor
to issue standards for millions of American workplaces. 289 Aside from
inadequate staffing and funding,2 90 comprehensive federal regulation,
285. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 82 (1990) ("[M]uch of the
work of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has also been ineffective.");
Stone, supra note 7, at 637-38 (commenting that OSHA standard-setting "project is so
vast, and the interests affected so varied, that today, twenty years after the enactment of
the legislation, standards have only been set for a small number of the tens of thousands
of industrial chemicals in common use").
286. See Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace 6 (United States Congress,
Office of Tech. Assessment, OTA-H-256, April 1985).
287. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 493-94
(1981) (invalidating OSHA standards concerning exposure to cotton dust); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607. 613-15 (1980) (invalidating
lower exposure threshold for the toxic chemical benzene because thresholds based on
findings unsupported by the administrative record); Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727
F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 1984) (invalidating emergency standard for asbestos). According
to Professor Rothstein, "The OSHA rulemaking process is protracted, detailed, cumber-
some, and adversarial. As a result, few new health standards have been adopted. The
stakes are high, in both economic and human terms. No doubt this fact affects the length
of the process. A new standard takes years to promulgate and consumes millions of
dollars." Rothstein, supra note 88, at 619. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Substantive
and Procedural Obstacles to OSHA Rulemaking: Reproductive Hazards as an Example,
12 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 627, 630 (1985) (analyzing current OSHA regulations gov-
erning reproductive hazards); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale 3. on Reg. 1 (1989) (ex-
amining regulatory problems and suggesting reforms).
288. See Finkin, supra note 40, at 368 ("In the first fifteen years of the [OSHA] statute
only twenty-two new health standards as contrasted to safety standards were promul-
gated, with procedures taking up to ten years from the time a standard was proposed
until it was upheld by a court of appeals."); Grace E. Ziem & Barry I. Castleman, Thresh-
old Limit Values: Historical Perspectives and Current Practice, 31 3. Occupational Med.
910, 914 (1989) (claiming that OSHA occupational exposure limits are poorly supported
by scientific evidence and recommending greater use of industrial medicine in identifying
health affects of exposures).
289. Of course, OSHA excludes certain classes of employers, such as the federal gov-
ernment and state and local governments. See OSHA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 652(5).
290. OSHA employs between 1,000 and 1,500 federal inspectors who are responsible
for inspecting five million workplaces. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 628. Using the
lower figure, an OSHA inspector is required to inspect 5,000 workplaces per year. See id.
In his budget proposal, President Clinton requested $294 million for OSHA and the hir-
ing of an additional 2,311 full-time employees. See House Appropriations Chops $1.8 Bil-
lion from President's Job Training Request, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 121 (June 25, 1993).
See also Weiler, supra note 10, at 157 ("OSHA has always suffered from the inability of a
comparative handful of inspectors to monitor hundreds of thousands of work sites in this
country in order to ensure even a modest level of ongoing compliance with legally man-
dated standards.").
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though industry-specific, may be less flexible than state standard-setting
in shaping regulation to local conditions.29'
Let us take an additional example-minimum wage and overtime
hours laws. The Fair Labor Standards Act292 (the "FLSA") authorizes
states to establish minimum wage and overtime standards that are higher
than the federal mandate.293 The law's flexibility reflects a concern that a
single minimum wage or overtime standard may not be appropriate in all
local economies in the country. Here, the balance of authority tradition-
ally has been struck in favor of minimum national standards, leaving the
states free to adapt the standard to meet local economic conditions.
In sum, state decision-making often "appears superior to uniform na-
tional standards. ' 29 4  As Professor Sunstein argues, "'Reconstitutive
law'-reforms that allow state and local flexibility by restructuring mar-
kets rather than imposing inflexible national commands-should be
viewed hospitably. '291
c. Power-Diffusion
The Federalist Papers reflect a belief that the people's liberties and
interests might receive "double protection" through power-sharing be-
tween the branches of the federal government and a division of power
between the states and the federal government. 296 This power-diffusion
291. Accordingly, under OSHA's reverse preemption provision see OSHA § 18(b), 29
U.S.C. § 667(b), about half the states have promulgated state level regulations that have
been approved by the United States Department of Labor. See supra note 133 and ac-
companying text.
292. Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
293. See FLSA § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Although the Fair Labor Standards Act does
not preempt higher state standards, a debate exists about whether a state may provide
greater remedies than those provided in federal law if an employer's practices violate both
federal and state standards. Compare Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 898-99
(Alaska 1980) (holding that state law not preempted it exceeds employee protections es-
tablished by FLSA) and Hendrix v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 234 So. 2d 93, 95 (La. Ct. App.)
(holding that FLSA does not preempt greater state remedy), cert. denied, 236 So.2d 498
(La. 1970) with Spieth v. Adasen Distributing Inc., Civ. No. 88-1541, 1989 WL 61187,
at *2-*3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 1989) (holding that FLSA wage provisions preempt state law)
and Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (holding that FLSA sole remedy available). See generally Michael D. Moberly,
Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage Payment Remedies, 23 Ariz. St. LJ.
991 (1991) (discussing whether FLSA preempts state law remedies that are more benefi-
cial to employees and concluding that they do not).
294. Sunstein, supra note 277, at 1578.
295. Id
296. James Madison, for example, argued that a federalist structure combined with the
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, created:
a double security.., to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other ... Whilst all authority in [the federal republic] will be
derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into
so many parts... that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
The Federalist No. 51, at 323-24 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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rationale often has been thought to spring from a conservative, anti-stat-
ist ideology-"more power in local government will likely mean less total
government.... [L]ocal government makes the cost of government pro-
grams more relevant, and the greater the relevance of costs, the fewer the
government programs. "297 More progressive voices, too, have embraced
power-diffusion rationales- "One may posit that it is more difficult to
capture fifty state legislatures and bureaucracies than to master one in
Washington. ' ' 298 Moreover, twice during the past two Supreme Court
terms, strong majorities of the Court expressly invoked power diffusion
as an animating concern of our federal system. 99
d. Civic Autonomy and Participation
State-level regulation also offers greater civic autonomy and participa-
tion than federal-level regulation. While it may be true, as recently
Madison's power- diffusion rationale for federalism received explicit approval from six
Supreme Court Justices in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, (1992)
(" '[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.") (quoting Colman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2570 (1991)); Gregory v. Ash-
croft, Ill S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (1991) ("Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate Branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one Branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
Not all proponents of the Constitution were so sanguine about the retention of state
powers, however. Alexander Hamilton argued:
If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them
on the part of the State governments as on the part of the general government.
... The people of America may be warmly attached to the government of the
Union, at times when the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by
the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement,
and supported by a strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very
opposite temper.
The Federalist No. 59, at 363, 365-366 (Alexander Hamilton), (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). See generally George Carey, James Madison on Federalism: The Search for Abid-
ing Principles, 3 Benchmark 27, 33 (1987) (discussing Madison's theory that federalism
does not leave any function or power purely in states authority and that federal power
always may interfere).
297. Lino A. Graglia, In Defense of "Federalism", 6 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23, 24-25
(1982).
298. Hoke, supra note 254, at 693. But see, e.g., Crain, Images of Power, supra note 83,
at 512-17. According to Professor Crain, feminist jurisprudential theory emphasizes
"power to" rather than "power over." See id. at 511.
299. See, e.g., New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2431 (holding that "take title" provision of Low
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments invalid under 10th Amendment). The
Court stated that:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the
States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit
of the public officials governing the States .... [T]he Constitution divides au-
thority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citi-
zens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."
Id. at 2431 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 11 S. Ct. 2546, 2570 (1991); see also Ashcroft,
111 S. Ct. at 2399 ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
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suggested by Professor Crain, that civic republicanism currently enjoys a
somewhat "trendy" revival,3 ° this may reflect its appeal from both the
instrumentalist and intrinsic good perspectives. 301 "A central lesson of
the republican revival is the need to provide outlets for sel-determination
in the public and private spheres. '30 2  While some scholars question
whether "a celebration of local autonomy" truly supports "individual lib-
erty,, 30 3 Professor Graglia's pragmatic analysis seems compelling:
Localism means greater respect for individual preferences, not simply
as a matter of theory, but as a matter of fact ... indeed, even as a
matter of arithmetic....
[A]s an issue is decided by larger units... the likelihood increases
that fewer people will obtain their preference and more will be
disappointed. °4
More fundamentally, whether one's preferences are implemented or not,
participation increases individuals' acceptance of policy as well as their
sense of connection to the political process.305
2. Arguments for Preemption
Arguments for federal preemption of state law fall into three catego-
ries: (a) uniformity and efficiency, (b) uniformity and fairness, and (c)
avoidance of parochialism.
a. Uniformity and Efficiency
Of course, not all values point to a preference for state, rather than
federal, law-making. Efficiency counts as well, and uniformity may con-
tribute to efficiency in various contexts. In employment law, ERISA's
preemption of state regulation of pension and fringe benefit plans306
300. Crain, Images of Power, supra note 83, at 491-92 n.45. See generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv. L Rev. 1695
(1989); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
301. Cass Sunstein's leading explication of the theory of civic republican theory to our
times is instrumentalist. See Sunstein, supra note 277, at 1541 n.8. Professor Sunstein
sees civic republicanism as necessary to "a well functioning deliberative process." Other
writers embrace civic republicanism because they view citizens participation in their gov-
ernance as intrinsically good. See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 254, at 690 n.19. Still others
have embraced both the theory's intrinsic and instrumentalist aspects. See, e.g., Paul
Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival. Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 Yale
L.J. 1623, 1623-24 (1988).
302. Sunstein, supra note 277, at 1578.
303. See Fried, supra note 273, at 2. Fried states that:
It seems to me that, with respect to individual liberty, the choice between cen-
tralism and localism is at best a standoff. It is not at all clear that localism
necessarily fosters the liberty of the moderns-the kind of liberty which is im-
portant to me-because small towns and small units can be as tyrannical as
larger political institutions.
Id
304. Graglia, supra note 297, at 23.
305. See generally Hoke, supra note 254, at 689-90 nn. 18-19 (discussing participation).
306. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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reflects the uniformity/efficiency rationale. As Congressman Dent, a
sponsor of the ERISA legislation, explained:
[T]he "crowning achievement" of [ERISA] was the "reservation to
Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee
benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the pro-
tection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting
and inconsistent State and local regulation., 30
7
Because the federal government long ago assumed responsibility for re-
tired individuals' social security, and the private pension system is often
integrated with, or complementary to, the national social security sys-
tem, arguments for uniform national standards carry much weight. Fur-
ther, many pension plans cover workforces across state lines and their
investment programs largely occur on national securities exchanges.
But, as the reductions in coverage in workplace medical insurance plans
for AIDS patients illustrates,30 1 the reach of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion sometimes exceeds the policy rationale for uniform standards. 30 9
b. Uniformity and Fairness
The uniformity rationale has a fairness component as well. Notions of
fairness between employers and employees in state "X" and employers
and employees in state "Y" may suggest that federal law-making should
be exclusive.
Consider one example in employment law-the 1978 Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act.310 After the Supreme Court declared in 1976 that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy did not involve gender
discrimination, 3 1' many states, as Title VII expressly allows, 31 2 amended
307. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 588 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974)) (arguing ERISA does not
preempt District of Columbia law mandating that employers provide workers' compensa-
tion beneficiaries with continuation of medical insurance benefits for twelve months).
The ERISA preemption provision provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.... ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a). The Supreme Court has construed the term "relate" to mean "connection" or
"reference." See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (stat-
ing that a state law " 'relates to' an employee [pension or] benefit plan .... if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan.") (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
308. See supra part III.
309. In the past eleven years, the Supreme Court has decided eleven ERISA preemp-
tion cases. See Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. at 580; Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498
U.S. at 133; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988);
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85; Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
311. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); cf Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that a policy of denying accumulated seniority to employees
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or construed their state sex discrimination laws to cover pregnancy. 313
Later, Congress adopted a uniform federal standard recognizing preg-
nancy as related to gender and requiring that pregnancy be treated the
same as any other disability.314 Uniformity also may avoid the "race to
the bottom" as states scramble to create an attractive business climate.
Or, conversely, uniform federal standards may avoid the "race to the
top" as states, in a time of chronic labor shortages, such as is predicted
for the next century,315 compete for high-skilled employees.
c. Avoidance of Parochial Interests
Avoiding local parochialism constitutes a third argument for exclusive
federal regulation.316 In the employment law context, proposals to pro-
tect sexual orientation under status discrimination laws may be feasible
politically in large cities and in some states, but not in smaller towns and
other states. Federal regulation avoids such problems.317
C. The Institutional or Interpretive Aspects of Federalism
As discussed above, the decision for or against exclusive federal law-
making, or the preemption of state law, raises problematic policy and
normative issues. Who should decide these questions? The answer is, of
course, Congress.
A major problem with discussions of preemption doctrine arises from
upon return from pregnancy/maternity leave violates Title VII if policy not applied to
other types of disability leaves).
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
313. See, e.g., Michael J. Langan & Richard G. Gisonny, Family Leave Proposals and
Existing State Law, 4 Benefits L.J. 289, 290-309 (1991) (summarizing then-existing state
statutes).
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(k). Notwithstanding the PDA's "same as" standard, the
Supreme Court upheld a California statute mandating preferential maternity leave for
women during the period of actual disability in California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987).
315. See generally Jack Lambert, Work Force 2000, 7 Lab. Law. 221 (1991) (charting
likely trends of labor force composition from present to 2000).
316. The recent spotted owl/Endangered Species Act crisis in the Pacific Northwest
immediately comes to mind as a local example. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Ancient
Forest, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land Law, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 605
(1990); Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Lai:
Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 435 (1991) (examining congressional exemptions from enforcement of existing
environmental laws).
317. In Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement, Professor William
Forbath points out that the Framers "created a constitutional scheme that treated the
sphere of common law rights of contract and property as a suprapolitical realm of private
right... [so that] ... class relations were presumptively matters of law and not politics,
matters for courts, not legislatures." Forbath, supra note 40, at 27. But, for labor unions,
"[t]he federal structure of government meant that American labor reformers had to con-
tend with multiple and competing tiers of policy-making authority. This structural exi-
gency raised the costs and reduced the efficacy of labor reforms. So doing, it
strengthened the case for voluntarism." Id. at 28.
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the failure to distinguish the normative/policy aspects from the institu-
tional/interpretive aspects of the problem. The Constitution eschews
neutrality on questions of federalism. Rather, it affirmatively establishes
a system of dual sovereigns. 31 8 Even with the expansion of congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause,3 19 the Spending Clause,3 20 and the
Civil War Amendments,321 the sister sovereigns retain broad authority in
most areas of economic, environmental, consumer, and workplace life.a22
Unless, and until, Congress exercises its authority, not only to regulate,
but to regulate exclusively, the states retain their constitutionally con-
ferred powers.323 Two major considerations support this view.
First, affirmative congressional action to displace state power provides
a political safeguard for federalism: "[I]n areas where the states may
legislate, the Constitution intends that Congress weigh and consider care-
fully any displacement of state authority. ' 3 24  Members of Congress
themselves are representatives of their states, and their districts within
their states, in a way that appointed judges and Executive branch officials
318. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (concluding
that "while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the
States to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders, the
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel states to do
so"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991) (stating that "our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government").
319. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
320. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl.I.
321. U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV; see also Wolfson, supra note 247, at 93-94.
322. The dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause doctrine restricts a state's authority
to regulate in a manner that unduly burdens, or discriminates against, interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-13
(1992) (holding Alabama statute imposing higher fees on an operator of hazardous waste
disposal facility for out-of-state waste invalid under negative Commerce Clause); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019,
2023-24 (1992) (holding Michigan statute requiring consent of county for landfill opera-
tors acceptance of solid waste originating out-of-county invalid under negative Com-
merce Clause). The Fourteenth Amendment and much of the Bill of Rights also operate
to restrict state powers. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding
that county constable's office had no justifiable interest supporting discharge of employee
for threatening to harm the president); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (holding that teacher's interest as citizen in making public comment must be bal-
anced against the state's interest in promoting efficiency of its employees); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that state policy of providing separate,
but equal schooling for black children violates the Constitution).
323. See generally Tribe, supra note 2, at 378-97, 479-511 (discussing state sovereignty
as a limit on congressional power and federal preemption of state law).
324. Wolfson, supra note 247, at 102. Wolfson argues that courts should require Con-
gress to state expressly its intent to preempt state regulation in a "clear statement." Id. at
111-14. Several recent Supreme Court opinions suggest acceptance of this "clear state-
ment" approach by a majority of the court. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct.
2395, 2401 (1991) ("Congress should make its intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends
to preempt the historic powers of the states .... In traditionally sensitive areas, such as
legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that
the [Congress] has in fact faced [the federalism issues].") (citations omitted)).
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are not.3
25
Second, absent congressional action pursuant to its powers under the
Supremacy Clause 326 to divest the states of their constitutionally retained
powers,3 2  the constitutional predicate for divesting the dual sovereign's
authority simply is not present. 328 Unless the exercise of state authority
implicates a provision of the Constitution other than the Supremacy
Clause,329 only Congress may displace state law. When, absent congres-
sional intent,33° the judiciary or the Executive Branch33' cloaks a deci-
sion concerning the proper division of authority between the states and
the federal government in the language of congressional intent, more
than a mere error in statutory construction occurs. Rather, the
325. See, eg., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989) (hold-
ing that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 because Congress did not
clearly and manifestly demonstrate its intent to include in definition); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (stating that federal authority is
inherently limited by the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (noting that Congress is presumed not to intend to upset
the federal-state balance of power).
326. "[T]he Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land...
anyThing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
327. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
Const., amend. X.
328. For a general discussion of the interpretive perspective, see Martin H. Redish,
Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy and the Interpretive Procesr An 'Institution-
alist' Perspective, 893 N.W. U. L. Rev. 761 (1989). It should be noted, however, that
Professor Redish's powerful arguments focus on interpretive issues in a jurisdictional
context arising from federal statutes.
329. See text accompanying supra note 322 and cases cited therein.
330. As Archibald Cox and Marshall Seidman commented in 1950:
Ideally ... Congress should draw the lines between (1) matters which are to be
subjects of exclusive national regulation; [and] (2) matters which are to be regu-
lated by the Federal Government but are also open to state regulation and (3)
matters which are to be left to state regulation. Yet it is the practice for Con-
gress to avoid the decision, thus leaving the problems to the Supreme Court.
And the Court, paradoxically, then draws the necessary lines by asking-in
form, if not in actuality-where Congress drew them.
Cox & Seidman, supra note 265, at 212. Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in a
1986 labor preemption case:
The entire body of this Court's labor law pre-emption doctrine has been built on
a series of implications as to congressional intent in the face of congressional
silence, so that we now have an elaborate pre-emption doctrine traceable not to
any expression of Congress, but only to statements by this Court in its previous
opinions of what Congress must have intended.
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 623 (1986) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, Cox favored such judicial activism.
See Cox & Seidman, supra note 265, at 1348.
331. Administrative preemption also presents delegation problems. "Although the
Supreme Court has almost always upheld the constitutionality of broad delegations to
executive agencies, the Court has occasionally construed such delegations narrowly to
avoid the problem of overdelegation. Overdelegation is of particular concern in the con-
text of the agency's responsibility for preempting state law." Foote, supra note 251, at
1440.
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constitutional allocation of power between the federal government and
the states is disturbed. Although correctable by Congress, the error thus
is of a constitutional dimension.332
V. PREEMPTION IN PRACTICE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SUPREME COURT PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Part V examines preemption doctrine generally as it has emerged from
recent Supreme Court decisions.
A. The "Clear Statement" Doctrine
The Supreme Court recently has declared that if Congress seeks to
alter the existing "constitutional balance between the states and the Fed-
eral Government," it must make its intention "unmistakenly clear."3 ' 3
At times, the Court has appeared to require a "clear statement." '334
This clear statement approach applies to legislation " 'affecting the
federal balance.' ,335 Consequently, " 'Congress should make its inten-
tion "clear and manifest" if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of
the states.' ,336 In this manner, according to Judge Easterbrook, the
Court is "groping for a way to merge federalism instincts with the plain
meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation. ' 337 Regrettably, much
332. But see Freeman, supra note 247, at 638 (arguing that "the framers intended the
Supreme Court, not the Congress, to determine where the demands of federalism should
require the line to be drawn" and that "the Supreme Court abdicates its duty as arbiter of
the federal system when it makes the test of preemption the intent of Congress.").
333. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding
police officer's state court action against state agency for denial of promotion due to
brother's "student activist" activities not maintainable because Congress did not indicate
clearly that state agency or state "person" under § 1983); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 ("Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in Federal court only by making its intention unmistakenly clear in
the language of the statute.").
334. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991) (stating that where
federal legislation "intrudes on traditional state authority, [the Supreme Court] should
not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent.... [Tihe plain statement rule we
apply today... [requires that] we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude .. "
(citations omitted)); see also Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 177, 196-206 (1991) (discussing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 11 S. Ct. 2395 (1991); ADEA
Does Not Bar Forced Retirement of State Judges, 137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 257 (July 1,
1991) ("Five justices ... apply a clear-statement rule.").
335. Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
336. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1992) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 65); see also
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing Ashcroft doctrine in
the context of claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act and finding actual
conflicts preemption where state required annual medical examination as condition of
employment for workers seventy years of age and older). But see Hilton v. South Caro-
lina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, (1991) (holding that Federal Employers Liability
Act overcomes Eleventh Amendment immunity and creates cause of action against state-
owned railroad for injured employee under stare decisis principles, notwithstanding lack
of "clear statement").
337. Constitutional Law Conference, 61 U.S.L.W. 2237, 2248 (Oct. 27, 1992). Judge
Easterbrook reached this conclusion after reading Gade v. National Solid Wastes Manage.
THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STATES
traditional preemption doctrine has strayed from the law as now
clarified.
B. The Traditional Framework for Analyzing Preemption Issues
Traditionally, the Court applied a three-part analysis to preemption
questions.338 First, the Court asked whether Congress expressly had de-
clared an intent to preempt (or not to preempt).339 Second, the Court
examined whether, absent express intent, Congress nonetheless had occu-
pied the field.34  And, third, absent express or field preemption, the
Court inquired whether state law conflicted with federal law and thus
was preempted.34'
These categories of express, field, and conflicts preemption, however,
confuse rather than aid analysis. 342 Field preemption, for example, can
be either express34 3 or implied .3 4 And, express preemption simply is a
subcategory of conflicts preemption.345 Even though Congress expressly
states a preemptive intent, it will not always, or even often, eliminate
arguments about the scope of the intended preemption. Even where
Congress expressly intends not to preempt, as in Title VII, implied
ment Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (workplace health and safety standards), Morales Y.
TWA, Inc, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992) (airfare advertising), and Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc-, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (cigarette labeling and marketing).
338. See, eg., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-9 (1990) (holding that
Energy Reorganization Act's non-retaliation provisions do not preempt nuclear power-
plant whistleblower's state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Cali-
fornia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that federal law
may preempt state law where Congress expressly preempts, creates a regulatory scheme
that necessarily precludes state regulation, or where state law conflicts with federal law).
For other preemption employment law issues concerning nuclear production plants,
see Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that federal law does
not preempt Ohio workers' compensation supplemental award based on employer's fail-
ure to follow state safety regulations at federal facility) and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that federal law does not preempt state law claims
for punitive damages based on radiation contamination at plutonium plant); cf Pacific
Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 212 (1983) (holding that federal law occupies "the entire field of nuclear safety con-
cerns," but does not displace state moratorium on nuclear plant construction based on
economic concerns over inadequate storage facilities).
339. See English, 496 U.S. at 78.
340. See id at 79.
341. See id
342. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5.
Interestingly, several recent preemption cases do not refer to the traditional three part
analysis. See, eg., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
343. See, e.g., ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
344. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
See generally, Tribe, supra note 2, at 498 ("[Mlultiplicity of federal statutes or regula-
tions... will help to sustain a conclusion that Congress intended to exercise exclusive
control over the subject matter."). The cases Professor Tribe has cited, however, better
illustrate conflicts, rather than field, preemption.
345. See English 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5 (stating that "field pre-emption may be under-
stood as a species of conflict pre-emption").
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conflict preemption issues arise.34 6
C. An Emerging Framework for Deciding When Congress
Affirmatively Has Exercised Its Power to Preempt and
When Joint State-Federal Authority Remains Undisturbed
A presumption against preemption emerges from the Court's preemp-
tion decisions between 1990 and 1992.347 This presumption applies in
both express348 and implied preemption 349 cases.
346. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988) (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988)
(Title XI); California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); infra text
accompanying notes 674-678.
347. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580
(1992) (ERISA); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (cigarette label-
ing and advertising); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374
(1992) (OSHA); Morales v. TWA, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992) (airline fare advertising);
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (ERISA); FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (ERISA).
348. In Cipollone, seven Justices held that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (the "1965 Act") did not preempt state common law products liability
claims. See 112 S. Ct. at 2619. Even though the 1965 Act contained an express preemp-
tion provision stating that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health other than [the
Surgeon General's warning] shall be required on any cigarette package .... [or] in the
advertising of any cigarettes... .," id. at 2616. Justice Stevens' opinion, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined, invoked the "presumption
against the preemption of state police power regulations." Id. at 2618. Justices Scalia
and Thomas decried the application of the presumption in an express preemption case as
"an extraordinary and unprecedented principle of federal statutory construction." Id. at
2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Conversely,
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Kennedy and Souter joined, concurred in the plu-
rality's opinion regarding the 1965 Act and applauded their application of a presumption
against preemption in express preemption cases. See id. at 2626 ("The principles of feder-
alism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-
emption where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force
where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously.") (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
It is unclear, however, whether the plurality applied the presumption in its holdings
concerning the 1969 amendments to the cigarette labeling and advertising statute. In this
portion of the opinion, the plurality held that the amended preemption provision, which
stated that "'[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act,' "id. at 2617,
preempted some, but not all, common law products liability and fraud claims. See id. at
2620. Justice Blackmun believed that this portion of the plurality opinion was nothing
more than "a compromise" that was "baffling" since the 1969 amendment "no more
'clearly' or 'manifestly' exhibits an intent to preempt state common-law damages actions
than did the language of its predecessor in the 1965 Act." Id. at 2627. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justices
Scalia and Thomas agreed with the plurality's holding that the 1969 amendment pre-
empted many common law claims, but argued that all common law claims should have
been preempted under either version of the statute. See id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But, Justice Scalia's opinion agreed with
Justice Blackmun that the plurality inconsistently had applied the purported presumption
against preemption. See id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
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Considerations of federalism dictate that congressional intent to pre-
empt must be "clear and manifest"3 ' or "clear and unambigu-
ous. "a"Accordingly, the concept of field preemption should be
discarded. As traditionally stated, field preemption arises when "the
scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.' "352
A reasonable inference about congressional intent is not the same as a
"clear and manifest" or "clear and unambiguous" intent. Though an
extensive federal scheme of regulation conceivably may compel an infer-
ence that Congress intended to regulate exclusively, formulating the test
in terms of "a," or one, reasonable inference violates the presumption
against preemption adopted by an emerging liberal-conservative
consensus.
353
Similarly, the doctrine of conflicts preemption requires revision. Tra-
ditionally, conflicts preemption occurred in two separate situations: (1)
"where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,' ,311 and (2) "where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' ,,31 The first prong of this conflicts doctrine raises few
problems, but the second prong needs refinement.
Where simultaneous compliance with federal statutes and state law is
740 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state mandated-benefits legislation as
applied to insured employer medical plans).
349. Despite the "clear statement" doctrine, congressional displacement of traditional
state powers need not be express. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (1991)("We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear
that judges are included. This does not mean that the Act must mention judges explicitly
.... Rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges.") (empha-
sis in original). According to the Court, to discern congressional intent, courts must
"'examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.'"
Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2382 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138
(1990)). The presumption against preemption in implied, as opposed to express, preemp-
tion cases follows a long history. See, eg., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-152 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236-
237 (1947).
350. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (1992) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S.
at 230).
351. Id at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
352. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
353. The application of the presumption continues to cause disagreements. See supra
text accompanying note 348 (discussing Cipollone); see also Morales v. TWA, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2031 (1992). Increasingly, such disagreements cut across the Supreme Court's per-
ceived "liberal-conservative" cleavage. Thus, in Morales, "liberal" Justices Blackmun
and Stevens joined "conservative" Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissenting from the major-
ity's holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted state regulation of deceptive
airline fare advertising practices. See id at 2054-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. Gade, 112 S. CL at 2383 (quoting Florida Lime and Avocado Growers Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)).
355. Id. at 2383 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
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impossible, conflicts preemption presents few problems conceptually.
Even where Congress remains silent on the question of preemption, the
inference is compelling that Congress intended to displace state authority
in light of Congress' presumed awareness of the Supremacy Clause.
Otherwise, the federal law would apply unevenly in the several states, an
intent that should not be attributed to Congress unless expressly
stated. 56
To illustrate, consider one example from labor relations-the peren-
nial right-to-work controversy. 57 Suppose, as is common, the employer
agrees to a union demand for a union security clause. These clauses typi-
cally require employees in the bargaining unit represented by the union
to become members of the union or to pay union dues and initiation
fees. 58 Under the original 1935 Wagner Act, involuntary union mem-
bership or financial payments were lawful and fully enforceable. 359 State
law, however, frequently made involuntary union membership or finan-
cial payments illegal. 3 ' The employer, not to mention the dissident and
union employee, thus faced a dilemma-compliance with both state and
federal law was impossible. In those circumstances, federal law prevailed
under the Supremacy Clause.3 6 ' Accordingly, the impossibility of simul-
taneous compliance with both federal and state requirements presents the
strongest case for implied preemption.
The second prong of traditional conflicts preemption doctrine, how-
ever, is more problematic. When does state law "stand as an obstacle to
356. Congress sometimes does authorize the uneven application of federal require-
ments. Consider two examples--compulsory dues payments to unions, see infra notes
359-63 and accompanying text, and OSHA's reverse preemption provision. See Gade,
112 S. Ct. at 2383. In the case of reverse preemption, however, the United States Secre-
tary of Labor must approve the state plan. See OSHA § 18(c), 29 U.S.C. § 667(c).
357. Protecting unions and their members from free riders as well as preserving per-
sonal autonomy are the theoretical and practical problems with which the Supreme Court
has struggled to resolve for more than thirty years. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991); Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Chicago
Teacher's Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466
U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113
(1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Em-
ployees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
358. The membership obligation, however, may not extend beyond payment of regular
union dues and initiation fees. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 743. In the public sector,
this financial core obligation is termed an agency or service fee.
359. See National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), § 8(3),(5), 49 Stat. at 449 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
360. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947) (providing legislative
history of 1947 Taft Hartley Act) ("At least twelve states. . . have laws forbidding com-
pulsory unionism.")
361. This conflict evaporated in 1947 with enactment of Section 14-B of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act of 1947. This so-called "right to work" amendment illustrates an early reverse
preemption provision. It states that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State... in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State ... law." 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988).
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the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress?" '362 Initially, the Court's presumption against preemption
suggests that, if compliance with both federal and state law is not impos-
sible and if Congress fails to indicate expressly3 63 an intent to preempt,
then such an intent is neither "clear and manifest" nor "clear and unam-
biguous." In fact, many current anomalies in employment law preemp-
tion arise from this branch of the conflicts doctrine. Too often, the
courts use the rubric of fidelity to the "full purposes and objectives" of
Congress to justify judicial activism in the preemption field. 316  Such ju-
dicial policy-making violates both the presumption against preemption
and the constitutional scheme of federalism that gives rise to that
presumption.
Yet, to argue for abrogation of this prong of traditional conflicts pre-
emption would be too simple a solution. Again, an example from the
New Deal collective bargaining statutes illustrates the point. Suppose
state law forbids unions from picketing on an employer's property, while
federal law protects such picketing.365 With two exceptions, the Labor
Management Relations Act (the "LMRA") does not speak about pre-
emption.366 Strictly speaking, the prong of conflicts preemption concern-
ing impossibility of compliance with both federal and state law does not
apply. Unions are not compelled to picket on an employer's property
under federal law, and employers are not compelled to stop such picket-
ing under state law. But, as the Supreme Court declared long ago, the
federal policy conferring a right to picket necessarily conflicts with any
state policy to deny that right.367 Thus, a state may not prohibit or
362. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
363. Congress conceivably could state such an intent in the statute itself or its legisla-
tive history. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2629-31 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
364. See text accompanying supra note 330 (discussing views of Archibald Cox and
Chief Justice Rehnquist concerning Supreme Court policy-making in the name of con-
gressional intent).
365. See, eg., Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978) (holding that National Labor Relations Act does not deprive a state
court of the power to entertain an action by an employer to enforce state trespass laws
against picketing). Although Justice Thomas' majority opinion in Lechmere, Inc i"
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), severely restricted non-employee rights of access for picket-
ing and hand-billing purposes under federal law, some rights of access remain. Presuma-
bly, employee organizers, in contrast to non-employee union organizers, continue to have
access rights. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding
that employer's prohibition against employee distribution of union literature on their own
time constituted an unfair labor practice).
366. One exception is the state option to adopt a "right to work" statute under Taft-
Hartley Act § 14-B, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). The other is the "no person's land" provision in
Section 14-C-(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2), which states
that: "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar... any State...
from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the [National
Labor Relations] Board declines... to assert jurisdiction." Id.
367. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)
("When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to
regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act... due regard for the
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
restrict that which is federally protected. Conversely, a state may not
require that which is federally prohibited.3 68 The conflict arises not from
the impossibility of simultaneous compliance with federal and state law,
but because congressional conferral of a right is inconsistent with state-
imposed limitations on that right unless Congress indicates otherwise.
Similarly, a federal prohibition of conduct is inconsistent with a state law
requiring or permitting the prohibited conduct. Thus, a congressional
intent to preempt state law may be "clear and manifest" or "clear and
unambiguous"- notwithstanding congressional silence.3 69
VI. APPLYING THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK-PREEMPTION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW
This Article now applies the framework developed in Parts IV and V
to preemption under federal labor and employment law statutes. Though
preemption questions arise under dozens of federal statutes,370 a clear
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."). For a critique of Gar-
mon, see infra part VII.
368. The converse also is true: what is federally prohibited, such as secondary boy-
cotts under NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), cannot be made lawful by state law.
369. One could reason that, if Congress did not intend some preemptive effect in the
collective bargaining statutes, it would not have provided for the express non-preemption
of state "right-to-work" laws and the "no person's land" provision for state authority
when the NLRB declines jurisdiction. See supra note 366 and accompanying text. In
this sense, there is an express, or "clear and manifest," indication of congressional intent
to preempt state law.
Some leading scholars seem to characterize preemption under the New Deal-era collec-
tive bargaining statutes as a species of field preemption. See, e.g., Getman & Pogrebin,
supra note 39, at 333 ("The question is how much of the field did Congress intend to
preempt."); Silverstein, supra note 7, at 2 ("Federal regulation ousts state jurisdiction if
Congress intends to occupy the field as it did in regulating labor-management relations
through the NLRA."). But since even these authorities concede that the question is re-
ally "how much of the previous patchwork of state laws" were "to co-exist" with the
federal labor relations statutes, the concept of field preemption is not particularly helpful.
Thus, Professor Getman's and Professor Pogrebin's formulation of the issue is just an-
other way of asking "when does state law conflict with federal law?" Many cases and
other authorities view preemption under the New Deal collective bargaining statutes as a
species of conflicts rather than field preemption. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1985) (refusing to extend the preemptive effect of the Labor Rela-
tions Management Act "so as to pre-empt state rules that prescribe conduct . . . in-
dependent of a labor contract."); Garner v. Teamsters, Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488
(1953) ("The national Labor Management Relations Act ... leaves much to the states,
though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from con-
flicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still
permissible.").
370. Preemption claims in employment law arise under a plethora of federal statutes.
The volume of preemption litigation is staggering. Justice Stevens, for example, recently
complained that some 2,800 ERISA preemption matters had already flowed from the
federal and state courts. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade,
113 S. Ct. 580, 586 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In some large firms, my employ-
ment law colleagues tell me, some attorneys now work full time on ERISA preemption
cases. The Supreme Court alone has found it necessary to decide, on average, one ER-
ISA preemption case a year, for more than a decade. In the burgeoning field of § 301
preemption under the New Deal-era collective bargaining statutes, the Supreme Court
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pattern emerges in two respects: (1) in most employment statutes Con-
gress addresses the preemption question expressly, and (2) federal regula-
tion is rarely exclusive. Moreover, though preemption doctrine remains
a quagmire in many respects, 371 the Supreme Court's employment law
preemption jurisprudence generally fits within the simplified interpreta-
tional framework that recently has emerged from the Court in the
broader preemption context.
Incongruities, however, do emerge. First, under some statutes (such as
ERISA), judicial preemption decisions generally follow the interpreta-
tional principles urged in this Article, but the reach of these decisions
exceeds the policy rationale for preemption.372 Second, a few preemption
doctrines conflict with these interpretational principles. These doctrines
include preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")3 73 and
preemption under the New Deal collective bargaining statutes.374 More-
over, while policy arguments can be made on either side of the preemp-
tion debate, this Article urges that, looking at the complex legal system
for governing the workplace as a whole, joint regulation by the sister
sovereigns often offers advantages over exclusive reliance on federal regu-
lation.37 5 This conclusion is reinforced by the globalization of labor
decided five cases in five years, starting in 1985. The result has been to thoroughly con-
fuse and confound both the practicing bar and the lower courts. A Westlaw search
reveals hundreds of lower federal and state appellate court § 301 preemption cases in the
past decade, and thousands of other disputes turn on § 301 issues. See infra parts
VII.C.3, VII.D.2.
Though most preemption cases arise under such federal employment and labor law
statutes, almost any federal statute carries potential for a preemption claim. Thus pre-
emption claims have arisen under the Energy Reorganization Act and its predecessors.
See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (no preemption); the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, see FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443
(10th Cir.), cerL dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992); the Federal Surface Transportation
Act, see Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1991); Todd v.
Frank's Tong Serv., Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 50 (Okla. 1989) (no preemption); the Civil Service
Reform Act, see Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 840-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (preemp-
tion); the Mine Safety Act, see Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir. 1984) (preemption); the National Bank Act, see Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank,
867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (preemption); Aalgaard v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 274
Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 278 (1991); the Federal Re-
serve Act, see Leon v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.) (preemption),
cert denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir. 1981) (preemption), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); the Home Loan Bank Act, see
Inglis v. Feinerman, 701 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1983) (preemption), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984); and the Railway Labor Act, see Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931
F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir.) (preemption), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 189 (1991); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1989)
(no preemption).
371. See infra notes 506-13 and accompanying text.
372. See infra part VI.B.
373. See infra part VI.D; see, eg., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that
§ 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act preempts § 229 of the California Labor Code).
374. See infra part VII.
375. See infra parts VI.B.1-3, VI.D, VII.D.
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markets, and the emergence of the post-industrial economy."'
A. The Baseline Model Explicit Non-Preemption Unless State Law
Directly Conflicts With Federal Rights or Prohibitions
Congress has broad constitutional authority to preempt state authority
over all aspects of the employment relationship. But Congress has never
done so, despite the now pervasive scheme of federal regulation.3 77
"Federal [employment] law in this sense is interstitial, supplementing
state law where compatible, and supplanting it only when it prevents the
accomplishment of the purposes of the federal [enactment]. 3 78 Federal
employment law preemption, instead, consists of a patchwork of specific
areas of preemption. This evolving patchwork of preemption doctrine
must be viewed, not as a series of ad hoc answers derived in isolation
from the terms of each particular statute, but rather as part of a larger
system by which the division of authority over workplace issues between
the states and the federal government continues to be elucidated. Shared
authority between the federal government and the sister sovereign states
emerges as the general rule under the New Deal-era labor standards leg-
islation, under the 1960s and 1970s status discrimination statutes, and
under more recent enactments on issues such as plant closure, privacy,
and family leave.
This shared authority originated in the 1938 New Deal labor standards
legislation.3 79 The federal minimum wage, overtime, and child labor leg-
islation expressly allows state standards that exceed federal standards.3"'
376. See infra notes 408-410 and accompanying text.
377. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (re-
jecting contention that ERISA and LMRA both preempted generally applicable state
minimum labor standards and mandated benefit statutes). In Metropolitan Life, the
Court stated:
The States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to
legislate as 'to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons.' 'States possess broad authority ... to regulate the employment rela-
tionship to protect workers within the State. Child labor laws, minimum and
other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety... are only a few
examples.' State laws requiring that employers contribute to unemployment
and workmen's [sic] compensation funds, laws prescribing mandatory state hol-
idays, and those dictating payment to employees for time spent at the polls or
on jury duty all have withstood scrutiny.
Id. at 756 (citations omitted); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987) (holding that the NLRA does not preempt Maine's severance pay statute).
378. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 756 (explaining the Court's hesitance to infer pre-
emption because the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police
power of the state).
379. See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
380. Section 18(a) of the FLSA provides:
(a) No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse non-
compliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a
minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter
or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established
under this chapter, and no provision of this chapter relating to the employment
THE SISTER SOVEREIGN STA TES
In fact, the states have traditionally regulated a broad range of labor
standards issues.381 By express language in the FLSA and longtime prac-
tice under that Act, the states retain broad authority over minimum
wages, overtime standards, wage claim procedures, rest and lunch
breaks, and a broad range of traditional "labor standards" issues.
The FLSA supplants state authority only when state law purports to
require or permit an act made unlawful by the FLSA-for example, a
state law purporting to establish a legal minimum wage lower than the
federal mandate. The converse, however, is not necessarily true-a state
law that forbids that which the FLSApermits, for example, late payment
of wages upon termination or employment of school age children during
the school year, is not preempted by the FLSA.38 2 Only if a state pur-
ports to make unlawful an act required by federal law, or to make lawful
an act prohibited by federal law, does an unavoidable inference of con-
flicts preemption arise.38 3
Similarly, under the FLSA's narrow version of strict conflicts preemp-
tion, the state may impose greater penalties or create more powerful rem-
edies for conduct made unlawful by the federal FLSA. Though at least
one writer disputes this point,384 it is certainly a reasonable inference
that, if Congress meant to allow the states to substantively regulate both
labor standards covered by the FLSA and labor standards that are not,
then Congress must have also intended to allow the states to create rem-
edy schemes different from those of the FLSA. Certainly Congress has
not "clearly and manifestly" required preemption of supplemental state
remedies in the labor standards area.
Starting with Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,385 this pattern of
confining the preemptive effect of federal employment legislation to a
narrow version of conflicts preemption continued. Under Title VII, pre-
emption occurs only when state law purports to "require or permit" an
act made "unlawful" by Title VII. 38 6 Therefore, Title VII erects no bar
of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or mu-
nicipal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established
under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
381. This state regulation includes both issues regulated by the FLSA, for example,
state law establishing higher minimum wage and child labor standards, and issues un-
touched by the FLSA regulatory scheme, such as state laws mandating lunch and rest
breaks, or time and manner of wage payments, including penalties for late payment or
improper deductions. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 395-402.
382. Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that California's failure to make timely wage
payments to state employees violated the FLSA. See Biggs v. Wilson, I F.3d 1537. 1539-
40 (9th Cir. 1993).
383. For example, suppose state law purported to forbid the payment of overtime pay.
The FLSA would, clearly and manifestly, preempt this law because simultaneous compli-
ance would be impossible.
384. See Moberly, supra note 293.
385. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(17) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
386. Section 708 of Title VII provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
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to state regulation in areas untouched by federal law-for example, Title
VII leaves state and local governments free to adopt prohibitions on sex-
ual orientation discrimination.3"7 Nor does Title VII bar more stringent
state regulation of conduct regulated by Title VII. The states, for exam-
ple, may impose vicarious liability on employers for supervisory sexual
harassment in situations where federal law would not impose liability.388
The states retain authority to provide greater remedies for regulated con-
duct than Title VII provides. For example, a state may allow tort reme-
dies for sexual harassment or other forms of discrimination.38 9 Only
when state and federal law actually conflict, for example when a state law
mandates maternity leave beyond the period of disability protected under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,39 ° does Title VII preempt state law.
Moreover, Title VII represents a version of conflicts preemption con-
siderably more narrow than the traditional conflicts preemption doctrine.
Under the second prong of the traditional formulation,3 91 a court may
declare a state law preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress."3 92 Under Title VII, application of
state law is preempted only if it results in a violation of federal law.
Because Congress chose to confine narrowly Title VII, its strict con-
flict preemption creates far fewer cases than does, for example, ERISA's
broad field preemption. Yet issues arise even under Title VII's "strict
conflict preemption model as illustrated by the two examples below.
First, some affirmative action/reverse discrimination cases involving
public employers-those raising issues under Title VII rather than the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-rest on preemp-
tion doctrine.39 3 Thus, if a state or local government's affirmative action
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
387. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 88, at 342 n.4 (citing statutes in Massachusetts,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia and referring to "about 50 cities [that] have
enacted laws prohibiting discrimination in private employment on the basis of sexual
orientation").
388. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986) (rejecting
respondent superior liability, at least in hostile environment causes, under Title VII; how-
ever an employer may be vicariously liable for hostile environment sexual harassment
under agency principles).
389. See, e.g., Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299-300 (Or. 1984) (en
banc) (recognizing sexual harassment as an actionable tort).
390. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-92
(1987); infra notes 394-95.
391. See supra notes 356, 362-67 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
393. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Supreme Court
considered whether Title VII preempted a local affirmative action plan. See id. at 626-40.
The Court held that the plan was fully consistent with Title VII. See id. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the purpose of Title VII was "inverted" by the deci-
sion. See id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
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plan violates the non-discrimination principles of Title VII, the state law
authorizing the affirmative action plan faces preemption. Second, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act39 4 not only guarantees that pregnancy-
related conditions will receive equal treatment with other forms of "disa-
bility," but also effectively operates to limit state authority to grant pref-
erential treatment for pregnancy.3 95 Both of these examples demonstrate
that federal "rights" legislation can, even under the narrowest conificts
model of preemption, displace state authority-a result that supporters
of the legislation sometimes may not intend.
One complication in Title VII preemption analysis, however, arises
from the broader preemption provisions of Title XI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.396 Title XI is a miscellaneous section of the 1964 enactment
U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that affirmative action layoff provision in collective bargaining
agreement violates Equal Protection Clause). For current standards under the constitu-
tional analysis, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The
current Title VII standard for allowable affirmative action is more permissive than the
constitutional standard, a matter disputed by some of the Justices in the Johnson case.
394. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); supra note 181 and accompanying text.
395. See, eg., California Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). In
Guerra, California mandated pregnancy leave in excess of what the savings and loan
employer provided for other disabilities. The employer challenged the California statute
on the grounds of "conflict" with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's ("PDA") com-
mand that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (em-
phasis added). Justice Marshall's plurality opinion upheld application of the California
statute to allow "preferential" treatment of maternity leave-as opposed, say, to a disabil-
ity caused by a heart attack. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 290-92 & n.32. Justice Marshall,
however, argued that "preferential" treatment is not required because an employee may
extend the same leave benefit commanded by the California statute for pregnancy disabil-
ity to employees suffering other forms of disability. See id. at 291. As Justice Stevens
acknowledged in his concurrence, however, the Guerra holding "allows some preferential
treatment of pregnancy." IdL at 294 (Stevens, J., concurring). Guerra effectively read the
PDA "same as" language to mean "at least the same as," a reading of the case made
explicit by the dissenters. See id at 297-304 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell, J.,
dissenting). Though distasteful as a policy matter, the opposite conclusion may be more
defensible. That is, the PDA's standard-treating pregnancy "the same as" other disabil-
ities-meant just that. See id at 297-304 (White, J., dissenting). Even Justice Marshall's
opinion carefully limited the holding-such "preferential" treatment is allowable under
the PDA only so long as the affected woman remains "disabled." See id. at 290, see also
EEOC Policy Guidance on Parental Leave, 224 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Fl (Nov. 20.
1990) (outlining "Safe Harbor" rules in this area). For example, a state law which man-
dated a year's leave for new female, but not male, parents would clearly violate Title VII,
and thus be preempted.
Regardless of the merits of this argument, Guerra was, in another sense, less a preemp-
tion case than one interpreting allowable conduct under Title VII. Guerra's holding, that
an employer does not violate the PDA by granting preferential treatment for pregnancy
disability, applies not only to employers acting under the commands of state law, but also
to an employer who adopts such preferential treatment as a matter of self interest and
accommodation to the needs of today's workforce. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Pa-
rental Leave, 224 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Fl, pt. (b) & (c) (Nov. 20, 1990).
396. Title XI, § 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title oper-
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generally applicable to all of the 1964 Act's titles, such as the public
accommodation provisions, and not merely to the employment discrimi-
nation provisions of Title VII. Under Title XI's preemption provision,
Congress preempted state laws "inconsistent with any of the purposes...
or any provision" of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.39 7 If this provision ap-
plies to Title VII, then the broader form of conflicts preemption tradi-
tionally stated by the courts-preemption based on state law that
" 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives' "398 of Congress-applies after all. That is,
under the broader language of Title XI, state law might conflict with
Title VII even though it did not require or permit an act violative of Title
VII, and thus did not qualify for preemption under section 708 of Title
VII. 3 99 Although Guerra leaves this issue unsettled, 400 the general non-
preemption language of Title XI must yield to the narrower express non-
preemption language of Title VII. First, to the extent these two provi-
sions create an ambiguity as to congressional intent, the interpretation
narrowing the range of preemption must be adopted. The strong, consti-
tutionally-based presumption against preemption requires a "clear and
manifest" indication of congressional intent to overcome the presump-
tion and preempt state law." 1 Second, even if preemption did not impli-
cate the constitutional division of powers, normal principles of statutory
construction require that Title XI, the more general provision, yield to
ates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any
provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988).
397. See id. (emphasis added).
398. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see supra notes 355, 362-64 and
accompanying text.
399. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
400. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Justice
Marshall's plurality opinion in Guerra, in rejecting the preemption challenge to a Califor-
nia pregnancy disability leave statute, invoked both preemption clauses. However, the
dissenters who argued for preemption in the case, omitted any reference to Title XI's
broader preemption potential. See id. at 297-304 (White, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and Powell,
J., dissenting). And Justice Stevens' concurring opinion expressly reserved the question
whether Title XI's broader language applies in Title VII cases. See id. at 292-95 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Scalia's concurrence specifically stated: "The only pro-
vision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 whose effect on pre-emption need be considered...
is § 708 of Title VII .... " See id. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring).
401. See supra part V. Justice Marshall's opinion in Guerra, however, failed to invoke
the presumption clearly. "[P]re-emption is not to be lightly presumed." Guerra, 479
U.S. at 28 1. The opinion, however, later notes that Congress failed to evince "clearly and
manifest[ly]" an intent to supersede state enactments granting preferential treatment for
pregnancy-related disabilities. See id. at 288. Moreover, as Justice Stevens noted in his
concurrence, the PDA's explicit solicitude for pregnancy-related disability also supports
the holding that the California statute was not preempted. See id. at 292 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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Title VII, the more specific provision. °2
Other status preemption statutes also contain Title VII's narrow ver-
sion of "strict conflicts" preemption. The 1967 Federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act contains an express non-preemption provision.
However, under this provision, a claimant is required to elect remedies
and "commencement of action" under the federal act divests the state of
jurisdiction." 3 Similarly, the Americans With Disabilities Act contains
an express non-preemption provision.' ° 4
The pattern of the New Deal labor standards and the status discrimi-
nation statutes manifests itself in other statutes enacted during the 1980's
and 1990s. The 1988 Polygraph Protection Act provides that "this chap-
ter shall not preempt any provision of any state or local law.. . more
restrictive" than the federal statute."° s The 1988 plant closure and layoff
enactment provides that its 60-day notice requirement and remedies "are
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory right
and remedies.",16 The 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act also con-
tains express non-preemption language. °7
Cumulatively, these enactments, stretching over a half-century, reflect
a long tradition of state and local police power regulation of the employ-
ment relationship. As shown by the above examples, Congress repeat-
edly rejected the notion that federal employment standards were
maximum rather than minimum standards. Thus, even without the aid
of the strong constitutionally-based presumption against preemption,
shared regulatory authority between the sister sovereign states and the
federal government has been the "baseline" rule in the American law of
the workplace. When "direct conflicts" preemption issues arise-as in
the Guerra maternity leave case-the presumption against preemption
may prove decisive.
Aside from the interpretational perspective, a perspective that confines
the proper institutional role of courts in deciding issues of preemption,
what normative and policy considerations support this pattern of shared
federal-state authority? And how does the emergence of international
402. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring); David A. Garcia A., Title VII
Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Private Club Employment Practices, 34 Hastings
L.J. 1107, 1118 (1983).
403. ADEA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). As with Title VII,
resort to state remedies is required as a prerequisite to a proper filing under the federal
law. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988); Title VII § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
404. ADA § 501 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or
limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any ... law of any State ... that provides
greater or equal protection [for the disabled than federal law]." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b)
(Supp. IV 1992).
405. See PPA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (1988).
406. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act ("VARN") § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 2105
(1988).
407. See FMLA § 401(b), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 2561(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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labor markets-reflected in, for example, the North American Free
Trade Agreement-affect the normative desirability of the traditional
federalist scheme?
It could be argued that the emerging global trading and information-
based economy requires uniform standards to promote efficiency and
competitiveness. In order to remain competitive with foreign competi-
tors, this argument goes, an American company should be required to
comply with only one set of regulatory requirements, rather than fifty-
one, in its relationships with its employees. Or, in the more precise ter-
minology of Robert Reich, if companies (whether Toyota or GM) that
operate and employ workers in the United States must comply with
widely varying state law requirements, they will be at a disadvantage to
competitors (whether Airbus or Nike) that produce outside the United
States."° On closer analysis, however, it is evident that just the opposite
is true-the emergence of international labor markets provides an argu-
ment for maintaining the traditional American system of federal mini-
mums with authority in the states to regulate further as local conditions
and preferences warrant.
Continued decentralization of regulatory authority over the employ-
ment relationship allows flexibility, autonomy, and experimentation val-
ues to be maximized as the process of adjustment inherent in the
emerging global economy continues. First, for the near future, nations
like Mexico, Indonesia and Vietnam are not likely to adopt employment
standards equal to those at either the federal or the state level in the
United States. The market for labor in such settings is simply cheaper
than labor markets in the United States-production workers in the de-
veloping countries willingly sell their labor for far less than the level of
compensation American workers demand and expect. Further, Ameri-
can consumers, who are most often other American workers, want
cheaper prices, or higher product quality, which the lower labor costs in
these countries sometimes permit. The question of how far and how fast
American wages must fall to meet the rising wage level in the developing
world-and thus "level the playing field"-is avoided by politicians, and
skirted by many academic and policy commentators who insist, some-
what unrealistically, that a high-wage, high-skill American labor force
can overcome the fundamental imbalance which now exists in the inter-
national labor markets.
Given this imbalance, a structure that allows Americans to shape legal
protections for the employment relationship at the state, rather than fed-
eral, level makes sense along two lines of analysis. If enactment of fam-
ily-oriented legislation-for example, paid maternity leave for mothers,
or a child-care subsidy, or protections for flexible or part-time work
schedules-raises the cost of labor in State X beyond the level where
companies will want to operate in State X, the citizens of State X can
408. See Reich, supra note 12, at 110-35.
[Vol. 62
THE SISTER SO VEREIGN STA TES
repeal the offending legislation, or elect to suffer the consequences in de-
creased demand for employment of its citizens. The threat of job losses
in, for example, the wood products industry in Oregon need not affect
labor standards in the oil industry in Texas. Maine may elect "high"
standards with little job loss, while Arkansas may be forced to accept
lower standards because of a concern that chicken patties now produced
in Arkansas will be produced in Mexico.
A second line of analysis supports the thesis that the emergence of
global markets supports the traditional American system of shared state-
federal authority. Some of the competition faced by firms operating in
the United States and employing American workers arises not in the de-
veloping nations, but rather in highly industrialized areas like the Euro-
pean Community. Indeed, the legislated standards for labor in the
European Community countries often exceed those in the United
States." 9 Though the European Community structure envisions some
adoption of uniform labor standards in the European Community coun-
tries, these "Social Europe" provisions remain highly controversial and
their implementation is problematical. 10 Thus, competitors across the
Atlantic operate under different national labor standards analogous to
the different labor standards in the American states.
In summary, consideration of the now-emerging global economy coun-
sels maintenance of the traditional American system of decentralized
governmental authority over the employment relationship. But not every
federal intervention in the labor markets fits this baseline model.
B. The ERISA Model of Optimum and Exclusive Federal Standards
As noted above, ERISA preemption claims perhaps constitute the
most common type of employment law preemption. ERISA preemption
cases involve such diverse state law claims as wrongful discharge, bad
faith handling of medical insurance claims, exclusion of AIDS and other
catastrophic illnesses from employer medical plans, denial of family
leave, denial of state spousal community property rights in pension bene-
fits, and denial of state-mandated workers' compensation benefits, among
many other issues. The frequency and breadth of these ERISA
409. See generally Frank Bajak, Germans Must Work More, Play Less. Government
Says, Oregonian, Sept. 4, 1993, at A-11 (Associated Press article listing legislated benefits
in Germany as follows: (1) paid six to seven weeks vacation, (2) protections against fir-
ings, (3) "common" thirty-eight and one half hour work week, (4) financial benefits for
having and raising children, (5) subsidized housing for employees, (6) common yearly
bonus of one month's pay (60 percent mandatory), (7) pay for days lost to weather (for
construction workers), and (8) a comprehensive health care system); Bok, supra note 43;
Donald C. Dowling, Worker Rights In The Post-1992 European Communities What "So-
cial Europe" Means To United States-Based Multinational Employers, I 1 Nw. J. Int'l L.
& Bus. 564 (1991) (discussing how stringent EEC labor laws may prove to be a detriment
to United States companies operating in Europe).
410. See generally Dowling, supra note 409; Terence P. Stewart & Delphine A. Abel-
lard, Labor Laws and Social Policies in the European Community After 1992, 23 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 507 (1992).
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preemption claims reflect the high stakes. Plaintiffs' lawyers frequently
invoke state law rights and remedies even when lesser federal law reme-
dies may also be available, and defense counsel seek to defeat these state
claims without reaching the merits.
Beneath these pragmatic concerns, however, federalism policy issues
are presented. Sound, perhaps even compelling, arguments exist for uni-
form national standards regarding ERISA's primary concern-private
pensions. The proliferation of multiple-employer and multiple-state pen-
sion plans undermines arguments for state-level flexibility and experi-
mentation, and heightens those for uniform standards for reasons of both
fairness and efficiency. Moreover, the retirement security of American
workers has been a matter of paramount federal concern since the Social
Security Act of 1935.411 As with the federal social security system, the
private pension system, backed by the financial and funding guarantees
of the federal Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, presents a unique
case for exclusive federal standards.412 Additionally, ERISA's regulation
of the private pension system follows the "detailed standards" rather
than the "minimum national standards" model. When the federal gov-
ernment promulgates detailed regulations rather than minimum standard
regulations, the case for exclusive federal regulation is stronger.
However, as shown below, Congress not only provided for broadly
preempting federal regulation in the field of private pensions, but also
chose to preempt state regulation of the broader category of employee
benefit plans, which include medical insurance and disability plans.
Moreover, Congress expressly carved out exceptions to preemption for
such things as state insurance regulation, state domestic relations orders
affecting pensions, and the state workers' compensation laws. Anoma-
lous applications have arisen from each of these exceptions as shown
below.
From an institutional perspective, the Supreme Court generally has
been true to its proper role, following the "clearly and manifestly" ex-
pressed preemption policies of Congress rather than those of judges. For
example, as the Supreme Court properly perceived, ERISA's preemption
language "clearly and manifestly" overcomes the presumption against
preemption. ERISA broadly preempts state regulation in the field of
pension and other fringe benefit plans. ERISA generally preempts "any
and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan."4" 3  Although there are certain expressly
411. See Social Security Act, Pub L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
412. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083 (1988).
413. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See generally Gregory, supra note
234 (examining tension between state and federal authority in employment regulation);
William S. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee
Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1313 (1984) (assessing
methods to determine whether ERISA preempts a state law because it "relates to" an
employee benefit plan); John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of
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enumerated exceptions,4 14 the general preemption provision uses" 'delib-
erately expansive' language... 'designed to "establish [employee benefit]
plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern."' "I" Moreover, the
legislative history establishes that Congress rejected attempts to limit the
preemptive effect to "state laws relating to the specific subjects covered
by ERISA."'4 16 Thus, any state law that "relates to" an ERISA-covered
plan, in a "plain meaning" sense,"' and that is not subject to an express
exception, falls under the ERISA preemption axe.418 This is so even
though the state law is "consistent with ERISA's substantive require-
ments." '419 Further, ERISA broadly preempts state regulation of non-
pension plans, such as medical plans, even though ERISA contains only
minimal regulation, or no regulation, of these plans.42
In traditional doctrinal terms, ERISA represents an express congres-
sional choice for broad field preemption. Thus ERISA preempts: (1)
when any state law actually conflicts with the requirements of the federal
enactment; (2) when a state tries to impose greater sanctions or remedies
for ERISA-covered conduct; (3) when the state law attempts to regulate
ERISA-covered conduct more stringently in a substantive sense, for ex-
ample by imposing tighter vesting and break-in service rules than those
set forth by ERISA; and (4) even when state law attempts to regulate
employee benefit plans in areas not regulated or covered by ERISA at all,
Preemption Exemption, Under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS
§§ 1001 et seq.), for State Laws Regulating Insurance, Banking, or Securities (29 USCS
§ 1144(b)(2)), 87 A.L.R. Fed. 797 (1988) (discussing cases relating to ERISA preemption
issues); Leslie C. Levin, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Indirect Regulation of Em-
ployee Welfare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1536 (1978) (dis-
cussing whether ERISA preemption provisions cover state insurance laws that indirectly
regulate employee welfare plans).
414. ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
415. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (citations omitted).
416. Id.
417. A state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan if it "has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)
(citations omitted). As Professor Gregory has noted "various theories of interpretations
of the 'relate to' " phrase have been suggested. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 457 n. 102.
Shaw and the 1992 decision in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of
Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992), however, settled the issue in favor of the "plain meaning"
approach. Indeed, the majority opinion in Greater Washington invalidated a workers'
compensation benefit, otherwise exempt from ERISA preemption, because the benefit
referred to the employers' ERISA-covered medical benefits as the measure of the state
law workers' compensation "continuation" benefit. See id. at 583-84.
418. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583-84 (holding that ERISA preempts a
District of Columbia law mandating continuation of medical insurance coverage for em-
ployees on workers' compensation benefits).
419. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
420. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-98; David J. Brummond, Fed-
eral Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 117-
118 (1976). As Professor Gregory has pointed out, "[i]f ERISA preempted all state law
relating to employee benefit plans, a dangerous vacuum would result. Progressive state
legislation would be frustrated, and Congress might not fill the void with the necessary
federal legislation. Major problem areas in employment law could be left unaddressed."
Gregory, supra note 234, at 457.
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for example by state law regulation of medical insurance provided
through self-insured employer plans.
While some commentators and judges argue that the courts should
reinterpret ERISA to mitigate these anomalous results,42 fidelity to the
principle that Congress alone is constitutionally authorized to displace
state law requires, instead, reform by the Congress. For if courts should
decline, for reasons of federalism, to find preemption in the absence of a
"clear and manifest" congressional intent, the reverse must also be true;
that is, courts must abide by the intent clearly manifested by Congress,
even where the court's own view of the policy aspects of federalism differ
from that expressed by Congress. 4 22 Yet the Supreme Court's very fidel-
ity to its proper institutional role in the ERISA preemption cases leads to
anomalous results supported by neither the general policies of ERISA
nor the policies of the exceptions to ERISA preemption articulated by
Congress. To these anomalies this Article now turns.
1. The Distinction Between Self-Insured and Insured Employer-
Provided Medical Plans
Although ERISA chiefly regulates pension plans,423 its definitional
section and broad preemption provisions apply to all "employee benefit
plans. '4 24 "Employee benefit plans" include not only pension plans but
also employer- provided medical plans.425 Thus, absent an applicable ex-
ception, ERISA's preemption provision includes state laws regulating
employer-provided medical plans. And this is so even though ERISA
provides little actual regulation of medical and other "welfare benefit"
(as opposed to pension) plans.426
These employer medical plans are the primary vehicle for medical in-
surance for most Americans. Further, the states traditionally regulate
medical insurance plans-requiring coverage for such things as prenatal
care and injuries, mental health coverage, breast implant removal and
mastectomy reconstruction, and drug and alcohol treatment coverage.427
421. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 585-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting); D. Brian
Boggess, ERISA's Silent Pre-emption of State Employee Welfare Benefit Laws: The Perils
of Relying Upon the Road Less Traveled, 1992 Det. C.L. Rev. 745, 767-68 (1992); Es-
treicher & Harper, supra note 164, at 944.
422. See supra parts IV.C, V.
423. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 432.
424. See ERISA § 4(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988); ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
425. ERISA section 4(3) defines an "employee benefit plan" to be either an "employee
pension benefit plan" or an "employee welfare benefit plan" or a plan which is both. See
ERISA § 4(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is further
defined to include any plan for the purpose of providing "medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unem-
ployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services." ERISA § 3(l)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(l)(A) (1988).
426. See Brummond, supra note 420, at 117-18.
427. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
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Mhndful of the historic role of the states in regulating insurance, Con-
p'ess, in enacting ERISA, specifically exempted state insurance regula-
ion from ERISA's otherwise all-encompassing preemption provision. 28
And here the plot thickens. In adopting this "savings clause" for
traditional state insurance regulation, Congress also qualified it. Thus
ERISA section 514(b)(2) provides that "an employee benefit plan" [i.e.,
including medical insurance plans] "shall [not] be deemed to be an insur-
ance company or other insurer... or to be engaged in the business of
insurance... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies."' 2 9 This clause frequently is designated the
"deemer clause."430
Almost immediately, employers with self-funded medical plans-as
opposed to those with medical plans provided by insurance companies
like Blue Cross-asserted that they were no longer subject to state insur-
ance regulation of the terms of medical insurance provided to employees.
As it happens, most Fortune 500 companies provided medical insurance
through self-insured plans.43' Recently, smaller companies have rushed
to establish self-insured plans, thus escaping state regulation via ERISA's
preemption provisions, as the famous AIDS case, McGann v. H & H
Music Co.,432 illustrates.
433
The Supreme Court has twice considered the ERISA insurance regula-
tion savings clause, and the deemer clause exception to that savings
clause.4 34 "Liberal, .... moderate," and "conservative" Justices alike, with
one exception, 435 have concluded that Congress preempted state regula-
tion when an employer provides a medical plan on a self-insured basis,
but not when an employer provides the medical plan through an
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728-30 nn.6-10 (1985); Wayne Chem. Inc. v. Columbus
Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 325 n.8 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd and modified, 567 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1977); Brummond, supra note 420, at 81-84, 101.
428. ERISA Section 514(b)(2)(A) saves from preemption "any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra
text at notes 239-42.
429. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 243-45.
430. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
431. See, e.g., AIDS: Health Insurance Caps Primary Concern of Employees With
AIDS, Attorneys Say, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 1123, 1123 (Oct. 19, 1992)
("[m]ost large employers are self-insured").
432. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
433. Professor Rothstein notes that "many advantages" result from self-insuring not
the least of which is avoiding state mandated coverages. See AIDS: Health Insurance
Caps Primary Concern of Employees With AIDS, Attorneys Say, 10 Employee Rel. Wkly.
(BNA) 1123, 1123 (Oct. 19, 1992). According to testimony at a Congressional hearing in
December 1992, two-thirds of health plans are now self-insured. See ERISA: Congress
Urged To Amend Pension Law To Prevent Health Coverage Reductions, 10 Employee Rel.
Wkly. (BNA) 1337, 1337 (Dec. 7, 1992).
434. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1990); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985).
435. Justice Stevens dissented in FMC, see 498 U.S. at 65-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
but rather curiously joined the majority in Metropolitan Life, see 471 U.S. at 724. Justice
Souter took no part in the FMC case. See 498 U.S. at 65.
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insurance carrier.436
The distinction "clearly and manifestly" drawn by Congress (whetho
consciously or not)43 7 between self-insured and insured medical plat
makes no sense as a matter of policy. As Justice Stevens argues in h.
dissent in the FMC case, the distinction is "illogical," and actually unde
mines the interest in uniformity as to the applicable law within th
states. 438 Both Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Metropoliti
Life, and Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in FMC, note that ii
interpreting ERISA to preempt state regulation of self-insured, but no
insured medical plans, the Court "merely give[s] life to a distinction cre
ated by Congress... and one it has chosen not to alter." '439 This viev
defers to the Court's interpretive, rather than policy making, role in de
ciding preemption issues that implicate the constitutional division o
power between the sister sovereigns and the federal government. Con.
gress, however, should revisit the issue."'
436. See FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1990); supra notes 244-45.
437. Congress devoted a great deal of time to the pension plan aspects of ERISA.
Only a fraction of this time was given to employee welfare [benefit] plans, how-
ever, and almost no attention was given to the language of Section 514 [the
preemption provision]. In view of the fact that the present language of section
514 was inserted by the Conference Committee at a very late hour, after no
congressional hearings, and with little explanatory comment, serious doubts can
be raised regarding congressional intent to broadly preempt state laws regulat-
ing employee welfare [including medical] plans.
Brummond, supra note 420, at 116. But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 137 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983).
438. See FMC, 498 U.S. at 65-66 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
439. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (footnote
omitted).
440. Several commentators previously reached the same conclusion, but often they ar-
gue judicial rather than legislative correction. See, e.g., Boggess, supra note 421, at 768-
72 (arguing for judicial correction or congressional limitation of ERISA preemption of
non-pension plans); Brummond, supra note 420, at 99, 118; Levin, supra note 413, at
1545, 1549 (arguing that ERISA preemption provisions should be limited to pension
plans, but also proposing judicial interpretation of ERISA preemption be limited to areas
ERISA actually regulates). Certainly the current distinction encourages employers to
shift to self-insured plans to evade state regulation. See Gregory, supra note 234, at 470;
William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA,
1979 Duke L.J. 383, at 420 (1979) ("[T]he insurance proviso and the deemer clause...
may raise more questions than they resolve.").
Not only does the distinction undermine the interest in uniformity in legal require-
ments applicable to employer-provided medical plans, but the definition of "self-insured"
includes plans administered by insurance companies, and plans that have "stop loss"
protection shielding the employer from liability beyond amounts negotiated with the car-
rier. See supra note 245.
The American Medical Association House of Delegates recently passed a resolution
that the organization will "aggressively" pursue efforts, inter alia, "to ensure that any
rules... apply equally to self-insured and insured health benefit plans." AMA Pursues
Changes In ERISA and Anti-Trust Laws, 141 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505 (Dec. 21, 1992).
Legislation has in fact been proposed in Congress to revise this aspect of the ERISA
preemption clause. See id.
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2. ERISA Preemption of State Regulation Relating to Family and
Marriage Issues
The distinction between state authority, under ERISA, to regulate in-
sured, but not self-insured, medical plans may affect coverage of the fam-
ily and other dependents of employees. But ERISA preempts state law
affecting the family and marriage relationship in other ways as well.
For example, retirement benefits often constitute a major portion of
the marital estate. ERISA, as amended by the federal Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 ("REA")," gives spouses a right to automatic survivor ben-
efits in the event of the death of the retired employee." 2 Additionally, in
the event of divorce, the REA created an exception to ERISA's generally
broad spendthrift or non-alienation provisions." 3 A state divorce court
may order a portion of the employee-participant's pension benefit to be
paid to the former spouse in a "qualified domestic relations order." 4
But what happens if the undivorced spouse dies before the employee-
participant?
Under California community property law, the deceased non-em-
ployee spouse's estate includes his or her interest in the pension benefits
of the employee. In practical terms, this means the non-employee spouse
may control disposition of this asset through his or her will (for example,
a bequest to a child of another marriage). But ERISA's broad preemp-
tion provisions divest the states of this authority."5 If the employee-
441. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055-1056
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Retirement Equity Act's ("REA") purpose was to "pro-
vide for greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their spouses and
dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status of marriage as an
economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses
who work both in and outside the home." S. Rep. No. 98-575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2547.
442. The statutorily-guaranteed survivor annuity must be at least fifty percent of the
employee's benefit. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) (1988). This survivor's benefit can only be
waived in writing by both spouses. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (1988). Prior to the
1984 REA, the employee-participant (often the husband) could elect to forgo the spousal
survivor's benefits. In that event the monthly benefit for the employee-participant would
be higher since the value of the pension entitlement would be paid out over only one life
instead of two.
443. See 29 U.S.C. § 1956(d) (1988); see also Guidry v. Sheetmetal Workers Nat'l Pen-
sion Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990) (disapproving a "generalized equitable exception...
to ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits").
444. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (1988). A qualified domestic relations order relates
to child support, alimony, or marital property rights. See id.
445. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Judge
Fletcher's dissent, id at 1460-68 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress did not
intend to preempt state law protecting the non-employee spouse's interest in pension ben-
efit). In 1979, the Supreme Court stated that ERISA's preemptive effect should be nar-
rowly and practically construed in the context of domestic relations issues which
traditionally "belong[ ] to the laws of the States." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
572, 581-83 (1979) (citations omitted). The Court's more recent preemption jurispru-
dence, however, now requires greater fidelity to the "clear and manifest" intention of
Congress to preempt, an intent evidenced both in the broad preemptive language of ER-
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participant dies first, however, he or she may, under federal law, desig-
nate another beneficiary in his or her will.446 While the policy issue may
be fairly debatable," 7 the point again is that Congress should revisit ER-
ISA's broad preemption language and the policy issues confronted.
State family and medical leave statutes provide another example.448
While the debate over the desirability of federal family leave legislation
raged for at least three years, 44 9 thirty-two states fulfilled the traditional
cutting edge role of the states by enacting these laws. Moreover, state
coverages and entitlements can differ from those provided in the federal
statutes. If the employer provides family leave through an ERISA-cov-
ered plan, the broad statutory language of ERISA's preemption provi-
sions and judicial decisions suggest that such plans may be preempted
from state authority.45° Once again, Congress should revisit this issue.
3. ERISA and Laws Relating to Worker Injury
The state workers' compensation statutes are generally exempt from
ERISA's coverage and preemption provisions. 451 Under these state laws,
when employees suffer work-related injuries, 452 their injury-related
ISA, and in the legislative history of the REA. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1455; supra part
V.
446. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457 n.12.
447. See, e.g., id. at 1457 (stating that "[p]ensions are designed for the benefit of the
living"). Of course, the children of the deceased spouse in Ablamis were living. See id. at
1452.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 186.
449. There were two Presidential vetoes, see supra text accompanying note 187, before
President Clinton signed the 1993 Act into law, see Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 2561(b) (West Supp. 1993).
450. See Gabrielle Lessard, Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict of Laws: ERISA Pre-
emption of Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave Act, 1992 Wisc. L. Rev. 809 (1992); see
also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (ERISA preempted New York
Human Rights Law provision regarding pregnancy discrimination insofar as the New
York law prohibited practices lawful under Title VII).
ERISA covers "employee benefit plans" that include both "pension" and "employee
welfare benefit plan[s]." See ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988). "Employee wel-
fare benefit plans" include any plan established or maintained for the purpose of provid-
ing, in addition to medical/hospital benefits, "benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or ... any
benefit described" in section 186(c) of Title 29. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(1988). Section 186(c) benefits are those provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act § 302(c), 29
U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988), and cover a broad range of benefits including "vacation, holiday,
severance, or similar benefits." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6) (1988). See District of Columbia v.
Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 584-85 (1992); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
451. See, e.g., ERISA § 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988) (ERISA coverage of
plans are not "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workemen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance
laws"); ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (ERISA preempts state laws that
relate to employee benefit plans provided such plans are "not exempt" from ERISA
coverage).
452. Many states also provide workers' compensation coverage for occupational dis-
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medical expenses and some of their lost time or lost income are compen-
sated through a "no fault" system.
Though the workers' compensation statutes cover injuries of workers,
these statutes do not cover injuries or illnesses of dependents. As Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent in Greater Washington: "In today's world
the typical employee's compensation is not just her take-home pay; it
often includes fringe benefits such as... health insurance."4 3 However,
because workers' compensation lost income payments typically amount
to about two-thirds of the employee's normal take-home pay, which does
not include fringe benefits like medical insurance, 4" employees suffering
on-the-job injuries also often suffer a substantial loss in total compensa-
tion in the form of lost medical insurance and other fringe benefits.
Like many states, the District of Columbia by statute mandates em-
ployer-paid continuation coverage of family medical insurance during
the period of the workers' compensation disability.'" In 1992, however,
the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted this provision.45 6 Eight
members of the Court agreed that, although workers' compensation laws
in general are exempt from both ERISA coverage and preemption,45 7 the
D.C. law nonetheless related to an ERISA-covered plan merely by refer-
ring to the employer's ERISA-covered medical insurance plan as the
measure of what medical insurance the disabled employee was entitled to
have continued under the workers' compensation continuation statute.
Again Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter. He argued that because
the District of Columbia could raise workers' compensation benefits by
"x dollars, it made no sense as a policy matter to say the District could
not also raise benefits by measuring the entitlement by the amount of
medical insurance provided when the employee is not injured. 4 8
Although Justice Stevens may have been right on the policy question, the
majority was probably correct in its construction of the ERISA preemp-
tion provision as written. The language of ERISA "clearly and mani-
festly" preempts the broad field of "employee benefit plan" regulation by
eases. Some even include work-caused emotional distress which becomes disabling or
deadly. See, e.g., Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Cal. 1992) (workers'
compensation statute exclusive remedy); Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d
597, 605 (Minn. 1984) (ulcer but not depression compensable); Brown & Root Constr.
Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So. 2d 813, 815 (Miss. 1985) (hysterical reaction to defaulted
promise of promotion); Ryan v. Connor, 503 N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (Ohio 1986) (employee
allowed to recover when he suffered heart attack the day after he was told that early
retirement was required).
453. Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 585 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
454. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 739.
455. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 582.
456. See id.
457. See id. ERISA's preemption provision, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), ap-
plies to all state laws which relate to non-exempt ERISA-covered plans. Workers' com-
pensation plans are exempt from ERISA coverage, see ERISA § 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(3) (1988), at least insofar as the relevant plan was established "solely" for the
purpose of complying with the state workers' compensation laws. See supra note 417.
458. See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the states even though this state regulation does not conflict with any
substantive provisions or policies of ERISA.4 59
Here again Congress, rather than the courts, should revisit the issue.
Congress surely did not intend, as a policy matter, that state workers'
compensation benefits, though generally exempt from ERISA, be pre-
empted from state regulation merely because the state measures these
benefits in part by referring to the regular medical insurance benefits pro-
vided by an employer's ERISA-covered medical insurance plan. Because
ERISA neither regulates workers' compensation benefits460 nor the level
of medical insurance benefits available through employers, no uniformity
interest supports ERISA preemption in this situation.461
C. An Intermediate Model: The Scheme of Cooperative Preemption
Embodied in OSHA
Though the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") 462
often has been described as "minimum standards" legislation,463 Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Assn 464 now establishes that OSHA
preempts more stringent state regulation in certain circumstances. 465
459. One can debate this interpretive conclusion, however, as applied to the facts of
Greater Washington. Because ERISA expressly exempts workers' compensation plans,
and because the "continuation benefits" were merely defined by reference to the general
medical plans level of benefits, one could argue that the continuation benefit does not
"relate to" the ERISA plan. But the Court's prior pronouncements at least had defined
"related to" to include "a reference to" an ERISA plan. See supra note 417.
460. Greater Washington, however, reinforced the prospect that employers may in due
course claim ERISA preemption protection against state workers' compensation laws.
See Greater Washington, 113 S. Ct. at 583-84. The exclusion for workers' compensation
applies to plans "solely" for such purposes. Employers might, for example, soon claim
that a "24 hour" medical plan covering on the job and non-job related medical problems
falls outside the literal language of this exception.
461. This brief illustrative review of current problems in ERISA preemption law nec-
essarily omits many other issues. For example, state "prevailing wage" laws for state and
local governmental construction and other contracts frequently include ERISA-covered
fringe benefits as part of the "prevailing wage" calculation. Some courts have held such
laws preempted by ERISA. See General Electric Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor,
936 F.2d 1448, 1459-60 (2nd Cir. 1991). The House of Representatives passed a bill in
the last Congress to exempt such state laws from ERISA preemption. See Preemption:
House Adopts Measure Exempting State Prevailing Wage Laws From ERISA, 19 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 1440, 1440 (Aug. 10, 1992) (discussing H.R. 2782). A similar bill was pend-
ing in the Senate. See Preemption: House Committee Approves Bill Limiting ERISA Pre-
emption Of Prevailing Wage Laws, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 988, 988 (June 15, 1992)
(discussing S. 794). The House bill would also overrule a Ninth Circuit decision holding
that ERISA preempts state laws regulating apprenticeship programs. See Hydrostorage,
Inc. v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers Local Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 891 F.2d 719,
720, 732 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990). Other legislation would limit
ERISA preemption of state regulation over certain health claims abuses. See Preemption:
House Committee Favorable Reports Bill To Remedy Unfair Insurance Practices, 19 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 1396, 1396 (Aug. 3, 1993) (discussing H.R. 1602).
462. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
463. See, e.g., Estreicher & Harper, supra note 164, at 572.
464. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
465. However, the "interpretive" issues under OSHA are, perhaps, more fairly debata-
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Unlike status discrimination statutes like Title VII or labor standards
legislation generally, current congressional policy in the field of work-
place safety often prevents the states from going beyond national stan-
dards, except when specifically approved by federal regulators.4 6
OSHA's preemption provisions uniquely establish a system of coopera-
tive federalism.' 7 Preliminarily, the statute expressly exempts from pre-
emption workers' compensation and other state laws providing
compensation for occupational injury or disease." And, more gener-
ally, the statute expressly preserves state law from preemption concern-
ing the many issues over which "no federal standard is in effect."
469
Thus, Congress clearly left state authority intact in many areas of work-
place health and safety. In traditional doctrinal terms OSHA preempts a
narrow, rather than a broad, field as in ERISA.
In areas governed by federal OSHA regulations, or standards, 470 the
preemption provisions generate more controversy. OSHA section
18(b)4 71 allows states to submit their own safety plan for approval by the
Secretary of Labor with respect to all safety or health issues over which
federal OSHA standards have been promulgated. An approved plan op-
erates as a kind of reverse preemption provision and the state assumes
responsibility for enforcement of state and federal standards. The ques-
tion arose whether states without approved plans, in areas for that
OSHA does have standards, may apply state laws which exceed the
OSHA standards. In the 1992 Gade case,4"2 a 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court answered "no," striking down an Illinois statute requir-
ing licensing of workers at a hazardous waste facility-a requirement ab-
sent from OSHA regulations applicable to these facilities. 73
ble than the interpretive issues resolved in the ERISA cases. See infra notes 478-80 and
accompanying text.
466. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383.
467. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (1992).
468. See OSHA Section 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 124-30.
469. OSHA § 18(a), 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988). As Professor Weiler pointed out in his
leading theoretical review of employment law issues, eighty percent of all workplace inju-
ries occur in areas without any OSHA standard. See Weiler, supra note 10, at 155.
470. See supra text at notes 133-36.
471. OSHA § 18(b) provides: "Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-
sponsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health
standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated... shall submit a State plan for the development
of such standards and their enforcement." OSHA § 18(b), 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988).
The Secretary has approved approximately half of the states' own state plans. See Gade
v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 (1992). However,
"many industrial states such as Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania" do not have such comprehensive state plans. See Finkin, supra
note 40, at 518.
472. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
473. Another key issue in the case was whether the Illinois statute, requiring licensing
of employees at hazardous waste facilities, avoided preemption because in addition to
protecting employees, it protected the public. Apparently every member of the Court
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Gade illustrates how the traditional framework for analyzing preemp-
tion issues is virtually meaningless. A four-Justice plurality, led by Jus-
tice O'Connor, thought the case was an implied conflicts case.474
Concurring, Justice Kennedy considered Gade an express preemption
case.475 Justice Souter, dissenting and joined by Justices Blackmun, Ste-
vens, and Thomas, thought the plurality's approach amounted to both
"purpose-conflict" preemption and "'federal occupation of a field pre-
emption' "4 7 6-- a field defined by areas for which OSHA standards exist.
As Justice Souter and the dissenters argued, the question, however char-
acterized, turned on whether the statute manifested a purpose, suffi-
ciently "clear and manifest" to overcome the general presumption
against preemption, to preempt more stringent state regulation.477
Although the interpretive issue may be debated," 8 the majority's com-
mon sense reasoning that OSHA's preemption and related provisions,
taken together, constitute a "clear manifestation" of congressional intent
to preempt state law seems sound. First, to conclude that there is no
preemption where there is no OSHA standard implies that preemption
arises when there is a federal OSHA standard. Moreover, to provide for
reverse preemption by a state plan, subject to approval of federal
rejected this "dual purpose" argument against preemption. Cf Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (California
moratorium on nuclear plant construction until finding by State Commission that ade-
quate storage and disposal methodologies existed for nuclear waste not preempted under
Atomic Energy Act, though field of nuclear plant safety generally preempted, where stat-
ute had avowedly economic purpose).
474. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2386 n.2.
475. See id. at 2388-91.
476. See id. at 2392. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion conceded that the case could
be analyzed as either an express, field, or conflicts preemption case. See id. at 2386 n.2
477. See id. at 2392-93 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also id. at 2386 n.2 (O'Connor, J., writing for a four-
Justice plurality) ("whether the OSH Act's pre-emptive effect is labelled 'express' or 'im-
plied' is less important than our agreement that the implications of the text of the statute
evince a congressional intent to pre-empt").
It is interesting that Justice Thomas joined in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion,
which states that the presumption against preemption applied. Just six days later, Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent in the cigarette preemption case, which argued that
the presumption against preemption did not apply in a case where Congress had ad-
dressed (although ambiguously) the question of preemption. See Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2634 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
478. Justice Souter argues somewhat convincingly, for example, that the provision ex-
pressly preserving state authority in areas without OSHA standards does not necessarily
mean that Congress intended preemption (in the absence of an approved plan) where
there are OSHA standards; as Justice Souter points out, the provision could mean, in-
stead, that OSHA standards only sometimes preempt (that is, when the state regulation
actually conflicts). See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2393 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Even where the preemption framework demands an analysis in terms of whether Con-
gress demonstrates a "clear and manifest" purpose to overcome the presumption against
preemption, lawyers and judges may still disagree about what constitutes a "clear and
manifest" intent. At least all will be starting with a proper recognition of the constitu-
tional role of the sister states, absent affirmative action by Congress, not only to regulate,
but to regulate exclusively.
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regulators, raises the inference that, absent such approval, OSHA and
not state standards continues exclusively in effect. Third, nothing pre-
vents the federal OSHA regulators from approving state workplace
health and safety standards that exceed national standards. Finally, as
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion notes, "[e]very other federal and
state court confronted with an OSH Act pre-emption challenge [had]
reached the same conclusion." '479 Such unanimity of the opinions of law-
yer-judges surely provides at least some indication of a "clearly and man-
ifestly" expressed congressional intent. Reform, if warranted, should
come from Congress.480
Thus, such divergent preemption schemes as the baseline, ERISA, and
OSHA preemption models primarily present policy, as opposed to inter-
pretive, issues. However, in two areas, judicial decisions clearly have
gone awry: (1) preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act, and (2)
preemption under the New Deal collective bargaining statutes. This Ar-
ticle now addresses these issues in turn.
D. Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act
As shown above, state wage and hour, status discrimination, privacy,
and family leave legislation remain proper exercises of state authority
under the dominant baseline model of narrow conflicts preemption.
Anomalously, however, remedies under such state enactments may be
preempted by another statute, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").481
This provides a classic example of judicial policy-making that ignores
both the interpretive or institutional constraints of federalism and the
strong presumption against preemption that emanates from the constitu-
tional division of powers. Moreover, current doctrine under the FAA
fails to connect the particular application of preemption doctrine under
that statute to the larger complex system of law which now governs the
workplace.
In Perry v. Thomas,482 the Court held that the FAA preempted a se-
curity salesman's California wage claim action for disputed commissions.
When applying for employment, the salesman was required to execute a
form agreeing to arbitrate any employment dispute that might
479. l at 2382. Many knowledgeable academic authorities also reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bokat & Horace A. Thompson III, Occupational Safety
and Health Law 680 & n.4 (1988) (ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law-spon-
sored treatise expressing authors' own views); Finkin, supra note 40, at 369 (noting that
"[s]ection 18 generally preempts... where any federal standard is in effect").
480. Insofar as OSHA, under Gade, preempts more stringent state regulation where
there is no approved state "plan" and where OSHA standards apply, a policy argument
can be made that Congress should "correct" this holding. As long as the sister sovereigns
remain primarily responsible for compensation for workplace injury and occupational
disease (through the workers' compensation statutes) they should retain ultimate author-
ity over the prevention of such injury and disease. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2391-95 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting); supra note 478.
481. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
482. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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subsequently arise.4" 3 California law made such agreements ineffective as
a bar to the employee's right to pursue statutory wage claim remedies.484
But Justice Marshall's opinion for the majority held that the FAA pre-
empted California's ban on pre-dispute waivers of statutory wage claim
remedies.485 According to the majority, a textual analysis of the FAA
supports the view that the FAA displaces not only state-created reme-
dies, but also state bans on prospective waivers of those remedies. Thus,
the FAA covers "contract[s] ... involving commerce to settle by arbitra-
tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract[s]. '48 6 The Act
further provides that such arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in eq-
uity for the revocation of any contract." '487 And in a series of cases
during the past fifteen years, the Court applied the FAA to a broad range
of federal statutory claims.488
In Perry v. Thomas, however, application of the FAA to preempt wage
claims under state law was improper for several reasons. Justice Mar-
shall's opinion omits any discussion of the requirement for a "clear and
manifest" indication of congressional intent to preempt, sufficient to
overcome the strong, constitutionally-based presumption against pre-
emption. While Justice Marshall's broad reading of the statute in Perry
is reasonable, this reading is hardly compelled. As Justice Stevens re-
marked rather acidly in dissent:
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50
years in 1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even con-
sidered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted state-created rights.
It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten
the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did
not intend.489
In addition, as Justice O'Connor argued in her separate dissent, because
the FAA does not prevent Congress from limiting waiver of federal stat-
utory rights by arbitration agreements, the inference, if any, is that the
483. See id. at 485.
484. See id. at 486 & n.2.
485. See id. at 489-91.
486. FAA, § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
487. Id.
488. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991)
(ADEA dispute subject to arbitration under FAA); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222, 227 (1987) (customer suit under Securities Exchange Act
and RICO Act subject to pre-dispute arbitration agreement under FAA); Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985) (statutory anti-
trust claims arbitrable under FAA); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
217 (1985) (customer suit under Securities Exchange Act and state law is subject to arbi-
tration under FAA); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1974) (contract
dispute under Securities Exchange Act is subject to arbitration under FAA).
489. 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The reference in the quotation
to the year 1973 is to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973), which the dissenters argued had effectively decided the same question against
preemption. See id. at 135 n.15.
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FAA similarly intended to allow the states to limit waiver of state-cre-
ated statutory rights.490
Moreover, far from being "clear and unambiguous," for many years
the FAA was widely thought not to address statutory claims at all.4 91 In
strict statutory language terms, the FAA applies to arbitration agree-
ments for "a controversy... arising out of ... [a] contract or transac-
tion" evidenced by the contract.492 Thus, one reasonable interpretation
is that the FAA covers only contractual as distinct from statutory claims.
Although the Court may reasonably interpret the FAA's language to
cover statutory claims that arise out of "contracts" or "transactions," as
well as contract claims,49 3 that is not so when preemption of state author-
ity in a traditional area of state regulation becomes the issue. A "clear
and manifest" intent, not merely a reasonably inferable intent, is neces-
sary to displace the authority of the sister sovereigns under the Constitu-
tion. The FAA simply fails to evidence clearly and manifestly such a
congressional purpose.
The error of Perry, however, is compounded by the fact that it is not
only a preemption case, but an employment law preemption case. What
further light is shed on the preemption issue by looking at the larger
context of the American law of the workplace? First, a question exists
regarding whether Congress intended the FAA to apply to employment
contracts as distinct from commercial arbitration over matters of com-
merce. As originally enacted in 1924, the FAA was primarily designed to
make lawful and enforceable commercial contract provisions for arbitra-
tion, reversing "centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments. '494 As shown below, the FAA's reference to "transaction
involving commerce" might not have been understood in 1924 as includ-
ing employment contracts for two reasons.
First, section 1 of the FAA expressly excludes "contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." '495 While this could be
construed to refer only to employees engaged in instrumentalities of
transportation for goods in commerce, it is not readily apparent why the
1924 Congress would exclude employment contracts manifestly within
its power to regulate, and not those thought at the time to be beyond
490. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
491. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding agreements for arbi-
tration invalid under Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Allegaerst v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437
(2nd Cir.) (holding that arbitration may be improper where discovery might be unavaila-
ble in arbitration of alleged securities fraud), cert denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
492. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (emphasis added).
493. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242
(1987) (holding both Securities Exchange Act and RICO Act claims arbitrable under
FAA).
494. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974); see H.R. Rep. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
495. FAA, § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, congressional
regulation of labor relations, even in the interstate railroad industry, was
not upheld by the Supreme Court until 1930,496 and congressional power
to regulate labor relations more broadly was not recognized until the post
Adair-Lochner cases beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel497
in 1937. The 1924 Congress, therefore, may well have framed the ex-
press exclusion for employment contracts in terms of the types of em-
ployment contracts then thought to be within Congress' power to
regulate commerce-employment contracts for seamen, railroad employ-
ees, and the like.498
A second reason exists for believing that the 1924 Congress did not
seek to cover the typical employment contract. The FAA's reference to
contracts "involving commerce" must be understood in the context of
the Clayton Act of 1914,'99 at the time thought to represent labor's most
important legislative victory in Congress.5" Section 6 of the Clayton
Act provided that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce." '' Although this proved a futile attempt to avoid
application of the anti-trust statutes to labor activities,50 2 the populist
language of section 6, still part of the United States Code,5" 3 clearly es-
tablishes that Congress in the first third of this century deemed "com-
merce" to be different from "the labor of a human being." There is
therefore an inference that the FAA was not understood by the 1924
Congress to include employment contracts generally, because these con-
tracts were not thought generally to be contracts in commerce.
Although labor contracts for transportation workers were thought to in-
volve interstate commerce, Congress expressly excluded even those labor
contracts from the embrace of the FAA.
Even assuming that the FAA was intended to apply to employment
contracts, 5°4 there are still other reasons for rejecting an interpretation
496. See Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 570-71 (1930).
497. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
498. See generally Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 39 (discussing constitutional con-
siderations affecting labor legislation in the late 1920s).
499. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
500. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1124 (1989).
501. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
502. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-36 (1941) (effectively
overruling Duplex by re-reading the antitrust statutes in the light of the policies of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
477-79 (1921) (applying Sherman Act to secondary boycott activities and product boy-
cott activities of unions notwithstanding § 6 and § 20 of Clayton Act).
503. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
504. The Supreme Court reserved this question in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, n.2 (1991). Several Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that
the FAA does apply to Title VII claims. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698,
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that the FAA "clearly and manifestly" evidences a congressional intent
to preempt state individual rights law. The FAA is a general commercial
statute, not tailored to the employment contract setting, if indeed it cov-
ers employment contracts. Congress, however, has spoken expressly
about many areas of the employment relationship, for example, in Title
VII (discrimination) and the FLSA (labor standards). As shown in the
preceding discussion,505 these more specific employment laws establish
congressional intent to leave broad authority to the states. From the
broader perspective of the whole scheme of federal and state employment
statutes, it is untenable to say that Congress meant to preserve broad
state authority over labor standards and discrimination in statutes like
the FLSA and Title VII, but that Congress, in an earlier-enacted general
arbitration statute, authorized private agreements to remove state au-
thority over remedies for these same state labor standards or state dis-
crimination law violations. At the least, the FLSA's adoption of the
narrow conflicts type of preemption for labor standards legislation de-
serves discussion when a statute like the FAA is interpreted to obliterate
the state authority over wage claims seemingly preserved by the FLSA.
Yet Perry does not mention either the FLSA, or the larger framework of
American employment law.
Similarly, there is no discussion in Perry of whether, in the larger con-
text of the American law of the workplace, the FAA should properly be
interpreted to allow boilerplate pre-dispute "agreements to arbitrate"
signed when applying for employment. As the early labor standards
cases well established, the 1938 FLSA and 1935 New Deal collective bar-
gaining statutes were premised on the assumption that individual em-
ployment bargains lacked legitimacy because of bargaining power
disparities.5 06 Yet the FAA, adopted a decade before, makes an agree-
ment to arbitrate revocable only when difficult common law standards
for revocation of commercial contracts are met. By ignoring such per-
plexing ironies-viewing the scheme of statutes as a whole--decisions
like Perry v. Thomas fail even to come close to demonstrating a clear and
manifest purpose by Congress to divest state authority over boilerplate
waivers of state law individual employment rights and remedies. And
when considered in light of the shared state and federal authority over
the workplace repeatedly approved and adopted by Congress, the Perry
699-700 (11th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 229-30
(5th Cir. 1991); see also Weiss v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1276
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (action under ADEA); Springfield Terminal Ry. v. United Transp.
Union, 767 F. Supp. 333 (D. Me. 1991) (action under Federal Railway Safety Act).
505. See supra text at notes 380-407 and accompanying text.
506. See, eg., 1935 Wagner Act (codified at NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)) ("The
inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess... actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of owner-
ship association substantially burdens... commerce... by depressing wage rates... and
by preventing the stabilization of . . . working conditions within and between
industries.").
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preemption doctrine makes little sense as a matter of policy. 50 7
VII. STATE LAW AND THE NEW DEAL-ERA COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING STATUTES
The New Deal-era collective bargaining statutes provide still another
basis for preemption of the state law of the workplace.5"' As with ER-
ISA preemption, the collective bargaining statutes often have raised pre-
emption issues. The Supreme Court has decided dozens of these cases
over the past fifty years.5"9 And as with the FAA, and in contrast to
federal individual rights statutes like ERISA, OSHA, Title VII, and the
FLSA, two aspects of preemption doctrine under the collective bargain-
ing statutes are evident: (1) Congress generally has remained silent about
its preemptive intent,510 and (2) the Court has often ignored the
507. This Article does not challenge the popular belief that alternative dispute resolu-
tion, including arbitration, presents an attractive alternative to more formal judicial liti-
gation. But see Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev.
81, 88-101 (1992) (discussing the lack of protection for constitutional rights in arbitra-
tion). Under the federalist scheme of workplace regulation for state law rights, this is an
appropriate issue for state legislatures and judges applying state law. However, given that
the states remain free to ban conduct such as sexual orientation discrimination or to grant
paid leave to new parents, and to provide remedies and restrictions on waivers for these
and other labor standards, under the federal statutes it makes little sense for Congress to
legislate these same remedy and waiver issues at the federal level indirectly through the
FAA.
508. There is a vast literature. See William C. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic:
Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 1037 (1973) (discussing
federal labor regulations preemption of state laws); Cox's works cited supra note 265
(same); Getman & Pogrebin, supra note 39, at 333-61 (1988) (same); William B. Gould
IV et al., Symposium, When State and Federal Law Collide: Preemption-Nightmare or
Opportunity?, 9 Indus. Rel. L.J. 4, 5-6 (1987) (same); David L. Gregory, The Labor Pre-
emption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
507 (1986) (same); Howard Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirma-
tion of Garmon, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 469 (1972) (same); Silverstein, supra note 7, at 2
(same).
509. According to a Westlaw search, more than ninety Supreme Court cases in the
past fifty years include substantial discussions of "preemption" under the Wagner, Taft-
Hartley, and/or the combined Labor Management Relations Acts. In short, the Court
has averaged nearly two "labor law" preemption cases per year for a half-century. Only a
few dozen of these can be discussed in this Article.
510. "The national [sic] Labor Management Relations Act . . . leaves much to the
states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from
conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissi-
ble." Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953); see also Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) ("[Tlhe question whether a certain state action
is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent."). While congressional silence
about labor law preemption is the rule, there are exceptions. NLRA § 14(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(c) (1988) preserves state jurisdiction over the labor relations of small employers
when the NLRB declines jurisdiction under its jurisdictional standards. Section 14(b), 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988), preserves state "right to work" laws; indeed, section 14(b) allows
a form of "reverse preemption" since a "right to work" state may enforce its prohibition
on compulsory union membership or agency shop arrangements, even though such are
generally authorized by the NLRA. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Scher-
merhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 102 (1963). Finally, the federal statute regulating the internal
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presumption against preemption. An elaborate' and confusing5t2 body
of preemption doctrine arose from the case law pronouncements of
judges.5 13 To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, from the "sensible
acorn" of implied conflicts preemption grew the "mighty oak" of the
Supreme Court's labor law preemption jurisprudence. 5 4
This Article proposes a fundamental revision of this jurisprudence. As
Michael Gottesman stated in his leading article, rethinking this area of
the labor law, "I want to travel against the flow of traffic. . . contrary to
[the] prevailing wisdom." 515 But unlike Professor Gottesman, this
operations of unions-the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act--contains express "non-preemp-
tion" language allowing states to impose additional responsibilities and remedies with
respect to internal disputes between unions, union officers, and union members. The Lan-
drum-Griffin Act is known formally as the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"). See 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1988). The general non-preemption
provision is found at LMRDA § 603(a), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988). In addition, the stat-
ute's "Bill of Rights," for union members, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988), is not only enforce-
able by individuals in federal court, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1988), but also expressly preserves
"rights and remedies" of union members under state law. See 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1988).
511. Labor law preemption is "one of the more intricate structures of legal theory."
Gregory, supra note 508, at 514 (citations omitted). Felix Frankfurter once remarked
that labor law preemption involved a more "complicated and perceptive process than is
conveyed by the delusive phrase, 'ascertaining the intent of the legislature."' See San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, at 239-40 (1959).
512. "No legal issue in the field of collective bargaining has been presented to the
Supreme Court more frequently in the past thirty years than that of the preemption of
state law, and perhaps no other legal issue has been left in quite as much confusion."
Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 959.
513. "The core reality in [labor law] preemption doctrine is judicial policymaking in
the face of congressional silence, disguised by the cosmetic judicial 'divination of congres-
sional purpose' and 'fabrication of intent.'" Gregory, supra note 508, at 516-17 (citations
omitted).
514. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Labor law" concerns state regulation that touches the rela-
tionships of employees and unions, and unions and management. Sometimes the federal
labor relations statutes preempt state law that attempts to regulate this relationship.
Other times the federal labor relations statutes preempts state individual rights law. See
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13 (1985); International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620-23 (1958).
515. Gottesman, supra note 7, at 355. Gottesman's article argues that through the
1935 Wagner Act, Congress limited National Labor Relations Board remedies to equita-
ble relief because it wished to "commit [the Act's] enforcement to an administrative
agency that could bring specialized expertise to the eradication" of anti-union practices;
by so doing, Gottesman points out, Congress laid the groundwork for NLRB v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act against, among others, a Seventh Amendment attack. Gottesman, supra note 7, at
408. Thus, Gottesman argues, the decision to limit the National Labor Relation Board to
equitable relief "furnishes no justification for inferring an intent to preclude stronger rem-
edies in court actions under state law." Id at 408-09. At least one other author has
acknowledged the great "analytical power" of Gottesman's article. See Matthew W.
Finkin, Back to the Future of Labor Law, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1005, 1018 (1991)
[hereinafter Finkin, Back to the Future]; Matthew W. Finkin, Reflections on Labor Law
Scholarship and its Discontents The Reveries of Monsieur Verog, 46 U. Miami L. Rev.
1101, 1112-13, 1116-17 (1992) [hereinafter Finkin, Reflections].
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Article addresses labor law preemption doctrine in all its aspects-not
just those that may adversely affect unions.
A. The Politics and Pragmatic Aspects of Labor Law Preemption
The 1935 Wagner Act provided affirmative federal protection for labor
union activities, and quite naturally, early preemption cases often in-
volved attempted state restrictions on activities protected by the new fed-
eral law.5 16 Even after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which
forbids unfair labor practices by unions and recognizes the right of em-
ployees to refrain from concerted activities, unions continued to seek the
preemption shield against state regulation less hospitable to their activi-
ties than the now neutral federal labor laws. Leading academic voices-
among them Archibald Cox--called for a broad implied preemption doc-
trine lest federal policies fostering and protecting collective bargaining be
undercut by state-level enactments.5 1 7 In the Warren Court years, these
predilections dominated the Supreme Court's labor law preemption juris-
prudence.51 8 The constellation of labor unions, academic writers, and
516. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1951) (preemption of state law
limiting public utility strikes); International Union of UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454,
455-56 (1950) (preemption of state law requiring vote prior to strike); LaCrosse Tel.
Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18, 24-27 (1949) (preemption of
state board's certification of union as the collective bargaining representative); Hill v.
Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 539-42 (1945) (preemption of statute restricting
eligibility for union representative).
In the earlier preemption cases "unions generally argued for (while employers op-
posed) preemption of state authority. Consequently, courts and ultimately the Supreme
Court and the Justices individually seemed to be choosing not only between the merits of
state and federal regulation, but also between one interest or the other." Bernard D.
Meltzer & Stanley D. Henderson, Labor Law 731 (3d ed. 1985).
517. Over a period of thirty years, Archibald Cox wrote a series of articles on labor law
preemption. As Professor Gottesman noted in his own plea for "rethinking" some parts
of the doctrine, Professor Cox's writings "heavily influenced the Court's labor preemp-
tion jurisprudence." Gottesman, supra note 7, at 355 n.2. For a list of Cox's writings on
preemption, see supra note 265. Cox's work, as Professor Gottesman notes, appears to
have directly influenced several of the leading labor law preemption rulings. See Gottcs-
man, supra, note 7, at 389 n. 140. Other writers have acknowledged Cox's huge impact on
labor law in general. See Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law
Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 483, 487-93 (1981). Cox has frequently been
cited on labor law issues by the Supreme Court. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 n.6 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 405-06 & n. 16 (1952).
518. During this period, the Court asserted federal preemption over a variety of state
laws directed at collective bargaining relationships. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St.
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 282-85 (1971) (state law claim for discharge for
failure to pay union dues preempted although union failed to provide employee with
grace period required by union's own bylaws and employee's breach of bylaw claim did
not state unfair labor practices under federal labor law); Local 100, United Ass'n of Jour-
neymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 695-98 (1963) (preemption of state claim for union's
alleged arbitrary refusal to refer employee for job preempted); Local No. 207, Int'l Ass'n
of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) (preemption of state claim for conspir-
acy to deprive employee of foreman's job); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
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activist jurists who supported a broad preemptive reach for the federal
labor laws has had its effect. 519
As time passed, however, the politics of preemption under the NLRA
grew less clear. The Nixon-Burger and Reagan-Rehnquist years saw the
reemergence of several versions of a "New Federalism,"520 and a Court
less inclined to infer exclusive federal regulation from congressional si-
lence. As might be expected, the Court's labor law preemption decisions
in the 1970s tolerated more state regulation in labor disputes. 2'
As the 1980s unfolded, the individual rights revolution caused many
business interests and employee advocates to switch sides. Employees
now argued for narrow preemption so that state individual rights claims
could go forward, while employers argued for sanctuary behind the pre-
emptive shield.522 The preemption doctrine grew more and more
layered, straining under the political stresses.5 23 Increasingly, employees
359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959) (precluding state courts from awarding tort damages where
union picketing activities are arguably within the compass of §§ 7 & 8 of the NLRA).
Although Chief Justice Earl Warren retired before 1971, Lockridge is an example of
broad preemption under the Warren Court Garmon doctrine. See Cox, Labor Law, supra
note 39, at 968 n.1-2.
519. See Gottesman, supra note 7, at 390-91 ("There can be little doubt as to the per-
suasiveness of Cox' thinking to the Court."); see also Stone, supra note 79, at 1515-16.
520. See, eg., R. Michael Amyx, New Federalism: How Is It Working?, 15 Washburn
L.J. 229 (1976) (discussing the origins and legislative application of Nixon's "New Feder-
alism"); William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifiing Perspectives on
Federalism and The Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623 (1975) (examining impact of
Burger Court's favorable disposition to concurrent state-federal regulation on preemption
doctrine).
521. See, eg., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 198, 202-07 (1978) (state trespass claim against union's organizational pick-
eting which is arguably protected and/or prohibited by NLRA was not preempted);
Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302-06 (1977)
(dissident union members' state law claim against union for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, which included alleged discrimination in referrals from hiring hall, not
preempted).
Of course, the cases do not fall neatly into packets of cases representing the "Warren"
or the "Burger-Rehnquist" Courts. For example, an early erosion of the Garmon doc-
trine occurred in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), in
which the Court interpreted the Garmon "local interest" and "peripheral concern" ex-
ceptions broadly to uphold a defamation claim against a union where N. Y Times v. Sulli-
van "actual malice" was alleged. See id at 59-62. And Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971)-
the "'climax in the dominance of the federally protective approach' "-came early in
Chief Justice Burger's regime. See Gregory, supra note 508, at 533 (quoting Bratton,
supra note 520, at 652). This doctrinal ambivalence continued in the 1980s. See id.
522. See, eg., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406-10 (1988)
(employee's state law tort claim of retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation
claim can be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, and thus
is not preempted by § 301); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 206-08 (1985)
(considering employer's argument that § 301 of the LMRA preempts employee's state-
law tort action for bad faith delay in making disability benefit payments).
523. In 1980, Professor Cox described the preemption cases of the 1970s: "One per-
ceives little interest in logical consistency and less interest in building a coherent and
continuing body of law.... [The] Justices... are primarily pragmatists more concerned
with the immediate outcome than with building a coherent body of law." Cox, Develop-
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and unions have stood on opposite sides of the preemption divide.52 4
Now both employers and unions sometimes favor broad labor law pre-
emption, and individual rights claimants who are dependent on state law
remedies dissent. 52 5
B. Three Blind Mice: A Summary of the Existing Doctrines
Traditional labor law preemption doctrine includes three distinct
strands: (1) the Garmon doctrine,526 (2) the Machinists doctrine,52 and
the section 301 preemption doctrine.528 Under Garmon's primary
agency jurisdiction rationale,529 the NLRA preempts state regulation,
subject to exceptions, 530 when the conduct is arguably protected or
ments, supra note 265, at 300. Professor Cox's comment strikes an ironic chord in that he
also defended the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act-considered by some elements of labor to be
"slave labor" legislation-on the grounds that it set up a preemption shield for unions.
See id. at 277.
524. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 364-68 (1990) (upholding
union's argument that federal law preempts respondent's state based tort claim for
union's negligent inspection of workplace); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hech-
ler, 481 U.S. 851, 855-62 (1987) (upholding union petitioners argument that § 301
preempts employee's state based tort claims of union negligence).
525. For example, in the landmark section 301 preemption case, Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), separate briefs filed by the United States Chamber of
Commerce and AFL-CIO both supported the employer's preemption claim against the
employee. See 85 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1985).
526. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon
discusses preemption of state law regulation of conduct arguably protected or arguably
prohibited by the NLRB. See id. at 244-45. However, later cases substantially qualified
the doctrine and appear to have interposed a number of additional tests, including a
"balancing" test. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205-07 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 290-97 (1977).
527. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). Machinists discusses preemption of state law when Con-
gress, though neither protecting nor prohibiting the conduct involved, intended to allow
the "free play of economic forces" without state regulation. See id. at 140 (quoting
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
528. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Lucas Flour
discusses preemption of a state law claim arising out of a collective bargaining agreement.
See id. at 101-03.
529. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
530. Under Garmon, no preemption occurred, even for conduct arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA, if it involved "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling," id. at
244, or if the matter was "merely a peripheral concern" of the federal labor law. Id. at
243. The classic example of a "deeply rooted local concern" is the regulation of violence.
See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657 (1954). The "peripheral con-
cern" exception applies to the regulation of certain internal union conflicts such as the
expulsion of members. See Machinists, 356 U.S. at 621-23; see also Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (employee removed from job for
failure to pay union dues). However, the Garmon exceptions do not apply when the
conduct is actually protected by the Act. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 503 (1984) (no preemption of New Jersey statute requir-
ing registration of unions representing casino employees, and disqualifying union officers
with certain types of criminal records).
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prohibited by the NLRA.53' Even when conduct is neither arguably pro-
hibited nor protected by the NLRA, state regulation may nevertheless
suffer preemption under the second strand of labor law preemption, the
Machinists doctrine. This is because Congress in many instances affirma-
tively intended that private actors be left to the "free play of economic
forces" without state intervention.532 Finally, section 301 of the LMRA
preempts state law claims whenever resolution of the claim requires in-
terpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.5 33
Although this scheme may seem coherent to the uninitiated, applica-
tion of the Garmon, Machinists, and section 301 tests for preemption in
fact have resulted in a morass of exceptions, limitations, refinements, and
qualifications.134 Thus, under the now-modified Garmon doctrine, even
where conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, state
law claims may survive to regulate violence and mass picketing, 35 mali-
cious defamation,5 36 fraud and misrepresentation,5 37 trespass,5 38 and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 39 As a result, the rule in
Garmon "can now only be described by reference to its exceptions."'
Although, under Machinists, states cannot "interfere" with the "free play
531. As Professor Bryson observed 20 years ago, "[s]trictly speaking, the term primary
jurisdiction is not really applicable to the preemption cases at all.... The [agency]
jurisdiction is not so much primary as exclusive." Bryson, supra note 508, at 1039 n.8.
532. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144
(1971)).
533. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1988); Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). For a relatively brief and recent
summary of each of the three labor law preemption doctrines, see Lee Modjeska, Federal-
ism In Labor Relations-The Last Decade, Ohio St. L.J. 487, 488-93 (1989).
534. As Justice Brennan, a champion of broad preemption, conceded: "Pre-emption
cases in the labor law area are often difficult because we must decide the questions
presented without any clear guidance from Congress.... [Our] standards are by neces-
sity general ones which may not provide as much assistance as we would like in particular
cases." Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 523 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
535. See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958); UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 267-68 (1956); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657 (1954).
536. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61-67 (1966).
537. See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498.
538. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 200 (1978).
539. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977).
For dozens of "Garmon" preemption cases involving emotional distress claims, see Greg-
ory G. Sarno, Annotation, Pre-emption by National Labor Relations Act (29 U.CS.
§§ 151 et seq.), of Employee's State-Law Action for Infliction of Emotional Distress, 103
A.L.R. Fed. 798 (1991).
540. Gregory, supra note 508, at 507, 527 (1986) (quoting Bryson, supra note 531, at
1058). As Professor Gregory observed in 1986: "The litany of exceptions to Garmon, in
areas wholly removed from the well-established violence and local concern exceptions,
threatens to swallow the doctrine, and has compromised the practicality of its applica-
tion." Id Professor Gregory, contrary to this author's views, however, laments this ero-
sion. See id at 580-82. From another perspective, Professor Modjeska finds solace in the
cases: "In my view, the decisions reflect the same sensitive analysis of conflicting state-
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of economic forces," which operates as the NLRA's fundamental proce-
dural mechanism for resolving bargaining disputes,541 the states may
substantively command that state labor standards be met, thus effectively
limiting the area for bargaining. 542 Moreover, the states may influence
bargaining relationships by such devices as providing unemployment
benefits to strikers.5 43 The third type of labor law preemption, section
301 preemption, suffers both from doctrinal inadequacies and from the
mass confusion suffered by lower court judges forced to apply it to state
law individual rights claims. 5" All three strands of labor law
federal interests that has traditionally marked labor, if not all, preemption adjudication."
Modjeska, supra, note 533, at 506.
Doctrinally, two additional tests now lie superimposed on Garmon's original "arguably
prohibited/arguably protected" formulation. First, where conduct is "arguably prohib-
ited" by the NLRA, preemption arises only where the state and NLRB proceedings ad-
dress the "identical controversy." Thus in Sears, Roebuck the court acknowledged that a
state trespass action over union picketing was arguably violative of the limitations on
recognitional picketing in NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988), but nonetheless
was not preempted because the state action focused on the location rather than the pur-
pose of the union's picketing. See Sears, Roebuck, 436 U.S. at 198 & n.28; Gregory, supra
note 508, at 543. Second, the Court now apparently also balances the relative importance
of federal and state interests ad hoc, thus further obliterating any possibility of meaning-
ful results. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 214 n.9 (1985); Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 297 (1977). In distinguishing Gar-
mon preemption doctrine, the Court in Lueck notes that the latter doctrine now "requires
a balancing of state and federal interests." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 214 n.9; cf Building and
Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders and Contractors, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 1194-95
(1993) (the Court's most recent pronouncement on labor law preemption wherein Justice
Blackmun, for a unanimous Court, spends two paragraphs summarizing Garmon pre-
emption without making any mention of a balancing test superimposed on the traditional
Garmon formulation).
541. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614
(1986) (city preempted from conditioning renewal of taxi franchise as settlement of em-
ployer's dispute with drivers union); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41 & 140 n.4 (1976) (state preempted
from punishing a union's concerted refusal to work overtime even though slowdown
strikes are unprotected by federal labor law).
542. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1987) (state
mandatory severance pay statute not preempted); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-47 (1985) (no preemption of state law mandating mental
health benefits); cf Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295-97
(1959) (state antitrust law preempted where applied to union's proposal to limit rental
rates of non-unionized independent owner-drivers).
543. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 545-46
(1979) (no preemption of New York statute allowing unemployment benefits to strikers);
cf Baker v. General Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621, 638 (1986) (Michigan statute which
denies unemployment benefits to strikers who finance strike fund benefits through means
other than dues not preempted). Both these cases, however, rely largely on indications in
the Social Security Act that Congress intended to allow the states to grant or deny unem-
ployment benefits to strikers as a matter of state policy. See Baker, 478 U.S. at 632-33;
New York Tel., 440 U.S. at 537. Thus, although these cases provide precedent for the
view argued herein that in deciding labor preemption issues more generally, the Court
should consider the entire now-evolved complex system of federal statutes regulating the
employment relationship, rather than merely the narrower policies of the federal statutes
regulating labor management relations.
544. See Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan
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preemption continue to confound academic writers, judges, and lawyers
alike, and the individual rights revolution in employment law has greatly
exacerbated this situation. Not only are the federal collective bargaining
statutes conventionally thought to displace much state regulation of the
relationships between employers, unions, and employees but they are
now routinely invoked to displace state individual rights law as well.
As previously noted, the New Deal-era collective bargaining statutes
are silent as to whether federal labor relations rules are to be exclusive, or
should constitute an exercise of authority to be shared with the sister
sovereign states. The strong constitutionally-based presumption against
preemption suggests a regime of shared federal and state authority.
C. The Interpretational Perspective
1. The Garmon Doctrine-Arguably Protected or Arguably
Prohibited-Federal Remedy Scheme and
Primary Agency Jurisdiction
The Garmon doctrine, however, far exceeds the necessary preemptive
inference that arises from the protections or prohibitions of federal labor
laws. It exceeds the necessary preemptive inference in several distinct
ways: (1) state laws that supplement federal protections are preempted;
(2) state regulation of conduct that is only "arguably" protected by fed-
eral law is preempted; (3) state regulation of conduct prohibited by fed-
eral labor law is also preempted (even if the regulation complements
rather than conflicts with the federal legislation); and (4) state regulation
of conduct only arguably prohibited by federal labor law also stands pre-
empted. The basis for Garmon's broad preemptive sweep beyond the
narrow confines of strict conflict preemption rests upon two notions: (1)
that the federal labor laws embody carefully balanced policies that in-
clude carefully considered remedies, and (2) that the NLRB applies spe-
cial administrative expertise to questions that arise under the labor
relations statutes. As shown below, however, the statutory scheme as it
has evolved does not necessarily compel either of these rationales for
broad Garmon preemption.
Life Insurance." The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 Indus. Rel.
L.J. 596, 604-11 (1987); Jane B. Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedier
Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 41 Hastings
L.J. 1149, 1162-64 (1990); Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based
Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. Rev. 169 (1991); Stone, supra note 7, at 593-620; Nancy Abra-
ham, Comment, Section 301 Preemption and Its Effect on An Employee's State Rights,
1988 Det. C.L. Rev. 735, 756-63 (1988); Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need Fora New
Approach to Federal Preemption of Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 Yale L. 209,
214-25 (1989). Authors writing on this subject call for a variety of adjustments in section
301 doctrine. Some commentators, however, have been less critical. See John P. Hoe],
Note, Labor Arbitration and State Wrongful Discharge Actions: Due Process or Remedial
Double-Dipping?, 1989 J. Disp. Resol. 179, 197-98; Rebecca H. White, Section 301's Pre-
emption of State Law Claims: A Model for Analysis, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 377, 415-34 (1990);
infra part VII.C.3.
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The question of supplementing NLRB remedies with more stringent
state remedies for conduct prohibited by federal law, or for conduct that
interferes with federally protected rights, must first be considered.
Under the interpretational approach urged here, the states would be free
to supplement NLRB remedies for conduct prohibited or protected by
federal labor law. For example, a person fired for reasons of anti-union
discrimination, like persons fired for reasons of handicap, gender, age,
race, or other reasons violative of public policy, could pursue damages
remedies under state law. Similarly, a union that violates the secondary
boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act could be made to pay dam-
ages under state law.
In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court, in the years before Justice
Frankfurter's Garmon opinion, interpreted the New Deal labor legisla-
tion in precisely this manner. In 1958, the year before Garmon, every
participating jurist, except Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, de-
clared that "[t]here is nothing inconsistent in holding that an employee
may recover... damages in a tort action under state law, and also hold-
ing that the award of such damages is not necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Federal Act." '545 Nor was this an aberrant ruling. In
1954, the Court allowed an employer to recover state law compensatory
and punitive damages against a union whose conduct was also assumed
to have violated the unfair labor practice provisions of the federal labor
relations law. 46 Garmon accommodated these holdings through Justice
Frankfurter's devise of an exception, from the general Garmon rule of
preemption, for interests "deeply rooted" in local feeling (i.e., vio-
lence).5 47 During the pre-Garmon 1950s, however, a majority of the
Court based these earlier holdings on the principle that the limitation to
equitable relief under NLRB administrative procedures "does not mean
that Congress necessarily intended this discretionary relief to constitute
an exclusive pattern" of relief. 4 The Court stated that the federal labor
relations statute was "far from being an express grant of exclusive juris-
diction superseding common-law actions, by either an employer or an
employee, to recover damages caused by the tortious conduct of a
union."549
545. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 645 (1958).
546. See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657-69
(1954) (action based on threats of violence and other intimidation by minority union
which did not represent the plaintiff company's employees). But see Plankinton Packing
Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953, 953 (1950) (per curiam opin-
ion invalidating a state board order requiring an employer to reinstate an employee who
was discharged for exercising his right to refrain from union membership); Bernard D.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: I, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 6, 14 (1959) (discussing the Plankinton decision).
547. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 n.2 (1959).
548. Russell, 356 U.S. at 645.
549. Id. at 642; see also Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957) (af-
firming state court injunction of union's violence provoking picket line activities); UAW
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274 (1956) (upholding state au-
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Even in Gannon, no fewer than four Justices, led by Justice Harlan,
refused to join Justice Frankfurter's expansive formula for preemption.
These Justices, instead, concurred on the narrow ground that the union
picketing involved "may fairly be considered protected under the Taft-
Hartley Act, and that therefore state action is precluded .... Because
conflict is the touchstone of [labor law] preemption, such [protected pick-
eting] activity is obviously beyond the reach of all state power." '  These
four Justices also complained that Frankfurter's opinion "cuts deeply
into the ability of States to furnish an effective remedy under their own
laws for the redress of past nonviolent tortious conduct which is not fed-
erally protected, but which may be... federally prohibited." '' More-
over, they specifically rejected the attempt to rationalize the
aforementioned pre-Garmon cases as depending on the fact or threat of
violence.55 2
Thus, both Gannon's antecedents and a near-majority of the Garmon
Court itself found no preemption of state damages remedies merely be-
cause conduct was prohibited (much less arguably prohibited) and reme-
diable through the NLRA's scheme of administrative enforcement and
equitable remedies. Given the widespread allowance of co-existing state
law and federal administrative remedies in other areas of employment
law since Gannon, the Court's continued lip-service to its now outdated
rationale is puzzling, particularly given the newly revitalized presump-
tion against preemption.
Furthermore, apart from the question of whether states may supple-
ment NLRB remedies for conduct prohibited by the New Deal-era col-
lective bargaining statutes, under the interpretational approach urged
herein,553 the NLRB would be displaced as the exclusive forum for
resolving disputes over whether conduct fell within the protections or
prohibitions of federal law. While notions of primary agency jurisdiction
might still result in deferral of state jurisdiction pending the outcome of
NLRB proceedings, the time has passed when distrust of courts, even
state law courts, justifies a judicially-created preemption doctrine. More-
over, in the larger context of federal labor law, it is evident that state
court judges already are swimming in federal labor law: (1) state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to interpret and enforce collective bargain-
ing agreements under federal law,5 54 (2) state court judges must apply
thority in labor disputes under general law not directed to labor relations, in case involv-
ing mass picketing, destruction of ingress/egress, and coercion and threats against
employees desiring to work); Laburnum, 347 U.S. at 665 ("T]here is no ground for con-
cluding that.., liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated."); cf. Garner v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 501 (1953) ("Congress... can save...
supplemental state remedies by express terms, or... clear implication.. .
550. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 249-50.
551. d at 253.
552. See id at 250-52.
553. See supra parts IV.C, V.
554. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1962); Local 174,
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"one of the most intricate structures of legal theory" in deciding ques-
tions of preemption, 555 (3) state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
decide claims that the union has breached its duty of fair representation
to employees under the federal labor laws,556 and (4) state courts decide
questions of arbitrability and enforcement of arbitration awards under
the federal labor law. 5 7 It is merely an illusion to think that federal
labor law questions arise exclusively before the NLRB. In the absence of
more explicit congressional action, the Garmon doctrine should be
discarded.
Of course, to say that the sister sovereigns retain jurisdiction in labor
relations except when state regulation actually conflicts with federal
rights or prohibitions will merely redirect the judicial inquiry in many
cases. The courts and the NLRB must continue to elucidate what con-
duct is protected or condemned by federal labor law in order to know
whether specific state regulation is preempted. For example, Brown v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local
545 5 raised the question of whether the employees' right to form and
join organizations "of their own choosing" under section 7 of the
NLRA559 preempted a New Jersey statute that required unions repre-
senting casino employees to register with the state and submit to state
requirements for eligibility for office in such unions such as a ban on
certain felons."6 Thus the case presented the question of how far section
7 rights extended to preempt state regulation of corrupt practices.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Brown provides a model for the type of
analysis urged in this Article. Rather than mechanically repeating the
mantra of traditional labor law doctrine broadly construing employees'
section 7 rights under federal law,561 Justice O'Connor looked outside
the collective bargaining statutes to the broader landscape of other fed-
eral statutes regulating unions. Because the 1959 Landrum-Griffin
Act5 62 affirmatively regulated internal union affairs previously unregu-
lated by federal law, and because that Act also disqualified certain felons
from holding union office, the majority opinion5 63 found obsolete the
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101
(1962).
555. See supra notes 511-12.
556. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-81 (1967).
557. See infra note 696 and cases cited therein.
558. 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
559. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
560. See Brown, 468 U.S. at 494. Forty years earlier the Court had invalidated a Flor-
ida licensing statute for union business agent. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S.
538, 541-43 (1945).
561. For example, the section 7 right to select a collective bargaining agent includes
the right to select an individual rather than merely a union. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(4)
(1988); See Brown, 468 U.S. at 515 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
562. Most of the Landrum-Griffin Act is more formally known as the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
563. However, only three Justices joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Three justices
dissented, and two others took no part in the decision on the case. Additionally, even the
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notion that employee section 7 rights were absolute. Further, the Court
noted that the Landrum-Griffin Act expressly disclaimed general pre-
emption of state regulation over internal union affairs and answered the
NLRA preemption question in light of the policy of non-preemption an-
nounced in Landrum-Griffin."' Justice O'Connor's opinion therefore
looked at the precise issue presented-whether all state regulation of cor-
ruption in labor organizations representing casino employees was clearly
and manifestly preempted by section 7-in light of the overall system
manifested in all federal labor relations statutes, not just the one being
narrowly construed. This Article argues for an even broader inquiry into
the entire complex system of the American law of the workplace as mani-
fested in federal employment law statutes and traditional state regulation
taken as a whole. 65
2. Machinists Preemption
This branch of current Supreme Court labor law preemption doctrine,
unlike the Garmon doctrine, rests on a sound interpretational footing.
The substantive policies of federal labor law extend beyond outlawing
certain private conduct, or affirmatively protecting other conduct from
interference by private parties. In addition, "the NLRA prevents a State
from regulating within a protected zone... [including] a zone protected
and reserved for market freedom.1
5 66
The New Deal labor relations statutes leave a great deal to "self-help"
by the parties-a union may resort to unprotected slowdown strikes, for
example, and an employer may counter with firings of the slowdown
strikers-all without violation by either party of the NLRA. s6' Under
current law an employer may permanently replace economic strikers,568
but a union can properly insist on reinstatement of the strikers as a con-
dition of settlement even though the employer promised the permanent
majority noted that a state could cross the line into activities protected by the NLRA by
imposing sanctions, such as a ban on dues collection, that might unduly hamper the
union in carrying out its responsibilities as exclusive collective bargaining representative.
See Brown, 468 U.S. at 510-11.
564. See 468 U.S. at 505-06. LMRDA, § 603(a) provides: "Except as explicitly pro-
vided to the contrary, nothing in this chapter shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of
any labor organization or any officer... under any... laws of any State ...." 29 U.S.C.
§ 523 (1988).
565. It is striking that the FAA case, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), held that a
federal law, which upheld arbitration clauses, preempted a state law that allowed judicial
remedy even under a contract containing an arbitration clause. The case does not even
discuss the historic role of the states in the regulation of such claims, or the explicit policy
of the Fair Labor Standards Act not to preempt state law in this aspect of the employ-
ment relationship. The approach followed in Brown, 468 U.S. 491 (1984), is a superior
means for ascertaining any "clear and manifest" intent to preempt.
566. Building and Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113
S. Ct. 1190, 1196 (1993).
567. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 493-95 (1960).
568. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426, 433 (1989); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
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replacements jobs beyond the strike 69 Similarly, after bargaining in
good faith to impasse, an employer may unilaterally implement changes
in wages, hours, and working conditions that had been rejected by the
union,57° or lockout employees to force a settlement in many disputes. 7 '
These "free play" rights572 rest upon a familiar view of labor relations:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every [person] to get the most he [or she] can for his [or
her] services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his [or her] services for the least possible return. 573
The New Deal-era labor relations statutes took this premise and made
the "free play of economic forces" an integral part of the statutory
scheme.574
Whether one agrees or disagrees with any particular application of the
"free play of economic forces" doctrine, some conduct not remedial
through NLRB unfair labor practice procedures nonetheless finds pro-
tection under the NLRA. This conduct falls within a zone of self-help
rights affirmatively left to the parties. 575 Perhaps, as many argue, the
New Deal statutes, as interpreted by the courts, leave more self-help rem-
edies in the hands of employers than employees and unions.5 76 But given
the permissible range of self-help remedies left to labor and management,
preemption necessarily follows as a matter of conflicts doctrine whenever
a state attempts to restrict such self-help options affirmatively guaranteed
under the Act.
569. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503 (1983).
570. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 744-45, 745 n.12 (1962).
571. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1957).
572. "The Court ... recognized in pre-emption cases that Congress meant to leave
some activities unregulated and to be controlled by the free play of economic forces."
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 144 (1976).
573. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
574. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144
(1971)). This premise of the New Deal collective bargaining statutes is, however, under
attack. See, e.g., Crain, Images of Power, supra note 83, at 487-89, 498-510 (attacking
"patriarchal visions of power" as domination and contraband adversarial assumptions of
NLRA and proposing a communitarian model of power dispersion); Stone, supra note 7,
at 641-42 (suggesting a "nexus of contracts" model of expanded collected bargaining
with labor and employees viewed as one stakeholder in the corporate enterprise along
with customers, lenders, investors and managers); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Influen-
tial Myth of a Generalized Conflict of Interests Between Labor and Management, 81 Geo.
L.J. 39, 56-67, 70-76 (1992) (using microeconomic analysis to attack New Deal assump-
tion of inherent conflict between labor and management, and suggesting that the model of
inherent conflict applies primarily in industries and settings with high fixed costs wherein
organized labor "confiscates" a portion of fixed cost investments, to the detriment of
unorganized members of the working class, or "ex ante workers," not working in high
profit/high fixed cost plants).
575. See Lesnick, supra note 508, at 480 & n.53.
576. See James B. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law 35-43
(1983); Klare, supra note 77, at 266-67; Stone, supra note 79, at 1548-52; see generally
Weiler, supra note 10.
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The question in Machinists preemption cases therefore turns less on
preemption doctrine per se and more on the question of what range of
activity Congress meant to protect within the Act's "self-help" premises.
Like the Title VII preemption case, California Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra,57 the preemption issue in this context essentially turns
on the question of how properly to construe the substantive commands of
the federal statute, rather than any complex question revolving around
whether Congress meant such commands to be exclusive.5 7 If a federal
statute commands a particular self-help remedy under the NLRA, a par-
ticular standard for pregnancy-related leave under Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or a particular minimum wage under the
FLSA, state commands to the contrary necessarily and "manifestly"
conflict with the federal enactment. Properly viewed, these cases are pre-
emption cases only in the sense that judicial delineation of the commands
expressed in the positive law created by Congress necessarily also define
the point at which the constitutionally sound doctrine of "actual con-
flicts" preemption triggers. 9
Applying this analysis to the Court's Machinists preemption jurispru-
dence explains the cases. In the recent Boston Harbor case,5 0 the Court
held that an agency charged with cleaning up Boston Harbor could prop-
erly contract with "union only" contractors because the Act allows such
arrangements in the construction industry, and more generally allows
any buyer of labor to freely choose union labor. In the Boston Harbor
case the Water Resources Authority acted as a proprietor and market
participant. s58 However, when the City of Los Angeles attempted to
condition renewal of a taxicab license/franchise on settlement of a labor
dispute between the cab company and the union representing the cab
company's employees, the Court held that the city acted as a regulator,
and its exercise of its otherwise valid governmental powers interfered
with the free play of market forces in resolving a particular labor dis-
pute.58 2 Note that the right to resort to market forces under the New
Deal labor relations statutes does not carry immunity from traditional
577. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
578. In Guerra, for example, the same issue would have arisen from purely private, as
opposed to state-commanded action. That is, if a private employer voluntarily granted
preferential treatment for maternity as opposed to other disabilities, the same question of
interpretation under the PDA's "same as" language would have arisen.
579. The constitutionally based presumption against preemption is clearly and mani-
festly overcome when state regulation conflicts with rights, be they self-help rights or
other rights, protected by federal law.
580. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113 S.
Ct. 1190 (1993) [hereinafter Boston Harbor case].
581. See id at 1196.
582. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614-15
(1986). In a second round of the same dispute, the Court held Los Angeles liable in an
action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interference under color of law with rights
guaranteed by the "laws" of the United States-i.e., the labor relations statute. See
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 113 (1989).
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general police power regulation of the substantive terms and conditions
of employment. The history of the New Deal labor legislation, and refer-
ence to the larger system of law governing the workplace, indicate that
Congress did not intend to restrict such state regulation. In any event,
the presumption against preemption defeats such a claim.583
The application of this analysis does change the outcome of one deci-
sion. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor, & Human Relations v.
Gould Inc.584 involved a state law "debarring" recidivist unfair labor
practice offenders from doing business with the state.585 The Court held
that the prohibited prong of the Garmon preemption doctrine preempted
the state statute, and rejected the argument that Wisconsin was acting as
a market participant in deciding to refuse state business to a repeat unfair
labor practice offender.586
The Gould holding was correct under the traditional Garmon analysis.
The Wisconsin "debarment" statute definitely regulated conduct "argua-
bly prohibited by the NLRA." To the extent the case rests on a Machin-
ists "free play of market forces" analysis, however, it makes no sense. As
a market participant, a state should be free to choose not to do business
with firms that the NLRB finds guilty of multiple unfair labor practices.
Private entities, for example, General Motors or Microsoft, could law-
fully adopt such a policy. Given Boston Harbor,587 the state of Wiscon-
sin, if it made ad hoc decisions against utilizing the offender in deciding
upon each state contract, could also adopt this policy.588 Certainly, as an
interpretive matter, this state participation in the labor market does not
"clearly and manifestly" conflict with the NLRA or Congress' intent.
3. Section 301 Preemption
Section 301... preemption is the preemption doctrine most in need of
583. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756-57 (1985).
584. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
585. The Wisconsin statute barred firms found guilty by the NLRB of three unfair
labor practices within a five year period from eligibility for state contracts. See id. at 283-
84.
586. See id. at 289-91.
587. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113 S.
Ct. 1190 (1993).
588. Of course, in addition to Garmon, such state decisions, even if made ad hoc, might
violate other state law requirements, such as statutes requiring contracts to be awarded
on the basis of competitive bidding.
589. Section 301 preemption refers to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)).
Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
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revision. For twenty years the doctrine, quite properly, limited the appli-
cation of state law to claims for breach of collective bargaining agree-
ments. A uniform body of federal labor contract law was required to
avoid conflicting state and federal rules for the same contracts. 59° How-
ever, this labor law preemption doctrine "says nothing about the sub-
stance of what private parties may agree to in a labor contract."159'
While there may be instances in which the [New Deal labor relations
statute] pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the
law in question, section 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal
law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements,
and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to
workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the
interpretation of such agreements. 592
However, in a series of five cases beginning in 1985,1 93 the Supreme
Court began applying section 301 preemption doctrine to the many state
individual rights claims asserting non-contract rights.
Under now conventional section 301 preemption analysis, state law
claims are preempted only if "an application of state law.., requires the
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." 594 In Lingle V.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
590. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding
federal law controls over anything arising from § 301); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1964) (section 301 suits controlled by federal law even when brought in state
court); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (Court looked
to both federal court holdings and NLRB conclusions to determine federal law); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514 (1962) (Court accepts that federal courts
will differ on this issue).
591. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). "Nor is there any sug-
gestion that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation."
Id. at 211-12.
592. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1988).
593. See supra note 267.
594. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413. An exception exists where the interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement merely affects the damages or other relief to which an em-
ployee may be entitled. See iL at 413 n. 12.
Other cases, and some commentators, occasionally frame the test somewhat differently.
See, eg., Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying
§ 301 to preempt state claim based on alleged breach of grievance settlement agreement;
although asserting that § 301 preemption applies even when labor contract issues are not
presented, the court apparently did not realize that grievance settlement agreement be-
tween union and employer is a collective bargaining agreement, and that one must inter-
pret and apply it to decide whether a settlement agreement has been breached); Schlacter-
Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 442 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 301 preempted state law
claims concerning drug testing; despite dicta, court's holding rests squarely on proposi-
tion that in order to determine tort claims, conditions that prevail under CBA must be
considered); Stone, supra note 7, at 605-06, 616-18 (artificially distinguishing between
"contract-interpretation issues raised by the employer in defense" and contract issues
presented by claims that the collective bargaining agreement contains a waiver of the
asserted individual right); see also Stone, supra note 7, at 617-18 (arguing that Schlacter-
Jones extends § 301 to any "working conditions" that are within the scope of the collec-
tive bargaining agreements).
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Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc.,"' the Supreme Court rejected a sec-
tion 301 preemption attack on a state tort claim for retaliation against a
worker who filed a workers' compensation claim for workplace injury;5 96
the alleged wrong was grievable to arbitration under a clause requiring
"just cause" for discipline in the collective labor contract. In denying the
preemption claim, the Court explained that "even if dispute resolution
pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state
law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting
the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for sec-
tion 301 pre-emption purposes. '597 Lingle generally established symme-
try in the law of the workplace at two levels: (1) unionized workers were
generally to retain the same status-based rights under state law as non-
unionized employees, 98 and (2) state law individual rights and remedies
were to co-exist with collectively bargained remedies, just as individual
rights claims under federal statutes such as Title VII, the FLSA, the
595. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
596. After Lingle, many courts have rejected § 301 preemption claims in the retalia-
tion context. See Stone, supra note 7, at 608 & n.136. However, prior to Lingle some
lower courts held such claims preempted under § 301 and commentators divided on the
question. Compare Abraham, supra note 544, at 756-62 (arguing that state and federal
laws can be applied equally to all employees, without regard to union membership) and
Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance" The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 Indus. Rel. L.J. 596,
639-58 (1987) (generally arguing against such preemption) with Susan F. Kinyon & Josef
Rohlik, "Deflouring" Lucas Through Labored Characterizations: Tort Actions of Union-
ized Employees, 30 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 64 (1985) (arguing that "no identifiable policy
reason can be found why state interests should not yield to federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion in the area of traditionally arbitrated labor disputes") and Raymond L. Wheeler &
Kingsley R. Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 Indus.
Rel. L.J. 1, 33-43 (1986) (arguing for a balancing of federal and state interests, and non-
preemption only where the state acts pursuant to a clearly defined, narrowly tailored
public policy).
597. 486 U.S. at 409-10. In Lingle, the Seventh Circuit joined those favoring broad
§ 301 preemption of state tort claims raising the "same facts" as those that would be
presented in a grievance arbitration under a just cause, or other clause of a collective
bargaining agreement. See id. at 401, 408-10. Lingle followed the implications of Cater-
pillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 396 (1987), which held that a state law individual
contract claim was not removable to federal court, because "a plaintiff covered by a col-
lective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agree-
ment, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a
collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 396; see Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-10 & n. 10.
598. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-10. "For while there may be instances in which the
National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of
the law in question, § 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis
for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the substantive
rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend
upon the interpretation of such agreements." Id. at 408-90.
"This Court has, on numerous occasions, declined to hold that individual em-
ployees are, because of the availability of arbitration, [in a collective labor con-
tract], barred from bringing claims under federal statutes. . ..
[N]otwithstanding the strong policies encouraging arbitration, 'different consid-
erations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a
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FELA, and other federal enactments have long been held to co-exist with
remedies provided in collective bargaining contracts. 99
Despite its surface simplicity, the doctrine retains a schizophrenic as-
pect.' °° In the seminal 1985 case, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,6a1 the
Supreme Court preempted an action for breach of an insurer's covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.6" 2 The employee alleged that his employer
and the insurer purposefully, and in bad faith, harassed him by repeated
delays in processing his disability claims."03 The Court found that "[iln
extending the pre-emptive effect of section 301 beyond suits for breach of
contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent.., to pre-
empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obliga-
tions, independent of a labor contract."' Consequently, "state-law
rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agree-
ments, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of
private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements."6" 5 Because the col-
lective bargaining agreement in this case incorporated the disability in-
surance plan by reference,6" 6 the state tort claim was "inextricably
intertwined" with the terms of the labor contract, 607 and thus preempted
statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual work-
ers' "
Although our comments in Buell... referred to independent federal statu-
tory rights, we subsequently rejected a claim that federal labor law pre-empted a
state statute ....
Id at 411-12 (citations omitted); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,
19, 22 (1987) (in the event of a plant closure, state severance pay statute is not preempted
by NLRA or ERISA); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758
(1985) (state statute mandating that employee health plan include mental health benefits
not preempted by New Deal collective bargaining statutes; however, ERISA preempted
such state enactments to extent applied to self-insured employees).
599. See 486 U.S. at 411-13; see also Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,
566-67 (1987) (labor contract remedies don't foreclose Federal Employer Liability Act
remedies for employee injury); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984)
(remedies under a collective bargaining agreement do not foreclose remedies for civil
rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (remedies under collective bargaining agreement do not fore-
close FLSA remedies for minimum wage and overtime pay); Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (remedies under collective bargaining agreement do
not foreclose Title VII remedies for race discrimination).
600. See generally John J. Coleman, III, Muddy Watem" Allis-Chalmers and the Fed-
eral Policy Favoring Labor Arbitration, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 345 (1987) (tracing the
origins of arbitral preemption through its misapplication in the courts and evaluating the
impact of Allis-Chalmers on the development of the law).
601. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
602. See id at 216.
603. See id at 205.
604. Id at 212.
605. Id at 213.
606. See id at 204.
607. See id at 213. For commentary on Lueck, see supra notes 596, 600. Lingle Y.
Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc, 486 U.S. 399 (1988), confirmed that Lueck is still
good law. See id. at 405, 411. Lueck illustrates the alliance between "big business" and
"big labor" on some preemption issues. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 204-05. The National
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by federal law." 8 This would be the case even if the collective labor
agreement governing the claim of a unionized employee provided no re-
lief for actions for which employers of non-unionized employees would
be liable under state tort law.6° 9
The tension between Lingle and Lueck confounds lawyers and judges
as they struggle to apply the doctrine consistently. In 1991, the Ameri-
can Bar Association's ("ABA") Committee on Labor Arbitration and
the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements reported that the United
States courts of appeal often disagree on application of the Lingle-Lueck
analysis, and that the existing doctrine "leaves a great deal of room for
courts to find preemption whenever they want to find it." 610 After re-
viewing inconsistencies in the federal courts of appeal, the ABA Commit-
tee Report noted that the "district courts were no more illuminating than
the circuit courts on the issue of how far section 301 preemption
reaches.
6 11
The courts have also confessed bewilderment. As the Ninth Circuit
began one opinion:
With this case, we revisit the field of labor law by asking a familiar
question: Are an employee's claims, in this instance alleging assault
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, preempted
by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)?
Familiarity, however, has not bred facility. There is no sure route
through the thicket and, as we face this problem anew, we once again
must hack our way through the tangled and confusing interplay be-
tween federal and state law.612
In another recent case, the Fourth Circuit split four to three en banc.
The dissenting judges "disagree[d] fundamentally with the majority's
view of the way in which the preemption effect of section 301 upon state-
Chamber of Commerce and National AFL-CIO both filed amicus briefs supporting pre-
emption of the workers' state tort claim. See id. at 203 n.*; see also United Steelworkers
v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1990) (preemption by federal law cannot be avoided by
characterizing the union's performance as a state law tort).
608. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218.
609. See id. at 215-16. Lueck also illustrates how hydra-headed labor law preemption
doctrine has become: courts frequently disagree about which doctrine applies to a partic-
ular set of facts. Thus, in Lueck, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the em-
ployee's state tort claim was preempted under the Garmon prong of labor law preemption
for activities arguably prohibited by the NLRA. See id. at 206 & n.3. But the Supreme
Court held that the state claim was preempted under section 301. See id. at 220-21.
610. Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 7 Lab. Law.
747, 755 (1991).
611. Id. at 758.
612. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Livadas v. Aubry, 943
F.2d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.) (dissenting judge accuses majority of "divining some preemp-
tive corona around the federal labor laws"), amended, 987 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1991);
Singh v. Trustees of Estate of Lunalilo, 779 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (D. Haw. 1991)
(federal district court judge complains of difficulty in reconciling "dozens, if not hun-
dreds" of § 301 cases).
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law tort claims is to be analyzed."6 3 This Article now reviews the lan-
guage of section 301 and the interpretative principles developed earlier.
On its face, section 301 is a jurisdictional statute. Section 301(a) of the
LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organ-
ization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.6 14
Yet the entire federal common law of labor contracts-from the Steel-
workers Trilogy 615 to the Boys Markets6 6 rule to the Misco617 public pol-
icy doctrine to section 301 preemption doctrine-sits atop this statute. 618
Section 301, far from constituting a clear and manifest declaration of
congressional intent to displace state authority, was not even an express
authorization for the fashioning of federal rules in this area.619
613. McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1991) (Phil-
lips, J., dissenting), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992).
614. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
615. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The "Trilogy" announced
strong presumptions in favor of the arbitrability of collective contract claims, and in favor
of the enforcement of arbitration awards. See American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568; Warrior &
Gulf, 363 U.S. at 585; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596.
616. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Boys
Markets held that "no strike" clauses were specifically enforceable notwithstanding the
Norris-La Guardia Act's broad policy barring injunctions in labor disputes. See id. at
254-55.
617. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In Misco, the
Court upheld an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee who apparently was smoking
and dealing marijuana, see id at 36, but generally confirmed a public policy exception to
the enforcement of arbitration awards, see id at 42-45.
618. Although the Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1957) (interpreting § 301 as a substantive grant of authority
to the federal courts to fashion a uniform body of federal labor law in construing and
applying collective labor contracts), is not the subject of this Article, it is worth noting
that this expansive reading was both controversial at the time, and arguably necessary to
uphold the constitutionality of the statute. See generally Donald H. Wollett & Harry H.
Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 445 (1955).
Felix Frankfurter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills, thought § 301 a "plainly procedural" stat-
ute, and declared that the majority was "attributing to the section an occult content" in
"transmut[ing it] into a mandate to the federal courts to fashion a whole body of substan-
tive federal law appropriate for the complicated and touchy problems raised by collective
bargaining." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 461 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Two concur-
ring Justices agreed with Justice Frankfurter that the statute conferred no right to apply
substantive federal law. See id at 459-60 (Burton, J., and Harlan, J., concurring in the
result). Because Justice Black took no part in the decision, see id. at 459, a bare majority
of the Court adopted the Lincoln Mills doctrine.
619. For contemporaneous comment on Lincoln Mills, see Alexander M. Bickel &
Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process." The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957).
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In addition, the legislative history of section 301 is devoid of any nec-
essary preemptive intent with respect to non-contract state claims. For
example, as the Senate Report states somewhat ambiguously, "the ag-
grieved party should.., have a right of action in the Federal courts....
The laws of many States make it difficult to sue effectively and to recover
a judgement against an unincorporated labor union. '6
As noted previously, however, a preemptive intent need not be ex-
pressly stated in the words of a statute or in its legislative history. 62 '
Implied conflicts preemption theory, upon which labor law preemption
rests, assumes preemption whenever state authority conflicts with the
substantive commands of the federal statute.6 22 In Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour,6 23 the Supreme Court, consistent with its holding in the
famous Lincoln Mills case,624 announced that substantive federal labor
law was to be the exclusive body of law applied to collective bargaining
agreements. 625 "The possibility that individual contract terms might
have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably ex-
ert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration
of collective agreements. ' 626 A few years later, the Court held that not
only does Lincoln Mills control the application of federal law in section
301 suits, but also that a state court suit to enforce a "no strike clause"
was removable to federal court. 62 7 As later cases explained, section 301
had extraordinary "preemptive force ... so powerful [for removal pur-
poses] as to displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' ,628 But from
these sound principles, the law took a wrong turn in the Lingle-Lueck
extension of section 301 to contract claim preemption of state law tort
and statutory individual rights claims.
The key to understanding the source of this now-obvious interpreta-
tional error is to realize that the 1962 Lucas Flour62 9 case (upon which
the Lingle-Lueck doctrine ultimately rests) did not displace state court
authority to decide issues under a collective labor contract. Indeed Lu-
cas Flour concerned a state court proceeding that the Supreme Court
620. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 15 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 421 (1985).
621. See supra part V.C.
622. See supra notes 516-22, 536-44 and accompanying notes.
623. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
624. See supra note 618.
625. See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
626. Id.
627. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560
(1968).
628. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23
(1983); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987); Caterpillar Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987).
629. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); infra notes 630,
696.
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affirmed.63° That same year, the Court expressly upheld concurrent state
court jurisdiction to enforce labor agreements under section 301;631
when individual rights claims flooded into the courts a generation later,
there was thus no problem of institutional competence in allowing state
court judges to interpret and apply collective labor agreements. Nor is
any issue concerning the primary agency jurisdiction of the NLRB in-
volved in section 301 preemption doctrine. 632 Therefore, the Court
needed only to require courts to decide state law individual rights claims
in a manner consistent with the federal common law of labor contracts-
a body of common law long entrusted to the state courts. However, the
Court instead extended traditional section 301 contract claim preemption
to state law statutory and tort claims that require the interpretation of
collective bargaining contracts.
Quite simply, as has happened before in the field of labor law, the
Supreme Court mesmerized itself.633 The long-shining bright light of
grievance-arbitration dazzled the court, perhaps made more blinding by
the joint position of the national AFL-CIO and National Chamber of
Commerce in Allis-Chalmers.6 34 But as Justice Stewart stated in another
famous section 301 decision, wisdom need not be rejected "merely be-
cause it comes late.' '6 35 A much simpler solution exists to the problems
that understandably confounded the court.
Section 301 preemption of state law individual non-contract claims
should be abrogated. In its place, the Court, pursuant to its Lincoln
Mills authority to fashion a uniform federal law of collective labor con-
tracts, should adopt the following rule: any state individual rights claim
asserted by either party which raises issues of collective bargaining agree-
ment interpretation should be submitted to arbitration pendente lite for
630. Lucas Flour involved an employer's Washington state court action for damages
after a union struck over a contested firing rather than seek grievance arbitration as pro-
vided in the labor agreement. See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 97-98. The state courts
awarded damages, though the collective agreement contained no express no-strike clause.
See id. The Supreme Court found this proper, under federal Lincoln Mills contract law
because a promise to arbitrate disputes necessarily implied an undertaking not to strike
over disputes. See id. at 105-06.
631. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962). In Charles
Dowd, the Court held that the state courts must apply the federal law of labor contracts
developed under Lincoln Mills. See id at 507-09, 514.
632. See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173 (1990); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962).
633. See, ag., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Em-
ployees, 481 U.S. 429, 453 (1987) (" 'Th[e] judge-made law of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries was based on self-mesmerized views of economic and social theory... and on
statutory misconstruction.' ") (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 382 (1969)).
634. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), the AFL-CIO and the
National Chamber of Commerce both filed amicus briefs supporting the claims for pre-
emption. See 85 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1985) (listing appearances of counsel); supra note 525
and accompanying text.
635. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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resolution of the collective contract issue.636 Once the arbitrator resolves
interpretational issues, the federal or state court should resolve the state
law non-contract individual rights claim based upon the arbitration
ruling.
This re-interpretation of section 301 would reconcile its preemption
doctrine with the presumption against preemption. It would protect
both the state individual rights claims of unionized employees and the
rights and interests of employers and unions in having their labor con-
tract interpreted and applied by an experienced labor arbitrator. It
would more appropriately preserve the prerogatives of the states to apply
their substantive law even-handedly to the claims of unionized and non-
unionized employees alike. Such a revision would rationalize this area of
labor law within the broader framework of general employment law pre-
emption and, indeed, the emerging framework for deciding preemption
issues in areas outside labor and employment law.
D. The Policy or Normative Perspective on Labor Law Preemption
This Article argues that current labor law doctrine, particularly the
Garmon primary agency jurisdiction doctrine and section 301 preemp-
tion as applied to non-contract state claims, violates now generally set-
tled interpretive principles for deciding issues of shared federal-state
authority, and represents inappropriate judicial tampering with the con-
stitutionally presumed division of powers. However, this Article now
considers whether current doctrine is supportable from a policy, as op-
posed to an interpretational, perspective. Viewed from this perspective,
the question might be asked: Should Congress act to preserve the broad
preemptive reach of the labor relations statutes? The policy analysis con-
firms that current federal preemption doctrine unnecessarily and
harmfully restricts the authority of the sister sovereigns.
1. The NLRB's Primary Agency Jurisdiction
Two related policy rationales underlie the Garmon 6 37 doctrine's pri-
mary agency jurisdiction rationale for federal preemption: (1) the inter-
est in uniformity and (2) the expertise of the National Labor Relations
Board in shaping a uniform federal labor relations policy. Neither re-
tains its former force in light of larger developments in the American law
of the workplace.
This Article turns first to the expertise argument. The New Deal-era
labor legislation, like much New Deal social legislation, placed an
636. Not only has the court's authority under Lincoln Mills been utilized to fashion
current § 301 preemption doctrine, but Lincoln Mills supported the judicial amendment
of the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act in Boys Markets and its progeny. The
proposed modification of the judge-made Lincoln Mills law of federal labor contracts
represents a far less intrusive incursion into prerogatives established in the Constitution
and state law.
637. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
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inordinate amount of confidence in an administrative agency, the NLRB,
to flesh out and operationalize the general policies of the Wagner Act.
But the general faith in administrative agencies, particularly in the "com-
mand and control" model, has waned.6 38 Moreover, the courts routinely
overrule the NLRB on questions of labor policy.639
For a variety of reasons, the courts have played a far more significant
role than the Act's drafters contemplated. The courts have used the
enforcement process to incorporate into the NLRA their own visions
of desirable labor relations policies, rejecting with regularity the
Board's legal conclusions, its policy determinations and its findings of
fact.
64 o
To a degree, the NLRB, with its constantly shifting doctrines depending
on the federal political administration, has fueled this disdain for follow-
ing the board's "expertise." 641 On many issues the expertise of the
NLRB in prior cases can be invoked on both sides of the policy divide.6'
Moreover, board processes-no right to hearing, limited enforcement
staff, no subpoena power or cross-examination unless a hearing is held,
limited relief, long delays-severely limit the utility of unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings to enforce the Act.6" 3 Quite simply, the thrill of a labor
relations policy made by the NLRB is gone.
The uniformity rationale fares no better. Preliminarily, there is little
"uniformity" in the present system. The NLRB refuses to be bound,
other than in the particular case at hand, by the labor law rulings of the
lower federal courts. Clients wanting to know what the legal rules are
must sometimes be advised that the NLRB has one rule, the relevant
federal court of appeal another, and other circuit courts, and perhaps
ultimately the Supreme Court, still another.6 "
638. See William Funk, Free Market Environmentalism: Wonder Drug or Snake Oil?,
15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 511, 512 (1992).
639. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 849-50 (1992) (holding that the
NLRB erred in concluding that management's labor practices were unfair).
640. See Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 112-13 (depending on whether elements of
law are involved in the issues under review, the Court has freely exercised its own judg-
ment); Getman & Pogrebin, supra note 39, at 7-8; cf. Ursula M. McDonnell, Note, Defer.
ence to NLRB Adjudicatory Decision Making: Has Judicial Review Become Meaningless?,
58 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 653, 687 (1989) (concluding that the inconsistency in the law of
labor-management relations results from both the great degree of court deference to
NLRB decisions, and the NLRB's failure to commit itself to a single position on a given
issue through the use of rule-making).
641. See, e.g., Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 1982 WL 23832, No. 18-RC-11713
(N.L.R.B. Aug. 4, 1982) (summarizing doctrinal shifts back and forth, through boards
appointed by four presidents, on how lying in NLRB-sponsored bargaining elections
would be handled).
642. See Getman & Pogrebin, supra note 39, at 6-7.
643. See, eg., Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 261-71; Paul Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 351 (1984).
644. The NLRB, of course, honors Court of Appeals decisions in particular cases, but
declines to give them controlling precedential effect even in subsequent cases arising in
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More fundamentally as a policy issue, the states already retain an im-
portant role in many aspects of labor relations under current law. First,
under current preemption doctrine, for example, state tort law may be
applied to union and management activities involving violence, threats,
blockages, trespass, defamation, fraud, the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and other tortious conduct in labor disputes."4' Indeed
one reason the courts have struggled to define a consistent and principled
basis for preemption doctrine is that many labor relations activities inter-
twine with such traditional areas of state concern and are not easily sepa-
rable. Second, the states remain free to legislate substantive standards
which labor unions and employers must include in their bargains. For
example, a state requirement for medical insurance for all employees or
state-mandated severance pay escapes preemption under existing law. 6
Third, even under the federal labor relations statutes, the states are free
to decide upon a basic issue in any labor relations policy-whether mem-
bership or financial support of a union bargaining agent may be com-
pelled. Under the "right-to-work" laws authorized by section 14-B of
the Taft-Hartley Act,6 4 7 the states may adopt laws that displace the
rights that unions would otherwise have against "free riders" under fed-
eral labor law."4 Many of the states in the American South, Southwest,
Plains, and Rocky Mountains areas operate under such laws now deeply
imbedded in local culture." 9 Not surprisingly, the percentage of unioni-
zation in the right-to-work states remains, on average, less than half the
percentage of unionization in states that follow the federal rule of com-
pulsory in-lieu-of-dues payments by non-members. 650 Arguments for a
uniform federal labor law fashioned with the administrative expertise of
the NLRB.must confront the reality that the NLRA leaves an issue basic
to any regime of collective labor relations to state control.
Finally, in several important areas of labor law, state courts have long
enforced important legal obligations. For example, collective bargaining
agreements or agreements to arbitrate may be enforced in state courts. 65
For more than thirty years state courts have applied and followed the
the same circuit. The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals frequently disagree with
each other on NLRA issues. See Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 12-13.
645. See supra note 535-39 and accompanying text.
646. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 14, 16, 18 (1987); Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746 (1985).
647. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1980). As of 1991, twenty-one states, chiefly in the South and
Midwest farm states, have adopted "right to work" legislation. See Cox, Labor Law,
supra note 39, at 1117.
648. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988); Abood v. De-
troit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
649. See Walter E. Oberer et al., Labor Law: Collective Bargaining in a Free Society
773 (3d ed. 1986).
650. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 70, at 243; Weiler, supra note 45.
651. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 & n.9 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).
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uniform federal labor law of contracts authorized by the Lincoln Mills652
case. Additionally, state courts, again applying federal labor law, have
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear and decide claims
against unions for violating the duty of fair representation to employ-
ees. 6 3 Finally, the states continue to play a role in the regulation of
internal union affairs.654
These matters of labor relations law extend far beyond the merely pe-
ripheral or interstitial aspects of labor relations. Rather these aspects-
tort law restrictions on labor activities, regulation of the substantive
terms of employment, the "right-to-work" issue, the enforcement of la-
bor contracts, the enforcement of the duty of fair representation, and the
regulation of internal union affairs-go to the heart of a system by which
employees bargain collectively for the terms of employment with their
employers. Claims that delicately balanced federal policies cannot be
disturbed by state action, or that the NLRB alone possesses the requisite
expertise to construe and elaborate on federal policies, must be weighed
in light of this wide-ranging role still given to the states in our federal
labor relations scheme.
From a broader perspective, one must consider the normative argu-
ments for exclusive NLRB regulation of labor-management relations in
context. Without massive upheaval in the structure of laws governing
the workplace, most aspects of employment law outside the labor rela-
tions context remain subject to state regulation.6 " This is true through-
out the broad range of workplace issues: from status discrimination and
sexual harassment, to workplace safety, to child labor and minimum
wage legislation, to privacy and family issues. Even in the employee ben-
efit plan area heavily regulated by ERISA, exceptions for domestic rela-
tions orders affecting pensions and for state insurance regulation leave a
major role for state level policy-making.65 6 The regulation of unions and
management in collective labor relations no longer dominates as the only
source of employee and employer rights and duties. Like the country
cottage gradually surrounded by urban development, the federal labor
laws are now but a small part of the landscape of employment law.65 7
652. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Under this
federal common law of labor contracts, the state courts, for example, routinely apply the
famous "Steelworkers Trilogy" presumptions in favor of arbitration. See United Steel-
workers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
653. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1967).
654. The 1959 "Landrum-Griffin Act," also known as the Labor Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988), contains an express
non-preemption provision. See LMRDA § 603, 29 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
655. See Silverstein, supra note 7, at 3.
656. See supra parts VI.B.1-2.
657. Even law school curricula, belatedly, are now changing. "Labor Law" courses
are giving way to courses in "Employment Law." See, eg., Estreicher & Harper, supra
note 164; Finkin, supra note 40; Rothstein, supra note 88. For a comparison of these
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Because employers operating within the United States already must con-
form their personnel practices to a wide variety of state level require-
ments, the arguments for strict uniformity in labor relations law are
substantially diminished.
Rather than using the NLRB's jurisdiction as a rationale for broad
preemption of state laws touching labor relations, a doctrine more suited
to the situation would simply be to defer state authority pending NLRB
adjudication of a dispute. As Professor Bryson pointed out twenty years
ago, as presently applied the NLRB's jurisdiction is not so much "pri-
mary," as it is "exclusive." 6 ' A proper application of the concept of
"primary" agency jurisdiction would merely require that disputes be de-
cided in the first instance by the NLRB, and not that the authority of the
sister sovereign states be supplanted altogether. Persons who believe fed-
eral labor law protects their conduct, or prohibits their adversary's con-
duct, may of course file a charge under the NLRB's unfair labor practice
procedures asserting that claim; where such a charge, or a complaint filed
by the NLRB Regional Director formally prosecuting such a charge, is
pending, the Act may easily be read, as indeed it is already, as displacing
a related state claim temporarily. 59
Indeed, experimentation at the state level may well be necessary to
breathe new life into the moribund condition of private-sector unioniza-
tion.66 For example, several writers agree that the states should be given
more freedom than has traditionally been the case in providing remedies
for anti-union discrimination within the well-established tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.6 61 Public sector unionization-
casebooks see Steven Howard Kropp, Rethinking the Labor and Employment Law Cur-
riculum: Legal Education's Belated Response to the Demise of Collective Bargaining and
the Rise of Individual Rights, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 433 (1991).
658. See Bryson, supra note 508, at 1039, n.8; 3 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, § 19.01 at 2-3 n.7 (1958).
659. This is essentially existing doctrine under Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 192-98 (1978) (holding that union that
fails to file unfair labor practice charge asserting that its picketing was protected under
the NLRA may not claim Garmon primary agency jurisdiction preemption in defense of
state court repass action).
660. One often senses that many employers assume the alternative to collective bar-
gaining is a return to individual employee-employer control of the terms of employment
or, in practical terms, control by the employer. However, the individual rights revolution
provides another alternative: direct governmental regulation through the political. Pres-
ently, the FLSA, Title VII, the ADEA, OSHA, ERISA, the Polygraph Act, WARN, the
ADA, etc. exist on the federal level, to say nothing of the far more pervasive system of
direct regulation at the state level. Professor Gottesman provides a relatively concise
summary of theories and arguments for and against individual contracts, collective con-
tracts, and direct governmental regulation. See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 2771-809.
If workers cannot effectively seek protections against sexual harassment, sudden plant
closings, or polygraphs, or benefits such as family leave and medical insurance coverage
of mental health, through the private-ordering techniques of collective bargaining, then
they will band together in voluntary associations not organized around the workplace,
and seek such protections and benefits in the political process.
661. See Finkin, Back to the Future, supra note 515 at 1018-19 (1991); Gottesman,
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the one area of substantial union growth during the past twenty-five
years-falls for the most part under the governance of state, not federal,
laws. The public sector experience cautions against any assumption that
the states cannot play a helpful role in revitalizing private-sector collec-
tive bargaining. 662
To be sure, proposals abound for the revitalization of the New Deal
collective bargaining system through reform at the federal level.6 3 Re-
gardless of whether any of these proposals are approved by Congress,
however, a greater role for labor relations by the states is an option that
should not be dismissed lightly. Certainly when viewing the larger evolv-
ing legal system that now governs the workplace, and the vital role his-
torically played by the states in that evolution, it is as easy to expect
wisdom in labor relations policy to originate at the state level as in Wash-
ington, D.C.
supra note 7, at 391-410; Alan Hyde, Endangered Species, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 456, 457
(1991) (reviewing Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and
Employment Law (1990)); Weiler, supra note 10, at 249 n.29. Professor Finkin, however,
appears to favor amendment of the NLRA to provide double or triple back pay, plus
attorneys' fees. See id.; cf Finkin, Reflections, supra note 515, at 1112-13 (1992) (ap-
plauding Gottesman's proposal).
662. See Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 616-
17 (1990) (reviewing Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor
and Employment Law (1990)).
663. Again, many voices from both the left and right seek, not the repeal, but the
"reform" of the New Deal labor relations statutes. The howls of labor leaders during the
early years of the "Reagan Board" still ring in this former union- side labor lawyer's ears.
See generally Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor
Board, 16 Rutgers L.J. 269 (1985). As Professor Modjeska described it, the Reagan
Board decisions represented "substantial deregulation" of employer conduct. See Mo-
djeska, supra note 53, at 131. Writing from the perspective of feminist jurisprudence, in
contrast, Professor Crain calls for restructuring
the current republican system of allocation, with its overlay of representation
and exclusivity predicated on both internal and external union hierarchies,
[which] reinforces and perpetuates the internal division and factionalization of
the labor movement[, which Crain would replace with] a communitarian struc-
ture, wherein multiple and overlapping communities of workers can cooperate
with one another in the process of direct action empowerment.
Crain, Images of Power, supra note 83, at 536.
Paul Weiler has proposed many reforms for more than a decade. See Paul Weiler &
Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace, 102 Yale L.J. 1907, 1916-20
(1993); Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 404-19 (1984); Paul Weiler, Promises To
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights To Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1769, 1804-22 (1983); see also Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, A New New Deal for
Labor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1993, at A-19 (proposing labor law reforms including some
advocated by Weiler). Perhaps most innovatively, Weiler also proposes a system of
mandatory worker councils in both unionized and nonunionized workplaces. See Weiler,
supra note 10, at 282-95. None of these ideas, however, was particularly new. See
Finkin, Back to the Future, supra note 515, at 1017. There is considerable reason to
doubt their political feasibility in the absence of widespread "industrial unrest." See
Hyde, supra note 43, at 388.
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2. Section 301 Preemption of State Statutory and Tort Claims
Unlike the Garmon and Machinists branches of labor law preemption
doctrine, section 301 preemption doctrine does not implicate the national
labor policy directly. Section 301 "says nothing about the substance of
what private parties may agree to in a labor contract." 6" Although the
Garmon and Machinists doctrines preempt state law based on the subject
matter in question, section 301 preemption ensures only that federal law
will be used to interpret collective bargaining agreements. 665 Further,
section 301 does not affect the substantive rights that states may provide
to workers when adjudication does not depend on the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements.666
The desire to protect arbitration as the federally preferred forum for
resolving disputes over collective bargaining agreements underlies the ex-
tension of traditional section 301 preemption doctrine667 to state law in-
dividual rights claims.66 s At the same time, the Supreme Court wanted
to preserve, insofar as possible, the individual rights claims of unionized
employees on a par with those of non-unionized employees. It would
stand the policy of the Wagner Act "on its head[,]" said the Court, to
hold that unionized employees with rights under collective labor con-
tracts automatically forfeited individual state law rights enjoyed by their
non-union brothers and sisters.669
The Supreme Court's solution in the Lingle-Lueck line of section 301
cases suffers both from over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness, how-
ever. The Lingle-Lueck test makes preemption turn on whether resolu-
tion of the state law individual rights claim requires interpretation or
application of some term of the collective bargaining agreement. Such
issues will typically be relevant in many cases which are commonly
thought not to be preempted by section 301.
In Lingle, for example, the state wrongful discharge action, based on
alleged retaliation for Ms. Lingle's filing of a workers' compensation
claim, ostensibly involved no issue of labor contract interpretation.670
However, in the absence of a "smoking gun" admission, as any trial law-
yer knows, to decide whether employees like Ms. Lingle suffered retalia-
tion, it may well be necessary to consider many issues requiring
interpretation of a labor contract-issues such as the normal contract
664. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1985) ("Nor is there any
suggestion that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation.").
665. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1988).
666. See id.
667. The traditional doctrine simply embodied the common sense notion that in con-
struing labor contracts negotiated under the federal labor laws, one body of contract law,
rather than fifty-one, should be applied.
668. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410-13; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-
20 (1985); White v. National Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 1991).
669. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
670. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408.
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practices in assignments, layoffs, and discipline of employees. Yet under
Lingle, a jury or judge may be called upon to consider the question of
motivation, very often proof depending on circumstantial evidence, with-
out any expert interpretation or application of the frequently complicated
and jargon-laden collective bargaining agreement.
In addition, state law status discrimination claims usually survive sec-
tion 301 preemption attacks.671 However, just as deciding the issue of
pretext in an alleged retaliation case may involve inquiry into practices
under a collective labor agreement, the labor contract may also be rele-
vant in deciding a status discrimination controversy. For example, disa-
bilities discrimination claims typically require reasonable
accommodation. In a unionized shop, determining what is reasonable
may depend, in part, upon the seniority, job bidding, and assignment
rights of the plaintiff and other employees-rights often defined in some
way in the union contract.672 Yet most disabilities claims escape section
301 preemption.673
From an employer's standpoint, consider the prospect of facing a state
court jury in a case where the employer asserts a particular accommoda-
tion is unreasonable based on complicated provisions in the union con-
tract, perhaps interpreted in the light of bargaining history, past practice,
the law of the shop, and industry practice. 674 On the other hand, no
preemption seems appropriate because labor law section 301 doctrine
should not be considered in a vacuum. Congress made clear in the fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes that the states retain joint au-
thority in the status discrimination area. Yet, present doctrine amounts
to an "all or nothing" approach: either the state claim falls to the pre-
emption axe, or it does not. The doctrine does not simultaneously pro-
tect the employee's individual rights claim and the employer's or union's
right to have the labor contract interpreted by an arbitrator.67
671. See Stone, supra note 7, at 609 n.138.
672. See Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to
Reasonably Accommodate Under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obliga-
tion?, 9 Lab. Law. 71 (1993).
673. See, e.g., Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1335 (6th Cir.) (holding that
discrimination and retaliation claims were not preempted by LMRA), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 992 (1989); Miller v. AT & T and Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that no § 301 state law handicap preemption claim under statute which required
reasonable accommodation even though assignment rights of employees were governed
by CBA). But see DesJardins v. Budd Co., 438 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that state handicap claim preempted by § 301).
674. On the construction of labor contracts see Cox, Labor Law, supra note 39, at 740-
75. As the Supreme Court made clear in Lingle, a central tenant of the Lingle-Lueck
preemption analysis is that "it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility
to interpret the labor contract in the first instance." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411 (1988).
675. Many other state claims besides status discrimination cases withstand the § 301
preemption analysis, even in unionized workplaces. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs Pension
Trust v. Wilson, 915 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that fraud in the inducement
claim against union not preempted), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992); Fox v. Parker
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Other state cases involving individual rights claims repeat this pattern.
For example, state law privacy claims676 and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims677 appear with increasing frequency in work-
place disputes. But when unionized employees bring such claims, at least
where a union contract is in effect, section 301 stands in their path; con-
versely, when such claims escape section 301 preemption, employers find
that bargained-for arbitration procedures are ignored. Workplace pri-
vacy claims often involve an examination of the reasonableness of the
employee's expectation of privacy.6 71 When those claims-for example,
a challenge to a drug testing requirement-arise in unionized workplaces
governed by the New Deal collective bargaining statutes, the courts usu-
ally hold them preempted under section 301.679 The Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning in Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc. 680 is typical. Under California law,
the right to privacy turns "in major part upon the parties' reasonable
expectations [that], of necessity, involve [an analysis of] the working con-
ditions agreed upon in the collective bargaining agreement." 68 Simi-
larly, workplace tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
by outrageous conduct often fail to overcome the section 301 preemption
hurdle in unionized workplaces. 682 Again, these courts typically reason
Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that tortious interference
claim not preempted); Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that defendant not party to collective bargaining agreement-no preemption of tor-
tious interference claim); Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir.
1989) (reviewing fraud claim in connection with exposure of workers to PCB's). Of
course, after Lingle, 486 U.S. 399, most courts have held that retaliation claims are not
preempted under § 301. See Stone, supra note 7, at 608 and n.136.
676. See Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); K-
Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
677. See Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 303-05 (5th Cir. 1989); Rulon-
Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Agis v. Howard
Johnson, Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976); Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 661
(Or. Ct. App. 1981).
678. See Julia T. Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-Mail: Protect-
ing Property or Personal Prying?, 8 Lab. Law. 923 (1992); W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).
679. See Schlacter-Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 442 (9th Cir. 1991); Stikes v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015
(1991); Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 120 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1107 (1989); Utility Workers, Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d
1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989); Strachan v. Union Oil
Co., 768 F.2d 703, 705 (5th Cir. 1985); Stone, supra, note 7, at 607.
680. 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990).
681. Id. at 1270; see also Jackson, 863 F.2d at 117 ("balancing ... the various factors
inherent in the situation" and noting that the employee's "claimed right to privacy is
enmeshed in the collective bargaining pact").
682. See, e.g., Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the portion of claim for refusal of light duty to employee, whose doctor
recommended it after she experienced abdominal pain during pregnancy was preempted);
Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 946 F.2d 1201, 1208-11 (6th Cir. 1991) (claiming that
information was improperly withheld in connection with negotiation of collective bar-
gaining agreement, preempted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992); McCormick v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 534-35 (4th Cir. 1991) (alleging careless dispo-
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that the "outrageous conduct" element of the tort cannot be determined
except by reference to the terms and conditions of employment estab-
lished in the collective labor agreement.68 3
The intentional infliction cases, however, go both ways. Several cases
hold that such claims can be resolved without reference to the union
contract.6 4 In Hanks v. General Motors Corp.,6" for example, the
Eighth Circuit found it possible to determine the element of "outrageous
conduct" without interpreting the union contract. 68 6 The employee
worked under a supervisor who had been arrested for allegedly sexually
assaulting the plaintiff's daughter, and the company failed or refused to
reassign the employee.68 7 While the case may have been a sympathetic
one, and while the court reached the correct result under the approach
suggested in this Article, the Hanks case illustrates the inadequacy of the
current doctrinal framework. It is simply not true that even such an
egregious case can be decided without considering the terms of the labor
contact. As the district court held, the contract addressed the assign-
ment rights of Hanks and was at least relevant on the question of whether
GM's conduct was outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional
distress.688
The poverty of present section 301 preemption doctrine is further illus-
trated by United Steelworkers v. Rawson.6 9 The families of miners killed
sal of work locker after discharge, preempted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992); Harris
v. Alumax Mills Prods. Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 402-03 (9th Cir.) (stating claim of discharge
was preempted without just cause), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 835 (1990); Douglas v. Ameri-
can Info. Technologies, Corp., 877 F.2d 565. 573-74 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating claim of
harassing conduct stemming from worker's disability was preempted).
683. See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 537; see generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation,
Pre-emption, by §301(a) of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.CS.
§ 185(a)), of Employee's State-Law Action for Infliction of Emotional Distress, 101 A.L.R.
Fed. 395, 409-10 (1991) (discussing how the rule providing employer-employee status
does not create special relationship relaxing outrageous requirements).
684. The following cases hold that claims for intentionally inflicted emotional distress
are not preempted, notwithstanding the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
that applied to the employee. See Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 899 F.2d
1473 (6th Cir. 1990); Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990);
Krashna v. Oliver Realty Inc., 895 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1990); O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887
F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1989). Professor Stone, who earlier in her article asserts that, "courts
have shown a strong tendency . . . to find unionized workers' state law claims pre-
empted," concedes later that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims "some-
times are preempted and sometimes are not[,]" acknowledging that these claims are
"particularly hard to distinguish from each other." Stone, supra note 7, at 605, 611, 613.
685. 906 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990).
686. See id. at 344.
687. See id at 342.
688. See Hanks v. General Motors, No. 87-0524-CV-W-5, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2811, at *9-10 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 1989), rev'd, 906 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990). Other
claims preempted under § 301 include wage claims, see Evans v. Einhorn, 855 F.2d 1245,
1246 (7th Cir. 1988), and fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, see Smith v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 765 (7th Cir. 1991); Dougherty v. AT&T Co., 902
F.2d 201, 202 (2nd Cir. 1990).
689. 495 U.S. 362 (1990); see Brian James Donahue, Note, Moving Toward a Clearer
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in a mine disaster brought negligence claims against a union, but their
claims were blocked by section 301. The survivors sued the miners'
union for alleged negligence in inspecting the mines as provided in a col-
lective bargaining agreement. The union inspections relied upon by the
now-dead miners had allegedly failed to notice that "the self-rescuers
were stored in boxes with padlocks or that the activating valves of the
oxygen-breathing-apparatuses were corroded shut. ' 690 The majority of
the Court held that section 301 barred the claim.
If the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with inspection, it
was a duty arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement....
Clearly, the enforcement of that agreement and the remedies for its
breach are matters governed by federal law. "[Q]uestions relating to
what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal conse-
quences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must
be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such ques-
tions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit
alleging liability in tort. '69 1
The reasoning in Rawson, however, is flawed for several reasons.692 As
the majority acknowledges in a later portion of the opinion, " 'a labor
union... may assume a responsibility towards employees by accepting a
duty of care through a contractual agreement.' ,693 The Court then itself
construed the agreement, and held that it did not "creat[e] rights directly
enforceable by the individual employees against the Union [because]...
the provisions . . . relied on . . . are not promises by the Union to the
employer [but] rather, concessions made by the employer to the Union, a
Standard for Federal Law Preemption of State-Law Claims Under § 301 of the LMRA:
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 121, 122
(1992).
690. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Rawson v. United
Steelworkers, 770 P.2d 794, 797 (Idaho 1988)).
691. Id. at 371 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)).
However, as the three dissenters pointed out, the Idaho Supreme Court, in upholding the
state law negligence claim, did not do so on the basis of any contractual interpretation,
but rather on the basis of the duty to inspect that "it is conceded the union undertook."
Id. at 378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America,
770 P.2d 794, 796 (Idaho 1988)). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopted as
the law of Idaho, an undertaking creates a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid
physical harm where reliance has been placed on the undertaking; thus, the miner's fami-
lies could have proven the negligence claim without reliance on the terms of the labor
contract. See id. at 377-79. For extensive discussion of the general problem presented in
cases like Rawson and Hechler, see Lorraine Schmall, Workplace Safety and the Union's
Duty After Lueck and Hechler, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 561 (1990).
692. Of course, unions do sometimes face tort liability for physical injuries which oc-
cur while business agents and other officers are attempting to carry out their responsibili-
ties. For example, if an employee and business agent get into an altercation over, say,
hiring hall practices, and the union officer assaults the employee, the union in certain
circumstances may be held liable. Neither unions nor their officers carry a general immu-
nity to tort liability. Nor should they. The same point could be made with respect to
strikeline violence cases.
693. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 374 (quoting Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851,
860 (1987)).
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limited surrender of the employer's exclusive authority over mine
safety."'6 94 This was entirely appropriate, for section 301 expresses a
"strong policy favoring judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining
contracts.,
695
This raises an interesting question: assuming that the Supreme Court
correctly interpreted the parties' intent in the Rawson contract, why was
the state tort claim deemed preempted as opposed to merely wrongly
decided? After all, state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to interpret
and apply labor contracts under section 30 1.696 If the Supreme Court,
rather than a labor arbitrator for example, properly construed the Raw-
son labor contract, applying uniform principles of federal labor law, why
then could the Idaho Supreme Court not do the same? To be sure, a
state court, or a lower federal court for that matter, might err in its con-
tract interpretation, or ignore applicable principles of the "uniform fed-
eral labor law" developed under Lincoln Mills. 697 However, that should
logically be an occasion for reversal on the merits, not preemption. Why
can state courts construe labor contracts in deciding contract claims, but
cannot construe labor contracts in deciding state law tort or statutory
claims?
6 98
To illustrate this latter point, suppose the Rawson labor contract
clearly was intended to create enforceable rights and a union duty to
inspect the mines with due care. Would the negligence claim of the min-
ers' families then become "unpreempted?" Nothing in the Lingle-Lueck
analysis, whether a labor contract must be interpreted or applied, sug-
gests any such notion.
This illustrates, as well, another problem with the Lingle-Lueck for-
mulation. Employers and unions may claim that the labor contract in-
cludes a waiver of the state individual rights claim.6 99 Because the union
694. Id at 374-75. In this portion of the opinion, the Court addressed an alternative
claim under § 301 that the miners and their survivors were third party beneficiaries of the
labor agreement.
695. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976)). Over thirty years ago, the court rejected
collective bargaining agreement enforcement by the NLRB even where conduct arguably
protected or prohibited by the NLRA was involved. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962).
696. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 (1962); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962). Of course, the state courts must
apply the uniform federal labor law authorized in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
697. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
698. A recent decision by Judge Posner illustrates this point. See Truck Drivers, Oil
Drivers, Filling Station and Platform Workers' Union Local 705 v. Schneider Tank
Lines, Inc., 958 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the necessity of a just-cause
clause in the collective bargaining agreement to obtain federal court jurisdiction).
699. This is true even if an employee's state law claim arises totally independently of
the labor contract, and even if the labor contract is irrelevant as an evidentiary matter to
the issues to be decided. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-
10 n.9 (1988); Stone, supra note 7, at 606; Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a
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contract must be interpreted to determine the issue of waiver, this appli-
cation of Lingle-Lueck threatens to preempt automatically even if in fact
a proper construction of the contract results in a finding of non-
waiver.7" Ironically, if such an independent state claim were brought in
state court, the defense of waiver would not provide a basis for removal
to a federal court, and the state court would have to decide the compli-
cated federal law preemption and waiver issues. 0
Not only does the Lingle-Lueck doctrine fail to preserve, in many situ-
ations, the state law individual rights claims of unionized employees on a
par with their non-unionized counterparts, the doctrine makes preemp-
tion turn on the fortuity of whether the union has a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer. This anomaly arises from the fact that
section 301 has no application where a union contract expires before
agreement on a successor contract, nor in the situation when first con-
tract bargaining continues.70 2 It does not make sense to say that, for
example, a claim of tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress
may be heard under state law when it is based on facts that occurred
while there was no labor contract, but not if the facts occurred while
there was a collective labor contract.
The policy rationales-and the interest of consistency in our employ-
ment law-point toward non-preemption. The concern for preserving
the primacy of labor arbitrators in construing labor contracts is valid-
but that can be accommodated by far less drastic measures than preemp-
tion. For example, a simple rule requiring arbitration of all questions
and issues arising under a collective bargaining agreement pendente lite
New Approach to Federal Preemption of Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 Yale L.J.
208, 218 (1989).
700. See Stone, supra note 7, at 606.
701. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-399 (1987); see also Lingle, 486
U.S. 399, 406 n.5 (1988) (summarizing Court's removal doctrine); see generally Thomas
Yamachika, The Law of Federal "Complete Preemption ": A New Brand of Federal-State
Conflict, 41 Lab. L.J. 337 (1990); Eric James Moss, Note, The Breadth of Complete Pre-
emption: Limiting the Doctrine to Its Roots, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1601 (1990).
702. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1989)
("[S]tate law claims based on an expired collective bargaining agreement are not pre-
empted by section 301."); Office and Professional Employees Ins. Trust Fund v. Laborers
Funds Admin., 783 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction based on expired collective bargaining agreement and expired
separate trust agreement). In these situations-where there is no collective labor contract
in effect-the rationale for § 301 preemption, the availability of arbitration to resolve
interpretational issues and the need for "uniform" interpretation of the labor contract
under federal law, simply does not exist.
Ironically, a recent Supreme Court decision, Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB,
111 S. Ct. 2215 (1991), limits the availability of grievance arbitration in the expired-
contract situation. Under Litton, the normal "Steelworkers' Trilogy" presumption in
favor of grievance arbitration expires with the contract except: (I) when the facts giving
rise to the grievance occurred before expiration, or (2) when rights accrued, or vested,
during the contract term. See id. at 2227; cf Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977) (presumption that grievance arbitration clause re-
mains in effect upon contract expiration).
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would suffice.70 3 Under such a rule, the parties to the labor contract
would receive the expert opinion for which they contracted, and union-
ized employees would receive an adjudication on the merits of their state
law individual rights claims based on the arbitrator's ruling. Both inter-
ests would be served and protected. Unionized employees would not find
themselves with fewer individual rights claims than their non-unionized
fellow employees, nor fewer rights than other unionized employees work-
ing without a labor contract. Whether employees should have so many
state law individual rights claims is a normatively debatable question.
Whether these rights as exist should apply equally to unionized employ-
ees and to non-unionized employees is not.
CONCLUSION
Although initially unnoticed, an overall and complicated system of
workplace law has evolved over the decades. Shared state and federal
authority is currently the rule. It is time to begin viewing employment
law preemption issues from this larger perspective. Moreover, employ-
ment law preemption doctrine should fit within the general framework
for deciding such issues in other areas of our economic and social life.
Lawyers and judges in the hustings can and do apply federal labor and
employment law with the same sophistication as lawyers and administra-
tive judges operating out of Washington, D.C. The New York Times
lands on our doorsteps each morning at 5:00 a.m. Lexis and Westlaw
office and home computer terminals give us access to most publications
and cases at the same instant as they are available in Washington or New
York or Los Angeles. It is time that labor and employment law too,
came into the post-modem age. Not all wise decisions emanate from cen-
tralized authority; indeed, history teaches that perhaps most do not.
703. Not only has the Court's authority under Lincoln Mills been utilized to fashion
current section 301 preemption doctrine, see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc,
486 U.S. 399, 403 (1988), but Lincoln Mills supported the judicial amendment of the
Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act in Boys Markets, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), and its
progeny. The proposed modification of the judge-made Lincoln Mills law of federal labor
contracts represents a far less intrusive incursion into prerogatives established in the Con-
stitution or federal statutory law.
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